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ixPREFACE
I first visited the Baban Rafi forest in August 1989, approximately two months after the
Baban Rafi Cooperative had held its first election of officers. At the time, Baban Rafi was
one of a small number of locations in the Sahel under consideration as the field research site
of the present study. The list of possible sites for this study was small, given that in the Sahel
the concept of socially oriented natural forestry management had only recently begun moving
into its implementation phase. I was lucky, though, to locate a site with the built-in
advantages of the Baban Rafi forest: (1) a committed effort was already under way in 1989
by CARE International in collaboration with the Nigerien
' government, further benefiting
from the technical support of the Cooperative League of the USA, to implement a natural
forestry management cooperative based on the principles of popular participation in natural
resource management and devolution of rights to profit from forest resource exploitation; (2)
the cooperative would have been in existence over a year prior to the commencement of field
research, during which time it was hoped that a group identity as well as organizational trends
and any accompanying problems would have become evident; (3) Baban Rafi is located in a
Hausaphone region (at the time I first visited the site, I was studying Hausa at Bayero
University, Kano, Nigeria, having already spent two years studying Hausa at the University
of Wisconsin-Madison); and (4) Niger had already built a solid record of research into and
support for the ideals of popular participation in natural resource management and
decentralization of property rights to resources.
Having identified Baban Rafi as a suitable site for the present study, I moved to Maradi
Department, of which the Baban Rafi forest occupies the southwest corner, in October 1990
and stayed until October 1991. The present document makes no attempt to describe the full
array of rewards I gained as a result of 12 months spent among the welcoming inhabitants
of Baban Rafi as well as the diverse populations of the departmental capital of Maradi and
the national capital of Niamey. In terms of research, however, if the rewards reaped over the
12 months are not evident in these pages, the flaw is certainly one of style and presentation
rather than the result of a fruitless search for meaningful data. As a consequence of an almost
shocking level of openness, tolerance, and helpfulness on the part of nearly all persons
encountered, field research conditions could be described as nearly ideal.
Perhaps the overriding impression I carried away from Niger in October 1991 is a deep
appreciation of the social and institutional complexities that may characterize societies
undergoing rapid transformation. But a dizzying social complexity (rendered ever more
resistant to superficial analysis by the speed with which social structures are being
transformed in response to changing economic and political conditions) must be sharply
* This study has adopted French usage as a means to distinguish the adjective derived from the country of
Niger, "Nigerien," from the adjective derived from the country of Nigeria, "Nigerian."
xidistinguished from social chaos, which might lead to very different conclusions. In sum, my
experience at Baban Rafi has left me even more committed than before to the principle of
popular participation as the appropriate guide to all facets of development. My conception of
popular participation, however, has been substantially modified in the process. In a word,
participation has lost the strictly "local" orientation with which I had earlier identified it.
While I would not dispute that participation may at times be enhanced through the definition
and enforcement of exclusive rights (e.g., property rights), it might also be expanded through
inclusive strategies directed toward a wide range of actors operating within an increasingly
interconnected economic and political system. Put another way, I have come to doubt whether
simply choosing the right team (whether of farmers, herders, small or large businessmen, or
the state) will, on its own, significantly advance the cause of development—however this
elusive term might be defined.
Field research for this project was funded by a grant from the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral
Dissertation Research Abroad program. Write-up was funded by a grant from the John D.
and Catherine T. MacArthur Scholars' program at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and
by the Land Tenure Center of the University of Wisconsin, where I worked as a research
assistant during a portion of the write-up period. In Niger I received guidance and/or
logistical support from the Institute for Research in Human Sciences (IRSH), the Ministry of
Water Works and the Environment, the American Cultural Center in Niamey, USAID/Niger,
CARE International-Niger, as well as representatives of a variety of government agencies and
private organizations. Of course, all views expressed in this document are my own and do
not necessarily reflect those of the sponsoring organizations.
[Ed.: This research paper is an edited version of Elbow's Ph.D. thesis, of the same
title, submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a doctoral degree in
Development Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1992.]
xiiChapter 1
DEVOLUTION AND IMPROVED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT:
Is THERE A LINK?
1.1 GENERAL 1NTRODUCTION
About three-quarters of the villagers and herders responding to a questionnaire on forest
resource use at Baban Rafi believe the region's forests will cease to exist by the year 2000.
Living memory affords ample precedent on which to base such a prediction. Local people
approaching middle-age and older recall similarly wooded regions elsewhere in Niger and
Northern Nigeria that have disappeared, and further recall that the local forest was once much
denser and used to harbor abundant wildlife. Periodic drought and a growing population are
commonly cited by local inhabitants as the crucial factors explaining the demise of the forests
of the Sahel.
However, upon further questioning of local inhabitants, drought generally emerges as a
supporting rather than a leading factor in the current process of environmental degradation.
In spite of the relatively high rainfall period that spanned the 1950s and most of the 1960s,
drought has long been viewed by the populations of the Sahel as a chronic condition.
Moreover, the uncertain climate of the Sahel is generally regarded as more threatening to
populations seeking to secure subsistence than as directly destructive of vegetation, thus
leaving the bulk of the blame for deteriorating natural resources to be assigned to human
activities. The environmentally taxing activities most often identified by the populations of
the Baban Rafi forest include the clearing of the forest for crop production, the use of the
forest for grazing and browse for livestock, and the harvest of fuelwood destined for market.
These three activities correspond to the forest resource user groups having the greatest
environmental impact on the area's resource base: farmers, herders, and fuelwood merchants
and consumers.
The population of the Sahel is growing at a rate of roughly 3 percent each year, yielding
a doubling of people in about 24 years. In other words, there are approximately twice as
many Sahelians in 1992 as there were in 1968 just prior to the onset of what might be termed
the modern age of drought. The consequences of such growth in terms of increased demands
placed on a fragile resource base are apparent.
An obvious question arises: Can institutions arise that are capable of reconciling growing
demands with limited supplies, and, if so, how? The first part of the question can only be
answered through demonstration, leading those who study the management of natural
resources in settings such as the Sahel to concentrate on the "how." At Baban Rafi, and
increasingly throughout the Sahel, a balance between supply and demand is thought to be2
attainable on the basis of an assumption that it will ultimately be the rational choice of local
populations to achieve such a balance, and, therefore, local populations must be allowed the
authority to decide how resources will be regulated and used as well as how benefits are to
be distributed. Since such authority is currently claimed by the state, the empowerment of
local populations through the granting of decision-making authority in the realm of natural
resource use and management is commonly considered to be a transfer of authority from the
state to civil society.
Such a transfer of authority is referred to in this study as "devolution," and its predicted
outcome remains largely hypothetical. One notes, for example, that the prediction of a
number of developmentalists and natural resource managers (that devolution might preserve
the ecological health of the forest) assumes that the set of conditions responsible for the
prediction of local residents (that the forest is on the road to extinction) may be significantly
transformed. This study is motivated by the suspicion that this assumption of the "devolution-
ists" has yet to be adequately analyzed or explored.
While the transformation of conditions leading to degradation are obviously essential to
the long-term ecological health of forests such as the one at Baban Rafi, strategies unleashed
toward this end may or may not lend themselves to generic formulas such as devolution.
Perhaps the most promising avenue toward illumination of these considerations is through
theoretically informed, in-depth examination of individual sites. The present document is a
record of one such examination.
This paper is divided into six chapters. The first chapter introduces the central issue under
investigation (the hypothesized relation between devolution and sustainable exploitation of
natural resources) and briefly situates the issue within its physical and intellectual contexts.
This chapter also provides a discussion of the research methodology employed in the course
of the investigation. A special appendix (see Annex 1) is judged necessary as a result of the
interdisciplinary nature of the inquiry. This appendix features a list of definitions of terms
relevant to the present study but whose meanings may be nonstandardized or confusing across
disciplines.
Chapters 2 and 3 constitute a unit compiling a broad composite of social and (to a lesser
degree) physical traits relevant to locally prevailing resource exploitation practices and
patterns. Thus chapter 2 consists of a detailed physical and social profile of the site of Baban
Rafi, while chapter 3 focuses on past and present resource use and tenure systems.
Chapters 4 and 5 address the broad institutional issues that, it is argued, will substantially
determine the potential for success of policies based on devolution of forest resource use and
management rights. Such issues include present and past legislation and policy, the nature and
strength of state structures, state-civil society relations, social structures and organization,
intercultural relations, and markets. Chapter 4 describes the institutional and policy
environment from a national perspective, while chapter 5 investigates the composition and
impact of institutions at the site of Baban Rafi.3
Chapter 6 summarizes the findings and states the conclusions of the study. This chapter
comments especially on policy issues and warns of the potential dangers inherent in the
uncritical translation of theory into policy.
1.2 RESEARCH AGENDA
1.2.1 PEOPLE-CENTERED FORESTRY AND DEVOLUTION
On an international level, the search for solutions to continuing resource degradation in
the Sahel and elsewhere has been moving in a defined and generally agreed upon direction.
A consensus has emerged among representatives of international aid agencies and experts in
development with an interest in natural resource management that the physical problem of
resource degradation—particularly in forest environments—can be solved only through the
application of social solutions. This understanding has been especially evident since the
United Nations Conference on Desertification was held in Nairobi in 1977, followed by the
World Forestry Conference convened in Jakarta in 1978. The new approach to forestry has
been heralded as "Forestry for the People" (Noronha and Spears 1985, p. 227). Terms such
as "social forestry" and "community forestry"' have since come to be commonplace in the
planning of donor-sponsored forestry projects throughout the world, and recipient country
national policies are sometimes adjusted to reflect the new emphasis.
Nevertheless, people-centered forestry remains new and largely untested as an
international development initiative, and it remains exceedingly broadly defined. There is a
need to understand better the way in which the initiatives are being defined and implemented
at specific sites, along with the way in which people are responding or might be predisposed
to respond. In particular, one needs constantly to question, preferably armed with empirical
evidence, whether one or another particular definition of people-centered forestry is effective
or potentially effective in achieving its central objective—the attainment of sustainability in
the use of forest resources in conjunction with the satisfaction of local development needs.
The present study is intended as a contribution toward answering this question. The definition
of people-centered forestry adopted for this purpose is embodied in the concept of devolution.
In the context of the present study, devolution
2 takes on a somewhat specialized meaning.
A conventional understanding of the word
3 considers the term within the context of the
balance of power between local and central government. Devolution is used in the present
1. While some observers and practitioners tend to lump these terms (as well as such phrases as farm forestry
or even agroforestry) together as interchangeable components of the same general strategy toward reforestation
through popular participation, others insist on technical distinctions between the meanings of the terminology
(see annex 1).
2. For a fuller discussion of "devolution," refer to annex 1.
3. See, for example, Bryant and White (1982, "Decentralization and Coordination," pp. 177ft); and Henry
Maddick, Democracy, Decentralization and Development (London: Asia Publishing House, 1963), cited in
Sherwood (1967, p. 7).4
discussion, however, as a handy label for an increase in the rights and responsibilities of local
nonstate agents and leaders—most especially and generally, local populations. In this sense,
devolution as a policy initiative is buttressed by the concept of popular participation in
development, that is, participation in decision-making on the part of civil society. Devolution
is also supported by the theory of common property, since common property provides a
framework in which to effect a transfer of rights from the state to civil society, particularly
in the domain of natural resources. In sum, the term "devolution" in this work refers to the
decentralization of decision-making (management) authority or property rights regarding
natural resources and, further, to the transfer of authority and rights from the state to civil
populations.
1.2.2 POLICY OF DEVOLUTION AND STUDY
 S OBJECTIVES
The policy of devolution is intended by its sponsors to allow greater flexibility to local
populations in the management of natural resources. It is expected that local initiatives
undertaken in view of increased local participation and security of holdings will lead to long-
term sustainable management.
Although the policy under consideration is referred to in this study as devolution, the
term appears nowhere in the policy statements (e.g., the decree of 16 May 1990, discussed
below) of the particular case under investigation. The policy statements refer, rather, to
"participatory management" and increased use rights and benefit flows to be captured by local
populations. Prior to such recent policy statements, all rights regarding management and use
of forest resources were clearly within the prerogative of the Nigerien State, which "owned"
all untitled forests.' The specialized meaning attributed to the term of devolution is a function
of this policy history. It is especially important to retain the notion of devolution as a
transfer of rights and authority from the state to local populations.
The current policy context of the study is as follows. Niger, in common with neighboring
Sahelian countries, is engaged in a reassessment of government policies regarding natural
resource management. In response to the alarming natural resource degradation observed in
the Sahel throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Niger and its Sahelian neighbors now concede that
the state has failed in its efforts to preserve the natural resource base solely by legislating and
enforcing sets of rules (e.g., forest codes) to be imposed on local populations of resource
users. The forest cooperative of Baban Rafi, established July 1989, represents an attempt to
devolve forest resource use and management rights from the state to local populations in the
hope that this will lead to sustainable forest resource exploitation practices.
On a national scale, the policy of devolution achieved legal expression in the form of a
legislative decree issued by the Nigerien Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock on 16 May
1990. The decree represents a radical departure from pre-existing forest legislation (the latter
assumes an undisguised "enforcement orientation" as contrasted to the "rights orientation" of
4. République du Niger, Law 74-7, 4 March 1974, ARTICLE 1.5
the decree) and remains at the time of this writing as the single piece of legislation in Niger
that embodies the notion of devolution. The first article of the decree reads as follows:
ARTICLE 1 - 1n order to encourage participatory management of natural resources, together
with a concern for their rational exploitation following established (or to be established)
technical norms, the following usufruct rights are granted to village communities who
participate in forest resource management on their traditional lands:
Harvesting of all types of wood (timber, building poles, firewood) as well as bark, leaves,
fruits, gums, medicinal plants, food plants, and all other secondary forest products [emphasis
added].
5
The first paragraph of ART. 1 summarizes the philosophy underlying the decree. Two
goals are named—one, developmental (participatory management), and the other, ecological
(rational exploitation)—and the strategy chosen to achieve the goals (the granting of usufruct
rights to village communities) is specified. To further reinforce local rights (as contrasted to
the pre-existing system of state-held rights), a later article adds:
ARTICLE 3 - The benefits incurred from the exploitation of forest resources mentioned in
ARTICLE 1 are reserved in priority for the involved village communities.
Baban Rafi is one of a handful of sites in Niger at which policies similar to the national
policy outlined above are in the early stages of implementation. The Natural Forestry
Management (NFM) project, jointly administered by CARE International and the Nigerien
government's Service of the Environment, established its office in Maradi (the provincial
capital of the region including the Baban Rafi forest) in March 1989. The project's zone of
intervention includes over 40,000 hectares of natural forest at Baban Rafi as well as an
extensive "buffer zone" of village and farmland along the forest's periphery.
The Baban Rafi Forestry Cooperative, sponsored by the NFM project, is intended to
function as the vehicle whereby local populations will assume management and property
rights to forest resources as incentives to invest in those resources in accordance with
ecological objectives. Such a strategy conforms to the basic precepts of devolution and the
supporting concepts of popular participation and common property. The linkage between local
rights and ecological goals is made explicit in the preliminary management plan for the Baban
Rafi forest produced by the NFM project in July 1991.
6
The policy context described to this point suggests three assumptions on the part of
policymakers. These three assumptions define the core issues for investigation in this study:
5. This English translation of the French original as well as the one below (from ART. 3) are reproduced from
a news release, dated 3 July 1990, prepared by Barry Rands of the United States Agency for International
Development in Niger. The news release emphasizes that this is an unofficial translation. The original text is
included in the present study as annex 3.
6. See discussion,
"NFM project and the cooperative," in ch. 5, p. 80.6
► the state is both willing and able to surrender to local populations use and manage-
ment rights it has long claimed;
► the reinforcement of use and management rights to forest resources at the local level
will unleash incentives to exploit resources on a "rational" (i.e., sustainable) basis;
and
► indigenous sociopolitical organizations either exist or may be created to manage forest
exploitation according to the notion of rationality intended by policymakers.
In summary, this study's primary goal is to evaluate the assumptions listed immediately
above along with the general strategy of devolution in light of a particular case in which both
national and local policy has been fashioned accordingly.
1.3 FIELD RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES
Field data on which this study is based were collected in Niger between October 1990 and
October 1991. Information priorities were established and collection techniques devised
according to the research objectives noted in the above statement describing the research
agenda and as a function of the investigation's intention to take the form of an in-depth case
study. The site of the inquiry is the western portion of the Baban Rafi forest, south-central
Niger. Although the NFM project holds jurisdiction over the entire Baban Rafi forest, the
western portion was chosen as the study site since it is the location of the first and,
throughout the research period, only Baban Rafi Forestry Cooperative. The primary
administrative seat of the NFM project is the departmental capital of Maradi, though the
project is also overseen by Nigerien government officials and CARE representatives based in
Niamey.
At the site of Baban Rafi, early application of rapid rural appraisal techniques yielded
information that guided subsequent random and nonrandom sample surveys and interviews.
The random sample survey is described below. Nonrandom sample surveys and interviews
of key informants were designed to collect information on such topics as local tree use;
existing tree species in the Baban Rafi forest; water rights; the existence of sacred trees and
forests; inheritance rules; village structures, boundaries, and history; and the social and
wealth status of specific groups (e.g., cooperative officers).
Periodic residence in the villages of the cooperative allowed for extended and repeated
sessions as a participant observer in village life, as did attendance at cooperative meetings and
activities. Residence in the departmental capital of Maradi facilitated formal and informal
interviews of government and NFM project officials as well as interviews of the primary wood
merchants of Maradi (most of the fuelwood consumed in Maradi originates in the Baban Rafi
forest). Many of the archival sources relevant to this study are also located in Maradi; others
were exploited in Niamey.
The largest survey exercise consisted of the formulation of a multiple-sectioned
questionnaire which was subsequently administered to a population of randomly selected7
Hausa (sedentary farming) heads-of-household and their wives between April and August
1991. A slightly modified version of this questionnaire was administered to herding (semi-
sedentary)' heads-of-households, while a somewhat abbreviated version was administered to
wives of the randomly selected household heads (the reason for the brevity of latter being the
greater time constraints generally characteristic of married women in the region relative to
men, and, to some extent, the relative inaccessibility of married women to a male researcher).
The random sample survey questionnaire was designed on the basis of information
collected in the course of the data-collection exercises noted above. Following about four
months of data collection and analysis, approximately one month was devoted to the
formulation and testing of the random sample questionnaire. The process of questionnaire
formulation for the random sample survey was guided at the outset through reference to two
model questionnaires employed in somewhat similar research settings and attempting to obtain
broadly similar categories of information.8.'
Following extensive testing of the questionnaire on farmers from villages outside the
research area and on NFM project assistants, the list of respondents was compiled by random
selection to include respondents from each village or herding camp roughly in proportion to
the total population of the village or settlement and with a geographical spread reflecting
ethnic, religious, or family patterns.'
The questionnaire was also administered to several individuals not included in the random
sample, but whose responses were judged to be of potential use as a result of a particular
7. Although often referred to in this study as either "farmers" or "herders," all of the respondents to the
questionnaire produce agricultural crops, and most raise at least some livestock. The distinctions between these
two major categories are discussed at length in ch. 2. It is sufficient to mention here that "farmers" almost
always speak Hausa as their first language and live in villages; while "herders" usually speak Hausa as a second
language, live in small groups scattered outside of the Hausa villages, and may be absent from their farms for
portions of the year.
8. The most important model influencing formulation of the questionnaire used in this study was that devised
by LTC Associate Researcher, Rebecca McLain, who formulated her questionnaire in the course of a study
examining forest-code and resource-tenure issues in central Mali (see McLain 1992). The second model
contributing to the present effort is that found in an annex to Delehanty et al. (1985).
9. In at least twelve cases the randomly selected individuals were either unavailable or unwilling to be
interviewed. In most cases replacements were selected by returning to the census list to choose the name
following that of the unavailable individual. In two cases a married son filled in for his aged father who had been
included on the original sample list. In one case (Garin Ali) a replacement was not found, resulting in the
interview of four instead of five heads-of-household. In one case (the Buzu herders residing outside of Mamouri)
the small population resulted in only two respondents' appearing on the list, and a third was added by choosing
an available individual upon arrival at the camp. Also among the Buzu of Mamouri, one of the wives
interviewed was not married to any of the male heads-of-household interviewed, but was selected on the basis
of availability. In general, in cases in which a male head-of-household had two or more wives (in 21 of 68 cases,
or 31 %), the wife interviewed was selected on the basis of availability. Finally, upon discovery of a herding
group living outside of Garin Ali that had not been included in the census conducted by the NFM project, three
respondents were nonrandomly selected by NFM project assistants to be included among the otherwise randomly
selected respondents.8
social position or status. Thus all village chiefs, a number of unmarried adult men, and most
of the officers of the Baban Rafi Cooperative were interviewed on the basis of the
standardized questionnaire. However, the responses of these nonrandomly selected
respondents are not included (unless otherwise indicated) in the data quoted throughout this
study.
The majority of the interviews were conducted by a team of two bilingual (French and
Hausa) NFm project assistants: one posed the questions, and the other recorded answers
directly onto the questionnaire form. Although the questionnaire was in French, an attempt
was made to standardize the oral translation into Hausa during earlier work sessions with the
project assistants. The average interview lasted between 2 and 2½ hours, but a number of
them lasted much longer because topics were pursued that had not necessarily been foreseen.
In other words, the questionnaire format was not strictly adhered to, though all of the
questions included on the standardized form eventually were posed.
The total of 130 randomly selected respondents are divided as follows among the primary
categories: 40 farmers; 28 herders (25 Fulani and 3 Buzu); 37 farmers' wives; and 25
herders' wives (22 Fulani and 3 Buzu). The sample represents slightly over 20 percent of
heads-of-household listed in census records pertaining to the villages and settlements of the
Baban Rafi Forestry Cooperative.
I would briefly note here the manner in which some of the diverse categories of data (i.e.,
random sample survey data, nonrandom sample survey data, participant observation data,
archival data, and interview data) influence data analysis and contribute to the present study.
Given the multiplicity of viewpoints (e.g., researchers, project implementers, government
officials, and villagers), wherever possible an attempt was made to combine a variety of
information sources related to each individual topic. For example, villagers, herders, and state
officials were questioned on the fining patterns for violations of the forest code, and forest
service documents were also consulted on the matter of fines.
A wider variety of information sources is, of course, more available on some topics than
on others. For example, the early settlement history of western Baban Rafi must be pieced
together on the basis of a few oral histories somewhat subject to exaggeration of some details
(such as dates) or other selective inaccuracies. Fortunately, such details are often less
important than are particular trends regarding resource exploitation (e.g., the evolution of
forest policy and its implementation at Baban Rafi), and it is often possible to substantiate or
refute broad trends since information may be collected across a wider range of sources.
Nevertheless, in the final analysis, a portion of the study's presentation is based on my own
educated guesses.
A final note is on the use made by the study of information collected via the random
sample survey. The difficulties in implementing a true and scientifically rigorous random
sample survey are well known. In the present case, some defects were discovered in the
census list earlier used for sample selection. For example, a number of family compounds
listed in census records as comprising two or more households (a household is defined as an9
adult male, his wife or wives, and their children) were found in fact to consist of two or more
independent households, that is, two or more compounds.
10 The resulting bias probably takes
the form of an overrepresentation of older, more established household heads since younger
heads-of-household were not always listed separately in the census records. In addition, it was
found that the project census probably underestimated Fulani populations, a group that proves
to be particularly elusive in the course of attempts to obtain census information.
Nevertheless, a wealth of valuable information was obtained in the course of the random
sample interviews and, unless otherwise indicated, numerical data referred to throughout this
study regarding socioeconomic characteristics of the populations of western Baban Rafi are
derived from these interviews. In general (as mentioned above), the information obtained
through random sample interviews that is used in the present report is also supported by data
collected through other means. The random sample survey is thus intended in this
investigation to be one data collection method among several, though the information it yields
is particularly useful for illustrative purposes since it allows for the convenience of presenting
trends in terms of numbers, that is, percentages and averages, which in this report are better
considered as rough indicators than as literal measurements.
10. I had begun by considering a compound to be a domestic unit sharing a defined set of agricultural fields
and including one or more households. What I found was that some compounds thus defined were not included
in the census from which I had compiled my random sample because of the establishment of separate agricultural
fields by some of the married males who had been considered by the census to be part of a listed compound.11
Chapter 2
BABAN RAFI: PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SETTING
2.1 NATURAL BACKGROUND
Baban rafi is a Hausa phrase meaning "big stream." The misfit between the name and the
setting is striking. Nonetheless, for three or four months out of twelve, the forest and fields
of Baban Rafi bloom, and during this period it is not difficult to imagine the proximity of
great bodies of water. By contrast, for about eight months of the year the area of the Baban
Rafi forest blends easily into the Sahara Desert to its north. One's impressions of life and
nature in the forest depend very much on the season.
2.1.1 LOCATION, SIZE, AND CLIMATE
The Baban Rafi forest is located in the south-central region of the Republic of Niger, with
the southern and western boundaries of the forest defined by 51.9 kilometers of the border
between Niger and Nigeria (Angoh 1989, p. 3). In administrative terms, the forest occupies
the southern portion of Maradi Department. Further, the forest straddles two subdistricts
(arrondissements), Madarounfa and Guidan Roumdji, occupying the western and southwestern
portion of the former and the extreme southern tip of the latter. In terms of local settlement
patterns, the village of Baban Rafi (the largest of the settlements under investigation in this
study), located in the west-central portion of the forest, is 62 kilometers southwest of the city
of Maradi; 42 kilometers west-southwest of the subdistrict seat of Madarounfa; and 25
kilometers west of Gabi, a large village on the eastern border of the forest (Abass 1990,
p. 3).
The Baban Rafi forest constitutes the northeastern region of a much larger ecosystem, the
majority of whose 2,000 square kilometers lie to the south and west of the Baban Rafi forest
and across the border with Nigeria (Puccioni 1991, p. 2). On the Nigerian side, the forest has
been designated as the Roungou Forest Reserve.
As is the case with many of the physical characteristics of the Baban Rafi forest, the size
of the forest has been subject to various debatable assumptions and widely varying estimates
since the inception of the Natural Forestry Management (NFM) project. Prior to FLUP's
preliminary investigation of Baban Rafi in January 1987,
11 no documentation on the site
11. The site of Baban Rafi was identified in Jan. 1987 by the Forest and Land Use Planning project (FLUP,
of which the Guesselbodi site outside of Niamey is a component) as a candidate for the implementation of a
forest-management system having as its objective the production of fuelwood [Projet SALAMA (1991, p. 18);
Angoh (1989, p. 9)].12















Source: After Puccioni (1991).13
existed (Projet SALAMA 1991, p. 18), beyond a series of aerial photos dating from 1962 that
reveal a large wooded region with a surface area in excess of 80,000 hectares.1
2 The figure
of 80,000 hectares is included in an early draft of the proposal for the Semi-Arid Lands
Management (SALAMA) project—of which the NFM project at Baban Rafi was to be a
component.
13 The final version of the SALAMA project document, however, also prepared
in 1987, cites a figure of 39,000 hectares as the size of the Madarounfa portion of the forest,
to which it adds 16,000 hectares—the estimated surface area of the portion of the forest in
Guidan Roumdji.
14
The surface area figure routinely quoted in studies carried out in the Baban Rafi forest
from 1987 through 1989 is 65,479 hectares, of which 40,575 are attributed to Madarounfa
and 24,904 are said to be in Guidan Roumdji (Djibo and Price 1990, p. 2; Angoh 1989, p. 1;
Abass 1990, p. 2). Angoh (1989, p. 1), however, adds that over 5,000 hectares of the
Madarounfa portion of the Baban Rafi forest have been put to agricultural production, and,
moreover, the forest is characterized by multiple "empty pockets" (poches vides). The Baban
Rafi forest, then, is not necessarily defined in terms of the extent of its "wooded" area.
A map based on aerial photos (1:25,000) was completed under the direction of INRAN in
March 1991. The project's preliminary management plan, unveiled in July 1991, defines the
forest as the zone photographed and provides the figure of 45,983 hectares as the surface area
of the forest—almost all of which is located in Madarounfa subdistrict. This figure is
significantly less than the 80,000 hectares of wooded area believed to have existed in 1962.
Nevertheless, in spite of resource degradation and farmer encroachment, the NFM project
management plan asserts that currently in Niger only the wooded region near Dosso
(southeastern Niger) and W National Park (extreme southeastern Niger) could be considered
as being of comparable "national value" (valeur nationale) to the Baban Rafi forest (Projet
SALAMA 1991, pp. 18-20).
Some maps locate the region of south-central Niger containing the Baban Rafi forest as
slightly south of the Sahel,
15 while others depict the Baban Rafi forest as just within the
Sahel and well within the region defined by the Sahelian drought and famine of 1968-1974
12. See Angoh (1989, p. 9). The 80,000 ha are described as "la brousse de Baban Rafi" (the woods of Baban
Rafi).
13. See Projet SALAMA (1987, p. 13). The draft proposal mistakenly stated that the Baban Rafi Forest
consisted of a 15,000-ha forest reserve (the French equivalent is fort classée) plus another 65,000 ha of
woodlands to the north and northwest of the reserve. In fact, the proposal to create the Baban Rafi Forest
Reserve in 1955 was never enacted (Angoh 1989, p. 9).
14. See Projet SALAMA (1988, p. 22). The figure for the surface area quoted above apparently refers to the
wooded (or at least unfarmed) part of the forest, since a separate figure of 40,000 ha of "multiple use" land is
listed as the buffer zone (zone tampon) of the project (ibid., p. 23).
15. See, for example, Gritzner (1988, p. 3) (fig. 2 of this study is based on Gritzner s map); or Grainger
(1990, p. 15).14






















Source: After Gritzner (1988).15
(Franke and Chasin 1981, p. xv).
16 The conflicting cartographic presentations of the Sahel
result because the Sahel is generally defined as a function of rainfall, but the isohyets defining
the region have not been standardized." In view of the climatological confusion, it is useful
to note that the Sahel is often considered as a political grouping that includes the nine member
countries of Cuss.1
8 It is important to note that more important than the average amount
of rainfall received by an area is the variability of rainfall, and one of the defining
characteristics of the Sahel is a very high degree of rainfall variability (Gritzner 1988, p. 4;
Delehanty 1988, p. 49). Although within the time frame of a single year one can expect
virtually all rainfall to occur in the Baban Rafi forest between May and September—with July
and August generally receiving 60 percent of the total (Projet SALAMA 1991, p. 2)
19—the
variation between years is striking.
In addition to the rainfall variability common between years, the NFM project's
"Management Plan" cites evidence of a long-term reduction in average rainfall in the Baban
Rafi forest (Projet SALAMA 1991, p. 2). The management plan adds that the decreasing level
of rainfall has had an adverse impact on the region's vegetation.
Temperatures are quite high in the department of Maradi (which includes the Baban Rafi
forest) resulting in rapid moisture evaporation. The average annual temperature is 27.45°C
(81.4°F). The average annual high temperature is 35.11°C (95.2°F) and the average annual
low temperature is 19.80°C (67.6°F) (Projet SALAMA 1991, p. 8). The hottest months are
April and May with the coolest being December and January.
2.1.2 TOPOGRAPHY, FLORA, AND FAUNA
The most significant topographic feature of the Baban Rafi forest affecting possibilities
for the exploitation of natural resources is the lack of permanent surface water points, rivers,
or streams (Projet SALAMA 1988, p. 30). Wells in the area are between 35 and 70 meters in
depth.
20 The absence of wells except in the villages located on the periphery of the forest
limits pastoral and other activities in the forest during the eight-month dry season. According
16. Also see the map reproduced in Franke and Chasin (1981, p. 25), which includes the region containing
the Baban Rafi forest as within the boundaries of the Sahel.
17. For references to some of the various isohyets adopted by different observers, see Franke and Chasin
(1981, p. 24); Grainger (1990, p. 14); and Gritzner (1988, p. 4). A helpful summary discussion of the Sahel
as a climatic region is contained in Delehanty (1988, pp. 45-51).
18. Cuss is an acronym for Comité Permanent Inter-
États de Lutte contre la Scheresse dans le Sahel
(Permanent Interstate Committee to Fight Desertification in the Sahel). CILss was created in 1973 following
several years ofdevastating drought in the Sahel, and since 1976 has been associated with and aided by its Paris-
based sister organization, the Club du Sahel, an organ of the OECD. The nine countries of Cuss are: Burkina
Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Chad.
19. The figure of 60% is an average, and it masks the variation that may occur within single years, which
also constitutes a significant risk factor for farmers and herders.
20. The higher figure is cited in Projet SALAMA (1988). The lower figure is based on figures quoted by
foresters and villagers in the first cooperative region of the Baban Rafi forest.16
to the first NFM project manager, the forest exists today as a result of the lack of available
water throughout the forest during the dry season (Mana Diakite, personal communication).
According to many of the area's residents, the absence of any year-round reservoirs of
surface water has not always been a feature of western Baban Rafi. The name, Baban Rafi,
translates as "big stream" or even "big river." It is unclear at what point in history the name
may have been an accurate description of local geography. However, older residents
sometimes attest to the former existence of year-round ponds or swampy areas, such as one
in the ancient region of Tielawa to the south of Baban Rafi Village, another to the east of
Garin Maigiya, and a number of swampy regions at various locations around Mamouri and
Goulgoussao. Today such areas contain water only during the rainy season. Village elders
also attest to the ease with which subterranean water was tapped at some sites in low-lying
valleys in the past: "It was enough to dig about 1 meter down and one found water." This
condition, too, has disappeared.
Land forms of the Baban Rafi forest include both steppe and savanna, the latter containing
the richer and more densely packed stands of naturally occurring vegetation. The vegetation
of the steppes is concentrated in depressions between dunes and consists especially of tree
species such as Guiera senegalensis, Combretum micranthum, Combretum glutinosum,
Piliostigma reticulatum, and Acacia mimsoides, and the herbaceous species, Chrzachyrium
exile (Projet SALAMA 1991, p. 14). The savanna lands of the Baban Rafi forest are variously
dominated by trees, bushes, or grasses depending on humidity retention and soil characteris-
tics. Some of the more prized tree species found on the richer savanna lands include Vitellaria
paradoxa (Butyrospermum parkin, Ficus platyphlla, Adansonia digitata (baobab), Parkia
biglobosa, and Ficus dekdekena (ibid). Other notable and valuable species found at Baban
Rafi include Bombax costatum, Prosopis africana, Tamarindus indica, Vitex donana, and
Isoberlinea doka.
21
Each of the non-Combretum species listed above is currently in decline in the Baban Rafi
forest, the increasing rarity of which is attested to by local residents and preliminarily
confirmed by recent censusing. According to a tree census carried out by an intern of the
ÉNERGIE II project,
22 Guiera senegalensis (a member of the Combretum family), Combretum
micranthum, Combretum nigricans, and Acacia macrostachya currently represent up to 97
percent of standing trees in the Baban Rafi forest—micranthum and nigricans alone
constituting nearly 80 percent (Niger 1990b).
23 The abundance of certain species might in
part result from a double-edged-sword effect of selective exploitation of individual species:
not only are favored species removed but unfavored species move in to fill the void. For
21. With the exception of Isoberlinea doka, these species are listed as present in the Baban Rafi forest in
Projet SALAMA (1988, p. 30). The presence of Isoberlinea doka is noted by Angoh (1989, p. 5).
22. The Énergie II project is a World Bank-sponsored initiative to study and reform fuelwood markets and
management in Niger. This project receives some attention in the closing pages of ch. 6.
23. The total of all standing Combretum species are said to appear in the Baban Rafi forest at an average rate
of 16 m
3 per hectare (Projet SALAMA 1988, p. 22).17
example, Hopkins et al. (1991?, p. 12) note that "Guiera senegalensis is generally viewed as
a pioneer ligneous species colonizing disturbed sites."
A total of 38 species were identified in the course of the nergie 11 census Neverthe-
less, the census report (Niger 1990b, p. 2) concludes the following:
one must underscore the significant degradation of this [Baban Rafi] forest soon [to be] mono-
specific [single species], and in which all valuable trees have been exploited. The large
number of species encountered (38)—but unfortunately each in very small numbers—bears
witness to a forest that should have been rich.'
Not all of the decline in species diversity, however, is the result of overexploitation. At
least one species, the important hardwood, Prosopis africana, has experienced an extremely
high rate of mortality throughout the Sahel in recent decades. While some observers link the
decimation of large stands of Prosopis to the droughts beginning in the late 1960s, others
believe that some tree pathogen is involved, while still others suggest that the trees' sickness
is linked to supernatural forces.
26 Whatever the cause, the death of this tree has visibly
affected the species composition in the Baban Rafi forest. A number of forest parcels are
currently dominated by the leafless white skeletons of these now dead trees.
27
Local residents also attest to a decline in the wildlife populations of the Baban Rafi forest.
Formerly common species that are now extremely rare or nonexistent include the lion, the
hyena, the cheetah, the giraffe, a type of buffalo, the ostrich, and the gazelle. Interestingly,
a large mammal species—the elephant—that apparently did not inhabit the Baban Rafi forest
prior to the 1980s, is now a seasonal visitor. These visits appear to be the result of increased
habitat destruction and other pressures applied to the elephant populations of Northern
Nigeria.
28
24. In a separate exercise (one conducted as a part of the research project presented in this study), villagers
listed a total of 59 natural forest-tree species known currently to be in the Baban Rafi forest. These species are
discussed in ch. 3 (pp. 44—46) in the context of uses made of the natural resources of the Baban Rafi forest.
25. "En conclusion il faut souligner la forte dégradation de cette forêt bientôt monospecifique et oil toutes les
tiges de valeur ont été exploitées. Le nombre important d essences rencontrées (38) mais malheureusement
chacunes en trop petit effectifs temoigne d une forêt qui a du étre riche."
26. The villagers of Baban Rafi generally believe that the drought is the direct cause behind the destruction
of Prosopis africana. A number of older villagers, particularly current or past hunters, suggest that the iskoki
(spirits) are angry and that they have killed the trees. The NFM project manager suggests that a tree disease has
spread among this species across the Sahel.
27. Dead stands of Prosopis africana provided a ready opportunity for the NFM project to organize the first
commercial woodcut to be undertaken by the Baban Rafi Cooperative in 1990. Prosopis was cut, stacked, and
eventually sold as fuelwood. This cut is discussed in ch. 5 (p. 86).
28. A special study was commissioned by CARE International in 1990 to study the elephant "problem." The
problem results from crop destruction perpetrated by elephants on the farmers of Baban Rafi (see Puccioni
1991).18
Soils are said to be the primary constraint to agriculture in the region. The soils are very
compacted and of poor quality. They are difficult to work and have poor water retention, but
this aspect can be improved through hard work. Gravelly or rocky areas of little to no
vegetation (plages stériles) are common. Yet one finds a dense woody vegetation in most
settings. Primarily as a result of poor soil quality the general region of the forest is said
currently to be more important for herders than for farmers, in spite of low levels of fodder
production and mediocre pastures. The greatest possibilities for agriculture occur in sandy
valleys and on sandy or clayey areas containing colluvial deposits (Raynaut et al. 1988,
pp. 72-73).
2.1.3 REGENERATION
The lack of specific information concerning the natural resource base of the Baban Rafi
forest is especially troubling insofar as it includes a lack of understanding of rates of
regeneration of plant resources. Given that the primary commercial resource of Baban Rafi
is considered to be fuelwood, it is particularly important that project planners be able to
calculate feasible offtake rates of wood from standing trees on the basis of the regenerative
capacities of the trees. Yet following nearly ten years of FLUP-sponsored activities,
29 the
regenerative capacity of species belonging to the Combretaceae family (the dominant family
in the Baban Rafi forest as well as at Guesselbodi) remains a matter of debate.
Hopkins et al., writing about 1991, point out that FLUP documents themselves are not in
agreement on the matter, and further "note that the post cut regeneration was significantly less
productive than was expected, and [study results] point to a change from more to less favored
fuelwood species among the Combretaceae" (Hopkins et al. 1991?, p. 3) Dennison (1990,
p. 1) also issues a warning on this matter: "There are ... serious concerns about how
effectively the species being harvested are being regenerated. The long term effects of
continued coppicing are unknown."
The NFm preliminary management plan circulated July 1991 refers to a single attempt to
inventory the vegetation of the Baban Rafi forest—that having been conducted by nergie II
intern, Lawali Arzika, in 1990-91. The management plan "insists on the fact that these results
are preliminary" (Projet SALAMA 1991, p. 15), yet is forced to use the same results as the
basis of proposed strategies for fuel-wood exploitation. As is the case with most technical
aspects of the Baban Rafi forest, there is clearly a need for more and better information
regarding the rates of regeneration of indigenous tree species. Only time can solve this
problem. One recalls that the NFm project dates only from 1989, and that prior to its
installation there existed almost no data on the area today known as the Baban Rafi forest.
Allegria notes that the lack of information on growth rates is nationwide and proposes the
following solution: "Permanent growth plots are critically needed throughout Niger. Forest
29. FLUP (Forest and Land Use Project sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development)
was active at the site of Guesselbodi, 20 km southeast of Niamey, from 1981 to 1990. It is famous for its
groundbreaking work in the domain of locally based natural forestry management and has provided the
inspiration for current generation of such projects, including the NFM project of Baban Rafi.19
management requires information which can only be gathered from monitoring permanent
plots.... Monitoring the plots on a periodic basis would identify the rotation period necessary
to maximize wood products" (cited in Hopkins et al. 1991, p. 13).
2.1.4 SUMMARY OF NATURAL CONTEXT
Although the natural resource base of the Baban Rafi forest historically has supported a
rich diversity of plant and animal life, it has proved in recent years to be very fragile.
Particularly significant in terms of ecological vulnerability are the low levels and variability
of rainfall and the poor quality of local soils. Efforts to devise a technologically sound
management system for the forest's fragile resource base are hampered by a lack of scientific
data concerning many aspects of the forest's ecology, but especially troubling is the lack of
knowledge concerning the regenerative capacities of local vegetation. By all accounts, both
the native vegetation and indigenous animal life of the forest have suffered declines in recent
years—both in diversity and in total biomass. The human population of the forest, meanwhile,
is increasing.
2.2 SOCIAL CONTEXT
2.2.1 REGIONAL HISTORY AND BROAD SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS
Regarding the period prior to the twentieth century and the installation of the French
colonial regime, a great deal of speculation and debate characterizes historical accounts of the
territory included today in the department of Maradi. It is clear, however, that the region has
long formed a part of the entity that has come to be identified as Hausaland. It is also clear
that there has been a great deal of turbulence and instability among the populations of
Hausaland preceding and into the twentieth century. The history of Hausaland—particularly
that of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—has helped to determine the nature and
character of specific societies one encounters at sites throughout Hausaland, such as the Baban
Rafi forest. The purpose of the following brief account is to convey a sense of the social
complexity, diversity, and movement characteristic of the region casually referred to as
Hausaland.
Several variations of the Hausa myth of origin—the legend of Bayajida—exist, but all
versions contain the same basic framework. The Bayajida narratives—named for the mythical
progenitor of the seven Hausa states
30—describe the installation of a new class of leaders
30. The number "7" is of some significance in Hausa culture. The Hausa city-states, sometimes referred to
as kingdoms, are customarily referred to as a group of 7—the Hausa Bakwai (literally: the Hausa 7). An
additional group of Hausa states is referred to as the Banza Bakwai (the "Bastard 7"). The composition of the
second group—and to a lesser extent the composition of the first group—is subject to debate among scholars and
appears to have been somewhat modified over the centuries. David (1964, pp. 9-20) provides a full discussion
of the various versions of the Bayajida legends and the differing accounts within the legends of the identities of
the Hausa Bakwai. There appears to be a consensus (though perhaps not unanimous) on the identity of 6 of the20
onto indigenous societies. Bayajida, or the group that is represented by the name Bayajida,
is generally said to have emigrated to what is now Hausaland from North Africa, with
Baghdad,
31 Cairo, and Jerusalem sometimes listed as intermediary steps along the way to
the region of modern-day Hausaland.
32 According to the historical document known as the
Kano Chronicle, the founding of Kano—currently and to a large extent historically the most
prominent of the Hausa city-states—took place as early as A.D. 1000 (Hallam 1966, p. 49).
Whatever the origins of Hausa culture, the linguistic uniformity that today occurs across
the large region of Northern Nigeria and Southern Niger identified as Hausaland is quite
exceptional in Africa. Nevertheless, the social diversity characteristic of the region must also
be emphasized. The Bayajida legend attests to a historical distinction between a once foreign
elite and various indigenous societies.
33 Another elite was composed of the merchant class
profiting from both trans-Saharan and domestic trade that was a central feature in the
development of the Hausa states.
34 Slave raiding was an additional source of social
differentiation and disruption.
35 Thus strong class divisions have developed and persist in
the face of such distinctions as those between conquerors and conquered, commercial classes
and others, and the historical prevalence of slavery. In addition, the Islamic religion has
played a powerful and complicated role in the often turbulent relations and social structures
within and between the Hausa kingdoms and throughout the subsequent period of the Sokoto
caliphate.
Although Islam probably first appeared in Hausaland in the fourteenth century and had
become firmly established by the end of the fifteenth century (Hiskett 1981, p. 131), it was
in the nineteenth century that all of Hausaland was shaken and to a large extent transformed
original Hausa Bakwai, which includes Kano, Katsina, Zaria (or Zazzau ), Daura (of special significance in the
legend of Bayajida as the first Hausa state), Rano, and Gobir (see also Hallam 1966, p. 48). To the 6 may be
added, for example, Zamfara (David), Biram (Hallam), or Ouangara (Grégoire, 1986, p. 16).
31. Hallam (1966, p. 48) mentions that in some versions of the legend, Bayajida is the son or grandson of
the king of Baghdad.
32. The representative of the Nigerien Institute for Research in Human Sciences in Maradi, for example, has
compiled a list of nearly two dozen sites at which the founders of the Hausa state (and more specifically, the
Gobir state, one of several Hausa states) spent varying lengths of time before and after arrival in sub-Saharan
Africa.
33. Fuglestad (1978, pp. 324-25) argues, for example, that relations between the external kings and
indigenous "priest chief(s)" amounted to a delicate exercise in power-sharing that in many cases could "lead to
a somewhat less [than] idyllic situation of conflict and rivalry between the two 'whole' of authority."
34. For an account of early economic development of Hausaland and of the commercial class that played a
central role in the developing economy, see Lovejoy (1978, pp. 173-93).
35. The extent to which slavery was practiced in the pre-jihad era and the importance of slavery to the Hausa
economies are not yet clearly understood. Levtzion (1987, p. 19), for one, believes that farm slavery among the
Muslims of Hausaland was well entrenched and growing in the eighteenth century. It is clear, however, that
slavery was a central institution to the economy of the Sokoto Caliphate, which ruled practically the whole of
Hausaland during the nineteenth century. Levtzion (1985, p. 193), for example, quotes an estimate of 1:3 as the
proportion of slaves to freemen among the population living in the Caliphate's emirates in 1890, and that in the
regions within and around capital cities such as Kano and Katsina, the ratio was closer to 1:1.21
as a result of Islamic holy war—or jihad. Perhaps most significant in the jihadic movement
was a new West African Muslim aristocracy composed of a non-Hausa and relatively recently
arrived group to Hausaland—the Torodbe clerisy, a subgroup of the Fulani.
The Toronkawa conquest of the centuries-old Hausa kingdoms began in 1804 and was
largely completed by 1807. Unrest and civil disorder, however, dominated until the
installation of the European regimes—the British in the bulk of Hausaland, and the French
in the northern and western extremes. The ostensible reason for the jihad was the
nonadherence of the ruling elites of the Hausa city-states to Muslim tenets. However, the
success of the conquest indicates that other factors were at play. Hiskett (1981, pp. 129-39)
suggests that among the reasons for popular discontent with the ruling classes were increasing
tensions between settled populations and nomads and the indiscriminate and violent process
of enslavement practiced by the Hausa rulers. Such factors, along with growing religious
fervor, helped convince many rural populations to side with the reformers. However, these
factors did not altogether disappear with the establishment of the Sokoto caliphate, and
factional conflicts between and among old and new rulers added to nineteenth century social
instability.
The region of modern-day Maradi Department was a sparsely populated and marginal area
within Hausaland prior to the jihad, constituting the northernmost province of Katsina
(Fuglestad 1978, p. 327). It also borders the Hausa state of Gobir, which, according to David
(1964, p. 39), over the centuries has shown little interest in the region around present-day
Maradi. Maradi was established as a "rump state" when the ruler of Katsina—Dan
Kasawa—took refuge there sometime after the fall of his kingdom to the Toronkawa about
1804. In David's (1964, p. 58) words, "It was war, and war only, that occupied the newly
installed ruler ... [with the] supreme and definitive objective [being] the reconquering of
Katsina and defeat of the Fulani." For better defense of Dan Kasawa's base at Maradi, the
newly installed ruler moved the scattered pagan hamlets from the wooded plains to the
heavily forested central valley of the region, including the present site of Maradi Town
(David 1964). Thus, if sites such as that of the current Baban Rafi forest had been occupied
prior to the nineteenth century, they were likely abandoned upon the arrival from Katsina of
Dan Kasawa.
Maradi, a land on the border between the Hausa states of Gobir and Katsina and long
neglected by both, achieved statehood in a time of turbulence and insecurity. Again the
pattern of an alien power imposing itself on indigenous populations played itself out in
Hausaland. One notes that, as is true of Gobir, Maradi was never transformed into an emirate
of the Sokoto caliphate. Considering Maradi as a transitional unit from west to east Hausaland
(a Hausaland writ small), one notes the contrast between the ancient principalities of Korgom
(sixteenth century) and Tessaoua (seventeenth century) in the far east of Maradi, and the
canton borders established much later during the colonial period that characterize western
Maradi. It is the western portion of Maradi that includes Madarounfa and the Baban Rafi
forest (Raynaut et al. 1988, p. 54).22
With the installation of the French colonial regime in the early twentieth century and the
resultant "pacification" of the region, boundaries were soon to be fixed throughout Hausaland
and the department of Maradi (Gregoire 1986, p. 16). It was noted above that Maradi existed
as something of a hinterland between the Hausa states of Gobir and Katsina and received little
attention from the two power bases, though parts of Maradi were variously under the
influence of one or the other state. According to the Maradi representative of the Institute for
Research in the Human Sciences (Institut de Recherche en Sciences Humaines, IRSH), it was
the French desire to organize groundnut production that led to the establishment of a defined
administrative division between the newly defined provinces of Maradi and Gobir in
1924-1926. The division was redefined in 1944 in the course of a reorganization of groundnut
production, at which time current boundaries were established.
An additional effect of the French pacification was the opening of new territory for
settlement. Prior to 1900 the majority of villages in the department of Maradi were either in
the eastern third of the territory or in or near the Maradi valley (Raynaut et al. 1988, p. 49;
Gregoire 1986, p. 26). It is almost certain that all the villages of the Baban Rafi forest have
been established since the beginning of the twentieth century.
2.2.2 HISTORY AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF BABAN RAFI FOREST
Population and demography: Madarounfa subdistrict and Baban Rafi. The
imprecision characteristic of estimates of the physical dimensions of the Baban Rafi forest
also applies to demographic data. Nevertheless, both the quality and quantity of demographic
information available from Baban Rafi have greatly improved since the installation of the
NFM project in early 1989.
Censuses conducted prior to 1989 that included populations of the Baban Rafi forest have
followed administrative (i.e., canton and subdistrict) boundaries and ignored forest
boundaries. The result has been the somewhat arbitrary nature of forest-area population
estimates. The SALAMA project document, for example, prepared prior to the initiation of
project activities, without elaboration states, "The region of the [NFM] project has a
population of approximately 120,000 persons" (Projet SALAMA 1988, p. 30).
36 If this is the
case, one could conclude that the project-area population was to include a sizable population
living well beyond the borders of the forest since the immediate forest-area population is well
below 120,000. Census figures published by the Nigerien government in 1988 list a
population of 193,816 (Niger 1989, p. 44) for the entire subdistrict of Madarounfa, of which
the Baban Rafi forest occupies a relatively sparsely populated portion, less than one-eighth
of the land area.
37
36. The project document does not specify borders or cite the source of the population figure.
37. The total area of Madarounfa is 3,500 km  (350,000 ha), of which the Baban Rafi Forest contains
approximately 45,000 ha (Niger 1986b).23
The population of Madarounfa is divided into five cantons and two groupements (herders
belong to a traditional grouping), of which three cantons (Safo, Serkin Yama, and Gabi) and
both groupements (Douban and Kandamo) extend into the Baban Rafi forest.
38 In each case,
the cantons and groupements have their administrative seats and population majorities beyond
the borders of the Baban Rafi forest.
The figures recorded in table 2.1 do not take account of the numerous distinct subgroups
of Hausa. It is also possible that the herding populations (especially the Fulani), because of
their relative mobility, were significantly undercounted and, therefore, are underrepresented
in the table. At any rate, the herding populations represent a much higher percentage of total
population in the Baban Rafi forest than indicated by these official figures—the Fulani alone
accounting for approximately 40 percent of total population according to the NFM
management plan (Projet SALAMA 1991, p. 18).






Source: Niger, Monographie de 1  Arrondissement 1986 (Maradi, Niger: Département
de Maradi, Arrondissement de Madarounfa, 1986).
Further to complicate demographic classification, in addition to the cantons of
Madarounfa, one canton, Tibiri, of the subdistrict of Guidan Roumdji, also extends into the
Baban Rafi forest. At least two of the villages included in the NFM project census as villages
within zones to contain forest cooperatives—Garin Gado Chawey in the northern zone
(population: 232), and Garin Labou in the western zone (population: 255)—are included in
38. Although the office of the sous prefecture at Madarounfa keeps a census of subdistrict populations for tax
purposes, these were not useful for compiling past and present censuses of forest populations since these records
are classified according to administrative and not natural boundaries, i.e., villages considered to be within or
on the border of the Baban Rafi forest are not identified as such. The need to compile a complete village and
hamlet census of the Baban Rafi forest was discussed at a NFM project meeting held in Baban Rafi on 5 Aug.
1991. I received a preliminary draft of an effort to complete a census of the villages and hamlets of Baban Rafi,
dated Oct. 1991, shortly after departure from Niger. The Oct. 1991 draft lists 44 villages and 30 herding
hamlets, compared to the 29 villages and 5 herding hamlets acknowledged in the preliminary NFM management
plan dated July 1991. Such data-gathering activities on the part of the NFM project are necessary not only for
the reason stated above, but also since the government census figures are updated sporadically and appear to be
incomplete—particularly regarding herding populations.24
the canton of Tibiri. In spite of these exceptions, the Baban Rafi forest is treated throughout
this report as primarily within the subdistrict of Madarounfa.
Part of the demographic confusion results from a mobile and shifting population. Many
of the herding populations of the Baban Rafi forest are only part-year residents of the forest.
Additionally, large populations of herders have settled in recent years into farming in various
pockets spread throughout the forest and have not been systematically enumerated. Finally,
census figures gathered for administrative purposes are sometimes classified by social
grouping more than by territorial grouping, thus contributing to demographic confusion. The
village of Garin Labou, for example, is considered a part of the canton of Tibiri in spite of
its location in the midst of villages of Safo canton. The anomaly is explained by the origin
of the founders of Garin Labou in the canton of Tibiri.
The completion by Djibo and Price (1990) of a socioeconomic study of the Baban Rafi
forest commissioned by the NFM project was a major step toward providing the demographic
background necessary for the planning of project activities. Djibo and Price provide a social
context of the forest based on survey and site visits of eight villages chosen from the western,
eastern, and southern regions of the forest. Based on censuses conducted in the course of the
socioeconomic study and subsequent censuses sponsored by the project in the northern region
of the forest, the preliminary management plan divides the forest into three proposed
cooperative areas with respective populations of 2,114 (western region), 5,135 (northern
region), and 6,524 (southern region)—the latter two figures, however, do not include any of
the extensive herding populations since they were not included in the census exercise (Projet
SALAMA 1991, pp. 32-35).
39 In each case, populations are likely to be higher as a result of
uncounted or undercounted herding populations.
40
Population and demography: Western Baban Rafi forest. The present study relies
almost entirely on field data collected in the western region of the Baban Rafi forest. This
region was chosen since it is the site of the first (and, at least through 1991, only) Baban Rafi
cooperative. The cooperative, which held its first election of officers on 14 June 1989, was
conceived to include the entire population of the western part of the forest, consisting of
seven villages and several herding/farming hamlets.
Virtually all inhabitants of western Baban Rafi are Hausa-speaking; village inhabitants
speak Hausa as a first language and the Fulani and Buzu have adopted Hausa as their second
language. Inhabitants of the seven villages are referred to and refer to themselves as members
of the Hausa ethnicity, but are subdivided into a variety of Hausa subgroups. The majority
of the inhabitants of the herding/farming hamlets are Fulani—but they, too, are subdivided
39. A later project document, dated Oct. 1991, redivides the latter two cooperative regions into five
cooperative regions (see Idrissae 1991, pp. 18-19).
40. For example, a village included in the study area, Garin Ali, had no dependent herding population (a
dependent herding population relies on the water sources of the village with which it is associated) according
to census data collected in 1989, but in 1991 (in the course of research conducted for the present study) was
found to have a dependent herding population in excess of 20 families.25
Figure 3. West Baban Rafi: Baban Rafi Forest Cooperative









































into more precise ethnic affiliations. The hamlet to the east of the village of Mamouri is
inhabited by members of an ethnic group known as the Buzu, who, like the Fulani, have
historically provided for their subsistence as herders and only recently have settled into
farming. The Buzu are thought to be descendants of past slaves of the Tuareg peoples, the
historical lords of the desert, and have adopted the language and many of the customs—such
as camel breeding—of their former captors. The total population of the first cooperative
region is given in the NFM management plan as 2,114, about one-third of whom inhabit the
herding/farming hamlets on either a year-round or a seasonal basis (Projet SALAMA 1991,
p. 32). Population figures by village and by hamlet are presented in table 2.2.
TABLE 2.2 Villages and hamlets of the first Baban Rafi cooperative (western region of







Baban Rafi 69 140 299
Garin All 56 144 247
Garin Maigiya 36 107 138
Goulgoussao 41 93 197
Yen Gobirawa 34 97 171
Garin Labou 48 140 255




Tielawa (Fulani) 68 200 290
Ado (Fulani) 18 53 79
Guilmi (Fulani) 19 61 84
Dan Alia (Fulani) 29 74 132
Ibrahim (Buzu) 11 24 35
Subtotal 145 412 620
Grand total 466 1,254 2,114
a. "Active" population refers to the nondependent population, i.e., individuals contributing
to production as well as consumption. Both girls and boys are generally active in
productive activities by about age 8.
Source: Projet SALAMA, "Plan provisoire d'aménagement de la fort de Baban Rafi" (Maradi
and Niamey, Niger: Direction de 1'Environnement/CARE International, 1991).
Research conducted in the course of the present study in the summer of 1991 indicates
that herding/farming populations in the forest (those referred to as residents of hamlets in
table 2.2) are growing faster than village populations since increasing numbers of former
transhumant herders have taken to clearing land and settling in the forest to farm. In spite of
their current mixed occupational status, residents of the herding/farming hamlets are often27
referred to throughout the present study as "herders," while residents of the villages (who
also generally raise livestock) are referred to as "villagers" or "farmers."
Western Baban Rafi has been home to a settled population for a relatively short time.
According to random sample data, only 42 percent of Hausa compound heads and 39 percent
of Fulani and Buzu compound heads were born in the Baban Rafi forest, while only 13
percent of the fathers of Hausa compound heads and 14 percent of the fathers of Fulani and
Buzu compound heads were born there.
Both before and after the first settlements appeared, perhaps between 1910 and 1920, this
area was known as a rich reserve of game and traditionally had been exploited as such by
hunters residing outside of the forest. The early settlers are often depicted by today's villagers
as farmers from other regions who became acquainted with the Baban Rafi forest during
hunting trips and eventually decided to clear parts of the forest to establish farmsteads. One
recalls that this was the period by which the French occupation had enforced a general
security that had heretofore been lacking.
Probably by the end of the 1920s, small villages had been established at three or four sites
in the western section of the forest. Taking the current site of Baban Rafi village as a
reference point, one notes that the site itself was the northern limit of the millet fields
cultivated by the inhabitants of Tielawa, a now-defunct village located a couple of kilometers
to the south. Less than 3 kilometers to the north and slightly to the west of Baban Rafi village
was and is the site of Garin Ali, by some accounts the oldest village in this part of the forest.
Another 3 kilometers to the north-northwest from Garin Ali is the site of the former village
of Garin Rafi, often referred to today as Tsohon Rafi (literally, "old stream," referring to a
natural feature that no longer exists and in contrast to Baban Rafi—"big stream"—which also
no longer exists). The current village of Garin Labou, which some claim was founded earlier
than the village of Garin Ali, is located about 10 kilometers directly northwest of Baban Rafi
village, with the slightly more recently established village of Mamouri being little over
1 kilometer to the northeast of Garin Labou. A more-or-less continuous agricultural
corridor—running from the southeast to the northwest—today occupies much of the territory
from a couple of kilometers south of Baban Rafi village to a couple of kilometers north of
Mamouri.
Although little else can be stated with certainty, it is clear that the early (and later) settlers
of the western portion of the Baban Rafi forest neither came from the same location nor
shared identical ethnic backgrounds. However, whether or not their ancestors spoke Hausa
and considered themselves to be Hausa in the past, contemporary individuals are fully
integrated into Hausa culture. Of the groups listed, only the Beri Bed., originally from the
Lake Chad region, have in some cases retained a knowledge of their ancestral language and
customs. Practically one-third of the Hausa residents of western Baban Rafi originated on the
Nigerian side of the border, specifically those calling themselves Katsinawa and Zamfarawa.
The predominance of Gobirawa, Katsinawa, and Zamfarawa among the populations of
western Baban Rafi—70 percent of the total—is explained by the Baban Rafi forest's28
geographical position at the confluence of the three traditional Hausa states of Gobir, Katsina,
and Zamfara.
Those who do not connect their ancestry to one of the three traditional Hausa states of
Gobir, Katsina, or Gobir or count themselves among the Beri Beri, are in one sense the
displaced populations of western Baban Rafi. Buzu is a name signifying the ex-slaves of the
Tuareg peoples of the desert. Hausacized Buzu have settled into farming and life in a Hausa
village. The Tagamawa and Adarawa, like the Buzu, most likely are descended from the
slaves of the Tuaregs
41 and are the only Hausa peoples (along with the Buzu) to come to the
Baban Rafi forest from north of Gobir—the northernmost of the traditional Hausa states.
The origins of the two early villages of western Baban Rafi that no longer exist—Tielawa
and Tsohon Rafi—are somewhat mysterious. Nevertheless, local oral histories
42 indicate that
the core populations of these now-defunct villages probably had come (though indirectly) to
the Baban Rafi forest from the neighboring region of Zamfara in what is today part of
Northern Nigeria. A number of the early residents later abandoned the villages and returned
to Zamfara. Others migrated from Tielawa and Tsohon Rafi to other villages of the forest,
especially to Baban Rafi (specifically, the southern quarter of Baban Rafi) and Garin
Maigiya—sites at which one finds today that the Zamfarawa constitute the largest ethnic
concentration. Tielawa was abandoned in stages, the primary reason cited being the constant
attacks of birds, which devoured much of the millet produced by Tielawa farmers. Residents
remaining in Tielawa village in 1961 moved at that time to the present site of Baban Rafi
village, where a well had been constructed by the Nigerien government. Today the site of the
abandoned village is surrounded by Fulani farmer/herders. Garin Rafi is said to have been
abandoned upon the death of its founder (referred to as "Rafi"), perhaps in the early 1950s,
at which time most of the villagers of Garin Rafi returned to Nigeria.
In the cases of Garin Ali and Garin Labou, the origins are much less subject to dispute.
Both villages were established at about the same time by family units whose descendants
continue to reside in the villages. Garin Labou is a village of Gobirawa (people from Gobir)
originating in the canton of Tibiri. Garin Ali continues to be known as the village of the
Tagamawa family that arrived in the Baban Rafi forest from Dakoro (located in the northern
section of modern Maradi Department).
Over a period of perhaps 50 years following the establishment of the first settlements in
the western Baban Rafi forest—Tielawa, Garin Rafi, Garin Labou, and Garin Ali—five
additional Hausa villages have appeared. The earliest of these, Mamouri, was founded by a
Katsinawa from Safo who came to the forest to live near his friend, Labou (of Garin Labou).
41. This is the opinion of the Nigerien social scientist who is the Maradi regional representative of IRSH.
42. Because of the relatively short history of the villages of western Baban Rafi, it is still possible to collect
information directly from a number of the earliest settlers. The current elder of Garin Ali, who gives his age
as 87, arrived with the pioneer settlers as a child. The current chief of Baban Rafi village is the nephew of the
87-year-old elder of Garin Mi. Similarly, the chef du quartier of Yen Gobirawa is the same man who founded
the village about 21 years ago.29
Mamouri remains among the more ethnically homogeneous of the villages, continuing to be
dominated by the Katsinawa descendants of the founder.
Garin Maigiya (founded circa 1940) and Goulgoussao (founded circa 1950), on the other
hand, are today more ethnically mixed than the villages so far discussed. Maigiya (literally,
"possessor of alcohol") was a native of Zamfara who had resided in both Tielawa and
Tshohon Rafi before establishing the new village of Garin Maigiya. Similarly, the founder
of Goulgoussao (the name signifies "movement," in this case movement away from Garin Ali)
was a Katsinawa from Garin Ali, who, for whatever reasons, wanted to distance himself
somewhat from his formerly adopted village. Garin Maigiya and Goulgoussao, along with
Saban Rafi village, are the only three of the villages of western Baban Rafi forest established
by people already residing in the forest. The populations of each of these villages have
increased and diversified since their founding as they have attracted additional immigrants
from outside of the forest.
The most recent of the five villages established in western Baban Rafi since the time of
the first Hausa settlements is Yen Gobirawa, founded about 1970. The founder (as the village
name implies, a Gobirawa) arrived in Baban Rafi in search of arable land after he was fleeing
drought conditions in Katouma (near Chadakori), subdistrict of Guidan Roumdji. The village
has remained remarkably homogeneous ethnically, with a good number of the current
residents related to the village founder.
A pivotal event in the settlement history of western Baban Rafi was the construction of
a modern concrete well by the government around 1961 at the present site of Baban Rafi
village. Securing adequate water supplies had long been a problem at sites such as Tielawa,
Garin Ali, and Garin Labou. Upon installation of the well, the canton chief of Safo, the
titular chief of the populations of Baban Rafi (with the exception of Garin Labou), instructed
the people of Garin Ali to move to the site of the new well. A significant portion of the
population did so (though also a significant portion of the population remained at the old site)
and currently constitute the majority of the northern quarter of Baban Rafi village. The
current chief of Baban Rafi, named by the canton chief of Safo, also came to the well site
from Garin Ali at that time. The population that had not earlier abandoned Tielawa for
Nigeria at that time deserted it for the site of the new well, where they today constitute much
of the population of the southern quarter (Dan Anna—literally, sons of pagans) of Baban Rafi
village. A well was also constructed at Mamouri. The establishment of permanent and secure
water sources in the western Baban Rafi forest in the early 1960s has been a major factor in
influencing subsequent settlement patterns.
No new village has appeared in western Baban Rafi since the founding of Yen Gobirawa
about 1970. Perhaps one factor in stabilizing village configurations was the internationally
funded installation in the 1980s of mechanical water pumps in each of the existing villages,
thereby increasing the security of access to water at these sites (though the pumps frequently
break down in some villages). The risk inherent in establishing a village in the Baban Rafi30
forest is typified by the early experience of Garin Labou, a village that had to change its site
at least three times subsequent to failed attempts at well construction. 43
Perhaps surprisingly for an area that otherwise exhibits the characteristics of a pioneer
region, populations at a, number of the villages of western Baban Rafi, particularly those
having retained relative ethnic homogeneity, appear to have remained fairly stable in the sense
that increases have been as much or more a result of natural increase than of in-migration
(though, as noted above, in-migration has been a factor in certain villages). That village
populations have been relatively stable in very recent years is attested to by the lists of
household heads kept for tax purposes by the subdistrict office at Madarounfa, most of which
date from 1985, and most of which differ only minimally from the lists of household heads
compiled by the NFM project in 1989. Villagers do note, however, that immigrants tend to
arrive especially during times of drought, the most recent having taken place in 1984-85.
Moreover, random sample data suggest that in-migration has continued to be a factor since
only 42 percent of Hausa heads-of-household (of whom the average age is 44) in western
Baban Rafi were born in Baban Rafi, while 13 percent of the fathers of current heads-of-
household were born in Baban Rafi.
Just as significant as Hausa settlement in the western Baban Rafi forest, but much less
understood, is the settlement of herding populations. The pasture and leafy vegetation of the
Baban Rafi forest have long been exploited—perhaps even for hundreds of years—by
transhumant, usually Fulani, herders on a seasonal basis. A significant and recent trend is the
settling of many of the herders into farming. As long as 60 years ago a number of the Fulani
herders began clearing fields in the western portion of the forest for crop production.44 .44 Since
then the population of agro-pastoral Fulani in the western Baban Rafi forest has increased
steadily, but especially since the droughts of the early 1970s and 1980s.
In contrast to the Hausa, most of whom originate on the Niger side of the Niger-Nigerian
border, the majority of the Fulani populations came to Baban Rafi from south of the border.
Fully 55 percent of the Fulani call themselves Katsinawa
In contrast to the village-dwelling Hausa, the Fulani generally live adjacent to their
agricultural fields in domestic units composed of a family or an extended family. A hamlet
is defined as a group of family units and their fields clustered within a loosely defined
geographical area (e.g., southeast of Mamouri) and dependent on a particular village for
water supplies for its inhabitants and their herds. The hamlets are usually referred to by the
name of the most prominent resident, the exception being one of the two hamlets attached to
Baban Rafi village, which is referred to simply as the Katsinawa. Although the division into
hamlets is somewhat arbitrary, one might compile a mapping as follows: two Fulani hamlets
are attached to Baban Rafi village and collectively known as the "Tielawa" Fulani or
43. Earning for its persistence the often-used nickname, Na Koka, "I tried."
44. This is according to the testimony of the Fulani farmers currently settled near the abandoned village of
Tielawa. Those in other parts of western Baban Rafi generally cite a more recent date for the arrival of the first
Fulani farmers to the area.31
singularly referred to as the Katsinawa and the Hardo Aja Fulani; one hamlet is attached to
Garin Ali (a commonly used name for this recently settled group has yet to emerge); one
hamlet is attached to Goulgoussao and is known as the Ado Fulani; one hamlet is attached to
Garin Maigiya and is referred to as the Adamou Fulani; and two hamlets are attached to
Mamouri and known, respectively, as the Dan Alia and the El Hadji Guilmi Fulani.
The dispersal of Fulani households makes it difficult to compile reliable demographic
statistics. As noted above, the size of the populations of both Fulani herders and Fulani
herder/farmers are likely to be seriously underestimated if one relies on available information.
Herders have generally taken up farming after loss of all or part of livestock holdings in times
of severe drought—a recurrent condition of recent decades. In the 1990s, the population of
Fulani herders settled in the western Baban Rafi forest may equal or surpass the Hausa
population.
Another herding group, the Buzu, established a hamlet outside of Mamouri in 1984 after
fleeing a drought in Abalak (north of Maradi Department). As noted above, the Buzu are
descended from the slaves of Tuaregs. They have retained the customs and lifestyles of the
Tuareg people and continue to breed camels rather than cattle as is customary for the Fulani.
Also in contrast to the Fulani, the Buzu live in what might be described as a small village
rather than dispersed homesteads, though they remain dependent on Mamouri for their water
supplies.
2.2.3 STRUCTURES OF SOCIOECONOMIC AUTHORITY AND DECISION-MAKING
Gandu. Gandu refers to the set of relations that collectively define the basic production
unit in traditional Hausaland. Most often these relations express themselves among the
members of the gida, the basic household unit of rural Hausaland. The gida corresponds
roughly to the common understanding of the extended family. Thus the nucleus of a gandu
is an extended family, but accounts such as the classic Baba of Karo (M. Smith 1954) make
it clear that the nineteenth century gandu also included slaves and descendants of slaves.
Sutter's (1982) review of the literature points out that some writers stress the gandu's
importance as a hedge against famine and food insecurity, while other writers emphasize its
role as a defense against the slave-raiding parties prevalent during the pre-colonial era—and
especially menacing in the nineteenth century under the Sokoto caliphate.
Ega (1980) suggests that the traditional gandu probably consisted mostly of slaves, but
stresses that the gandu was a work unit in which the owner and the slaves had mutual
obligations. The owner had the right to a certain number of hours of labor from his slaves
each day, and in return he was expected to provide them with land and the time to cultivate
it. The slaves had full rights over the product of their "private" plots. It is thought that the
elaborate and detailed mutual rights and duties between the gandu head and his younger
brothers and sons—such as those enumerated by Hill (1970)—have evolved from the
traditional mutual duties characteristic of master/slave relationships in the nineteenth century.
For example, in most gandu arrangements the father assumes the responsibility of paying the
taxes charged to his sons and may even be obligated to pay his sons' brideprice.32
Prevailing production and domestic configurations. Current populations of the Baban
Rafi forest exhibit only slight resemblance to these descriptions. It is no longer necessary to
secure protection against slave raids, and in an increasingly monetized economy young men
are becoming economically independent of their fathers. The nuclear family, rather than the
extended family, is quickly becoming the model for the agricultural production unit today
encountered at Baban Rafi. And even within the nuclear family one finds a significant level
of autonomous decision-making authority over productive resources at the level of the
individual household member.
The domestic unit that corresponds to the gandu is referred to in this study as a
compound.
45 A compound includes one or more households—a household is defined as a
married male, spouse(s), children, and other dependents. The average number of households
included in a compound appears to be shrinking. It was found, for example, that by 1991
many of the compound heads included on a census list of western Baban Rafi compiled by
the NFM project in 1989 were technically heads-of-households rather than of compounds,
since married younger brothers or married sons had since formed independent domes-
tic/production units.
46 Random sample data indicate that the average number of households
in a compound in 1991 was 1.4 for the Hausa of western Baban Rafi and 1.6 for the Fulani
(including the Buzu), while average total population for each compound was 7.4 for the
Hausa and 7.3 for the Fulani (giving an average household population of 5.2 for the Hausa
and 4.5 for the Fulani and Buzu).
Ninety-five percent of Hausa household heads and their wives questioned on the matter
agree that the gandu system is in decline. To some extent, the older and the younger
generations blame each other for the decline: the former citing a lack of respect and
sometimes greed among the young, and the young men claiming they are encouraged by their
parents to move from the compound once they marry. Other commonly cited reasons for the
decline include: the widespread adoption of animal traction which makes communal labor less
necessary; disputes between related households; and simply the growth of a money economy
and the increasing individualism the new economy appears to promote. As one farmer put it,
"It used to be that the gandu bought the sheep to celebrate the marriage of a male member
of the compound; now the groom has to buy the sheep himself."
The situation among the Fulani is slightly different since most Fulani farmers are only
first or second generation farmers. As herders the Fulani tended toward small family units
compatible with a mobile lifestyle. Some of the Fulani farmers questioned stated that gandu,
45. Compound is here considered to be a more neutral term than the gida, which, in turn, implies a
gandu—the latter signifying a specific domestic and production unit that, arguably, no longer exists. Ganda
continues to be a term commonly used by both Hausa and Fulani, however, and will be used in this study to
refer to the commonly held fields of the household or of the compound as contrasted to the individually held
fields of family members.
46. It is also possible that the married brothers and sons already lived separately from the head-of-compound
recorded on census figures in 1989, but that the listing of a single head-of-compound reflected past tradition
rather than current reality.33
by which they understand large or multifamily units, are actually on the increase since the
time that they or their fathers have become farmers. Nevertheless, 85 percent of Fulani
farmers and their wives complain about a contemporary individualism—sometimes articulated
in terms of a lack of respect, laziness, or greed—among the young that makes it increasingly
difficult to hold the family together as a cohesive unit.
Whether cause or effect, entry into a market economy by Hausa farmers clearly has been
coincident with the fragmentation of the traditionally centralized decision-making apparatus
of the gandu. Nearly 70 percent of Hausa males age 15 or older have worked as field
laborers, 21 percent have herded for wages, and 38 percent have worked as wage laborers
outside of Baban Rafi (mostly in Nigeria) during the nonfarming season. Individuals earning
their own salaries are no longer dependent on their parents for payment of taxes or
brideprice. No figures are available to indicate the past incidence of wage-earning activities
among the Hausa farmers of western Baban Rafi, but it is certain that the current significant
incidence is recent and growing.
The Fulani are, so far, less experienced as wage earners than the Hausa. Only 15 percent
of Fulani men age 15 or older have earned wages as field laborers; 16 percent have earned
wages for herding; and 16 percent have earned wages outside of Baban Rafi 4
7 In contrast
to the individually earned wages becoming common among Hausa adult men, Fulani adults
are more likely to contribute to production understood to be under the control of a more
senior household head. For example, while only 16 percent of Fulani adult men have earned
wages outside of the Baban Rafi forest, 45 percent have traveled with the family livestock
herd during its seasonal transhumant migrations—much of which normally extends beyond
the boundaries of the Baban Rafi forest.
The small population of Buzu herders settled to the northeast of Mamouri presents a
rather special case in terms of wage earning among the herding populations of western Baban
Rafi. The majority of adult males in the eleven Buzu families have earned wages outside of
Baban Rafi as well as participated in transhumant livestock raising. Many of the Buzu
families travel seasonally as a group to Douala on the coast of Cameroon where some men
work as menial laborers (many of them stated, for example, that they polish shoes) while
other men stay with the herds.
Economic diversification. Table 2.3 is a tabulation of the responses of Hausa, Fulani,
and Buzu household heads when asked to name their primary, secondary, and tertiary
economic activities. One notes especially the relative lack of economic diversification of the
Fulani (88% of male household heads list no tertiary economic activity) relative to the Hausa
(33% of male household heads list no tertiary economic activity).
It is interesting that in comparing the Hausa to the Fulani, the contrast in occupational
diversity is much less noticeable among the women than among the men. Only 46 percent of
47. These figures do not include the Buzu.34
TABLE 2.3 Economic activities: male heads-of-household of western Baban Rafi
a
HAUSA FULANI BUZU
ECONOMIC (n=40) (n=25) (n=3)
ACTIVITIES 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
Farming 35 5 0 17 8 0 1 2 0
Herding 0 17 13 8 17 0 2 1 0
Trading 1 4 3 0 0 1 0 0 0
Tailor 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Woodcutting 2 3 6 0 0 1 0 0 0
Wage labor 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
Religious leader 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Blacksmith 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weaver 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Butcher 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Musician 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sculptor 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Barber 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mason 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hat cleaner 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
None 0 1 13 0 0 22 0 0 0
a. All figures are numbers of respondents answering affirmatively in view of a given
category. For example, 35 of 40 Hausa heads-of-household list farming as their primary
economic activity, while the equivalent figures are 17 of 25 Fulani heads-of-household
and 1 of 3 Buzu heads-of-household.
Hausa married women and 41 percent of Fulani married women list no tertiary economic
activity. Women are particularly active in trading (51% for the Hausa and 77% for the
Fulani) and livestock raising (89% for the Hausa and 91% for the Fulani). Although
conventional wisdom states that Fulani women generally do not work in the fields, random
sample data do not support this impression since 77 percent of the Fulani women questioned
are involved in farming. Buzu women, on the other hand, may come closer to conforming
to the conventional wisdom (only one of the three questioned is a farmer, and she as well as
others state that this is quite exceptional among Buzu women). All Hausa married women
questioned on the matter are active in farming (table 2.4).
The separate household economy of women will be further discussed in the following
chapter, as will be the distribution of arable land between households and among household
members. Here it is sufficient to note that domestic economic decision-making is not
exclusively the preserve of male heads-of-household, and it especially is not centralized under
the control of a male head-of-gandu—as it may or may not have been in the past. Rather,
domestic decision-making is characterized by a high degree of fragmentation relative to the
portrait provided in the literature of the "traditional" system of gandu.35
TABLE 2.4 Economic activities: wives of household heads 
HAUSA FULANI Buzu
ECONOMIC (n=37) (n=22) (n=3)
ACTIVITIES 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
Farming 36 1 0 13 3 1 1 0 0
Herding 0 28 5 6 14 0 0 2 0
Trading 1 6 12 2 4 11 0 0 0
Weaving 0 0 3 1 0 0 2 0 1
Hairdressing 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
None 0 1 17 0 1 9 0 1 2
a. All figures are numbers of respondents answering affirmatively in view of a given
category. For example, 36 of 37 Hausa women listed farming as their primary economic
activity, while the equivalent figures are 13 of 22 Fulani women and 1 of 3 Buzu women.
2.2.4 NONFAMILY AUTHORITY STRUCTURES
Nonfamily authority structures in place in western Baban Rafi may be enumerated as
follows: the village chiefdom (the hardo in the case of the Fulani); the canton chiefdom (the
lamido for the Fulani); Islamic religion and authorities; traditional religion and authorities;
and the structures of the Nigerien state.
Village and canton chiefs. In view of the recent settlement history of western Baban
Rafi, it is not surprising that coherent traditional authority structures have failed to firmly
entrench themselves. In spite of their weakness, however, traditional structures are in
place—though they appear to be firmly integrated into and dependent on state institutions. The
canton seats are in each case far removed from the Baban Rafi forest; nevertheless, each
village in Baban Rafi is ostensibly under the jurisdiction of a canton chief.
Of the seven villages of western Baban Rafi, only three are recognized as autonomous
administrative units by the Nigerien state, that is, only three of the villages have village
chiefs. These three villages are Baban Rafi, Mamouri, and Garin Labou. The remaining four
villages—Garin Ali, Garin Maigiya, Goulgoussao, and Yen Gobirawa—are considered by the
state to be "quarters" of Baban Rafi village. In the case of the village quarters, a subchief is
appointed for each quarter by the village chief of Baban Rafi for purposes of tax collection.
The Fulani of western Baban Rafi are divided between the jurisdictions of two Fulani
lamidos—the Fulani equivalent of the Hausa canton chief. As is the case of the Hausa, the
lamidos are seated outside of the Baban Rafi forest. The Fulani equivalent of the village chief
is the hardo, of which there are only two in western Baban Rafi. One hardo lives in the
Tielawa area south of Baban Rafi village, and another, west of Goulgoussao, but they do not
represent the majority of the Fulani living in the region. Other hamlets generally have an36
"influential person" who is responsible for communication between the hamlet and the
lamido.
To a striking degree the authority of contemporary "traditional" chiefs appears to be tied
to the state. The establishment of canton and provincial borders by the French colonial
administration was mentioned above. An additional illustration of the interlinking between
traditional and state authorities is that in reference to contemporary populations of Baban
Rafi, the first function of traditional chiefs mentioned by villagers and state functionaries alike
is tax collection.
48 Perhaps more than any other topic, taxation illustrates the threat posed
by the state (referring not only to the colonial state but also to the Sokoto caliphate before it)
to the sovereignty of traditional village and household authority structures.
Viewed from a regional (across Hausaland) perspective, the preoccupation with tax
collection appears to be an inheritance from the colonial administration, which had inherited
it from the rulers of the Sokoto caliphate before it (Hill 1977; Ega 1980; Shenton 1986).
There was no role to be played at the local level by community heads or village chiefs. The
responsibility for the collection of taxes at the village level was in the hands of an army of
civil servants collectively known as jakadu—a word meaning "messengers." Taxes went to
support several levels of administration: jakadu, hakimai (the city-based overlords of the
jakadu), emirs, and, finally, the caliph. Each level had some interest in exacting the highest
rate of tax from the level below while passing on fixed or rising amounts to the level above.
Only the villagers had no say in this process and so were subjected to increasingly
burdensome demands. The legal basis of the Sokoto tax system was the Islamic precept of
landownership and the right to demand tribute on the part of a conquering, Islamic state
(Oluwasanmi 1966).
Although just beyond the borders of the Sokoto caliphate, Maradi did not escape the tax
burden imposed by the French colonial administration, whose right to establish a tax system
was also based on privileges established by conquest. French tax policies were designed to
accomplish more than the collection of revenues. In contrast to the tribute collected in kind
by the Fulani administrators of the Sokoto caliphate, the French required that taxes be paid
in cash. The result, of course, was the region's entry into a cash economy and the emergence
of the state as a rival to local institutions, such as gandu, and village chiefdoms as managers
of local production and, therefore, of regional economies. Groundnut production was not
always sufficient to meet tax obligations, and grains also began to circulate in the growing
market economy. Raynaut reports that 50 percent of farm heads-of-household in Maradi sold
48. Djibo and Price (1990, p. 36) list the responsibilities of canton chiefs as follows:
► porte parole de 1'administration et collecteur des taxes et impôts;
► arbitre des conflits non seulement entre particuliers mais encore entre villages et des groupes
ethniques divers;
► détenteur du pouvoir d'accéder ou d'opposer une fin de non recevoir a la demande d'installation
de nouveaux venus sollicitant des terms.
Although these responsibilities correspond substantially to those listed by the populations of Baban Rafi, at least
the second and third appear to be somewhat idealized—at least according to the accounts related below and in
the following chapter concerning conflict resolution and land distribution.37
35 percent of their subsistence crops (millet) in order to meet tax obligations.
49 Significantly,
village and canton chiefs were assigned roles as middlemen in the transmission of taxes from
family heads to the state.
Today the major tax affecting the populations of Baban Rafi is an annual head tax in the
amount of CFA 700 (approximately $2.80) applied to all individuals fifteen years of age and
older. Table 2.5 illustrates the proportions of tax revenues to be awarded to the middlemen
acting between the populations of Baban Rafi and the Nigerien state according to current state
regulations.





Provincial chief 1 %
Fulani populations
Fulani hamlet representative (e.g., hardo) 12%
Fulani "canton" chief (lamido) 5%
a. Figures are percentages of revenues collected that are legally retained by the agents listed.
These figures were obtained during an interview with the sous prefet of Madarounfa on
26 September 1991. The sous prefet further explained that the monetary incentive offered
to the base-level Fulani tax collectors is set at slightly higher rates (12% as compared to
10%) to compensate for the difficulty of their task in working with a mobile and scattered
population. Examination of the tax records kept by the sous préfecture confirm the
disarray of census figures regarding the Fulani as compared to those of the Hausa.
After tax collection, the second most often cited function of traditional chiefs is conflict
resolution. Two categories of common conflicts are those over the distribution and use of
land, and domestic or marital disputes such as divorce settlements. The latter category was
not systematically investigated in preparing this study, although some anecdotal evidence
indicates that domestic disputes may not be brought to the attention of the local chief until
after a resolution has been reached.
50 Judging from incidents involving land disputes
49. As cited in Harriss 1982.
50. The two known female heads-of-household in western Baban Rafi—both living in Garin Maigiya—reside
in the house and village abandoned by their husbands, who left unilaterally in the absence of any reported
interaction with traditional village authorities. Reports of additional marital disputes indicate they were settled
with the participation of members of the extended family but not of village chiefs. Perhaps also relevant here
is mention of a young village chief who was himself involved in a marital dispute leading to the threat of wife
abandonment on the part of a man who was reacting to the discovery of an affair between his wife and the
village chief. It hardly seems likely that the incident inspired confidence in the abilities of the chief to mediate
the marital problems of others.38
occurring in western Baban Rafi, the functions of traditional authorities as dispute regulators
appears to be largely illusory. Part of the explanation may be that contemporary land conflicts
are often between groups not under the authority of a single village chief.
Two land-use disputes arose during the research period. Both disputes pitted a Hausa
village against a herding group. The first took place in the village of Garin Maigiya, the
village of the western portion of the Baban Rafi forest that has the least amount of unoccupied
arable land. The dispute involved the clearing of a parcel of land by a newly arrived family
to Garin Maigiya whose relatives already resided in the village. The parcel was wedged
between two parcels long-established and farmed by the newly arrived family's relatives, but
also located adjacent to the farms of the Fulani hamlet located to the east of Garin Maigiya.
The Fulani farmers immediately protested, claiming that the newly-cleared parcel was within
the sphere of influence created by the Fulani when they cleared their present farms.51 .' The
Fulani took their case to the lamido, who, like the Hausa canton chiefs, is a nonresident of
Baban Rafi. The chief arrived in Baban Rafi to discuss the affair with the villagers of Garin
Maigiya as well as with the village chief. No statement or ruling was issued, however, and
the affair has never been resolved to the satisfaction of the Fulani farmers who continue to
feel that their rights were violated. Apparently, the lamido has made no further effort to
involve himself in the dispute.
The second land-use dispute was between the villagers of Mamouri and the herder/farmers
of the Buzu hamlet located to the east of the village. The dispute was sparked by the
relocation of the Buzu settlement from directly east to northeast of the village in an effort to
cut off the agricultural expansion in that direction on the part of Mamouri's farmers. The
Buzu intended to preserve the large parcel in question as a forest where they could herd their
camels and other livestock, rather than to allow it to be converted to farmland. This time it
was the Hausa farmers of Mamouri who took their complaint to the canton chief at Safo. If
any decision was made by the canton chief, it was simply to remain uninvolved in the affair,
and the Hausa farmers of Mamouri remain slighted.
Interestingly, the village chiefs of western Baban Rafi failed to play active roles in the
land use disputes cited above. Both complaints were made at a level of authority beyond the
Baban Rafi forest, a level at which the complaints could be conveniently ignored.
Another possible indication of weakness of the chiefdoms of western Baban Rafi is the
lack of noticeable gift-giving to village chiefs. Although the chief of Mamouri states that he
continues to receive gifts of grain and small amounts of cash from. Mamouri's household
heads, NFM project assistants believe that such gift-giving is negligible compared to
"traditional" levels of gift-giving. The gifts are used mainly to enable the chief to provide
hospitality to newcomers and guests to the village.
51. Such a "sphere of influence" is explained in ch. 3 of this study under the heading of the "land clearing
rule" (see pp. 53ff.).39
It is unclear whether the observed weakness of the village chiefdom in western Baban Rafi
reflects a general decline in the institution, a reflection of the recent installation both of
society and chiefs in western Baban Rafi, or an inability of current chiefs to assume the
authority inherent in their office. One notes that the latter possibility is not counted out given
the characteristics of current chiefs. Of the three chiefs of western Baban Rafi, one is old,
in poor health, and head of a strikingly diverse ethnic population; another is young and
dynamic—having recently inherited the office from an old and ailing father—but prone to
"adventures" that are not always upholding of the dignity of a village chief; and the third is
widely said to be encumbered with personal problems, as well as hampered by a longstanding
dispute with his canton chief.
Yet the "pioneer" character of the settlements of Baban Rafi probably contributes as well
to the lack of authority attributed to the chiefs of western Baban Rafi. Populations have
settled at Baban Rafi in a haphazard and self-directed fashion. Few farmers, for example,
inform a village chief prior to clearing new fields in the forest.
The apparent lack of recourse to active traditional dispute settlement proceedings may be
more characteristic of the populations of Baban Rafi than is true of many settings. A visit to
the seat of the canton of Safo, for example, is likely to find the canton chief involved in
hearings concerning disputes that have arisen much closer to home than the distant Baban Rafi
forest. The canton chief, however, is also recognized as an Islamic scholar and religious
authority, a status not enjoyed by any of the village chiefs of western Baban Rafi.
The Fulani appear to maintain family units that are even more independent vis-à-vis
traditional chiefdoms as well as vis-à-vis each other than is true of Hausa society. Social
cohesion between and among Fulani families is not evident even when they are under the
authority of the same lamido and within the same region of western Baban Rafi. A case in
point consists of an attempt a few years ago to organize the Fulani into a Samarya
52
unit
similar to the one previously formed among the Hausa of Baban Rafi. The effort consisted
of the convocation of the area's Fulani heads-of-household to a meeting that included the
participation of the lamido and an assortment of government officials. According to the Fulani
who were called to the meeting, scheduled elections of officials to a Fulani Samarya unit
were finally canceled when the Fulani could not be convinced of the utility of an organization
that was to include a large number of unrelated families.
53
2.2.5 RELIGION
There exist in western Baban Rafi a variety of religious figures—representing both Islamic
and indigenous denominations—who enjoy varying levels of patronage. These figures,
however, appear to function more as consultants than as popular leaders or authority figures.
52. The Samarya is a government-sponsored youth organization.
53. This incident is reconstructed from the early notes (and later verbal accounts) of the CLUSA agent who
arrived in western Baban Rafi in late 1988 to lay the groundwork for the Baban Rafi Forestry Cooperative. The
incident was said to have taken place a year or two before the arrival of the agent.40
It is universally recognized by the residents of Baban Rafi that the traditional religious beliefs
are in decline. For example, rites initiated at the sites of sacred trees to assure bountiful
harvests—if they take place at all—are no longer the pivotal events in village life they might
have been in the recent past.54 Djibo and Price (1990) note two factors responsible for the
decline of indigenous religions: the Islamization of the population, and participation in a
money economy.
Islamization is a recent development in the Baban Rafi forest. Although the vast majority
of the population-Hausa and Fulani alike—of western Baban Rafi profess to be Muslim,
many villagers call themselves animist as well. In contradiction to Islamic precepts, a
significant number admit openly to the consumption of locally produced alcohol. Garin
Maigiya, for example, translates as "village of the possessor of alcohol." Another revealing
place name is that of the southern quarter of Baban Rafi village—Dan Anna—which translates
as "children of pagans." One villager noted that she could no more lose or denounce her
animism than she could erase the scars that were carved into her face in her infancy to
proclaim it. Nevertheless, few would not also claim to be Muslim for fear of being taken for
pagans.
55
An Islamic Association has been organized at Baban Rafi. The leading members of the
association reside in the northern quarter of Baban Rafi and in the village of Garin Ali—both
units dominated by the same ethnicity and linked to each other by family ties. The teachings,
practice and rites of Islam are quite visibly a central part of the lives, beliefs and routines of
a large number of families, and the philosophy of Islam is, in a general sense, a central part
of the popular philosophy of Baban Rafi. But does Islam function as an organizing force in
systems of social authority and decision-making? A general forestwide answer to this question
probably does not exist; the role of Islam in Baban Rafi presents a means for the division and
segregation of particular populations at the same time as it supplies a force for social cohesion
in specific instances.
Islam has had an impact on social institutions such as gandu similar in some ways to that
of capitalism and the modern state: it has promoted commerce, that is, a money economy,
and individualism—developments that appear to be destructive to social or family groupings
such as gandu.
56 Perhaps the best example is the conflict between the inheritance rules of
traditional Hausa society and the laws of Islam. The gandu system dictates that holdings are
inherited in their entirety by the eldest son who will assume the role as gandu head.
According to Islamic law, land that is to be passed on is to be divided between all sons and
daughters, with the sons receiving equal portions and the daughters entitled to one-half the
54. Such rites are described by Djibo and Price (1990, pp. 19-20).
55. See, for example, Djibo and Price (1990, p. 20). One should not assume, however, that the two
contrasting sets of religious beliefs represented by local animism and international Islam are absolutely mutually
exclusive. Greenberg (1946), in his classic book on Hausa religion, discusses the hybrid religious forms that may
result from a synthesis of indigenous and imported beliefs.
56. Greenberg (1947) draws a direct correlation between the introduction of Islam and the decline of Hausa
clan organization.41
amount inherited by their brothers. Although this rule is not practiced to the letter in western
Baban Rafi, it is undoubtedly an encouragement to the fragmentation of living units that used
to include wider extended families—a fragmentation that was noted above. Thus Islam is
added to the forces contributing to the transformation of indigenous society.43
Chapter 3
USE AND TENURE OF FOREST RESOURCES
The principal objective of the Natural Forestry Management Project is to establish a
resource management system that promotes ecological sustainability while it benefits local
populations. Success is seen to rest on the willing participation of local populations. In view
of growing demands placed on a fragile environment it is clear that if sustainability is to be
attained, access to resource use will need to be regulated. Incentives will play a key role,
since expectation of benefits are to encourage respect for rules regulating access and use. In
order to achieve maximum balance between incentives and regulation, this chapter provides
an analysis of use patterns and systems of resource regulation already operating locally at
Baban Rafi.
The methodology of the current study is an outgrowth of Bruce's (1990, p. 22) advice that
it is appropriate to begin a tenure appraisal exercise by focusing on behavior and later move
to tenure. Therefore, in addition to providing clues concerning appropriate incentives that will
be central to a management system, land and resource use practices provide an important base
for the study's analysis of tenure and management rules. The approach adopted here is not
simply a case of the dictum that actions speak louder than words, but, rather, that words
describing actions are likely to more accurately reflect reality than words describing abstract
rules and principles. For example, many Hausa farmers state that they "own" the trees
located in their agricultural fields. Yet many farmers also admit that Fulani herders have
regularly lopped off the branches of the field trees for use as fodder, and further, that the
farmers do nothing about this." What is one to understand by "ownership" in this case? The
actual use made of the trees, and by whom, is often more revealing of tenure relationships
than is categorization based on abstract labels such as "ownership" or "property."
The first half of this chapter is devoted to a description of how the resources of the Baban
Rafi forest are used, that is, of who is using which resources and what they are used for. The
second half of the chapter relates resource use to resource tenure and management and
discusses authority structures active in the domain of natural resources at the level of the
village and of the household. The focus in this chapter is especially on the use of resources
by local populations—whether full-year or seasonal residents of the forest and its periphery.
57. One notes also, however, that these practices are currently in transition. The indiscriminate lopping of
branches by transhumant herders is decreasing as farmers increasingly object to the practice. The NFm project
has played a role in this transition.44
3.1 USE OF FOREST RESOURCES
The natural resources exploited in the Baban Rafi forest fall into four primary categories:
surface and groundwater, wildlife, soil, and vegetation.
3.1.1 SURFACE AND GROUNDWATER
Probably no class of natural resources could be described as abundant in the Baban Rafi
forest (or, more generally, in the Sahel), yet it would be difficult to deny that the most crucial
resource shortage is that of water. Of the two categories of uses made of surface and
groundwater at Baban Rafi—domestic needs and livestock—the former is, of course,
indispensable to human existence. Crop irrigation does not exist at Baban Rafi, agriculture
being entirely dependent on rainwater.
It was noted in the previous chapter that nowhere in the forest does there exist year-round
surface water. No one knows how many wells have been dug and later disappeared in the
settlement history of western Baban Rafi. Although a small number of traditional wells
continue to function, the largest portion of the water consumed in western Baban Rafi comes
from wells that were constructed by the Nigerien state (with the financial support of
international participants). Two of these wells—located in Baban Rafi village and
Mamouri—are open, concrete tubewells from which water is drawn in buckets or animal skin
bags. These wells are very heavily used by Fulani populations supplying water to their cattle
and other animals. During periods of the dry season the wells may be continually in use
nearly twenty-four hours a day. The continual presence of livestock in the area of the well
degrades water quality for human consumption.
Most of the water consumed by the human populations of western Baban Rafi—whether
Hausa, Fulani, or Buzu—comes from the mechanical wells in each of the villages. These
wells tend to fall into disrepair from time to time leaving the villagers of the affected village
with little choice but to rely on open well water (if the village is Baban Rafi or Mamouri) or
travel to a neighboring village in order to meet water needs. During a series of open meetings
held in each of the villages as part of the research program for this study, six of the seven
villages expressed strong feelings of dissatisfaction with water availability, and considered the
alleviation of water shortages as among the most pressing needs of each village (the exception
is Mamouri, which has both a mechanical well and an open well). The NFM project gained
a great deal of confidence on the part of the villagers by including among its first activities
in the forest the repair of a number of malfunctioning well pumps. The census of the area's
wells recorded in table 3.1 was compiled with the participation of villagers from each of the
villages.
Domestic water needs of all groups are met through the labor of the women and girls of
each household who draw water at the well and carry it home, often by donkey in the case
of Fulani populations far removed from the village pump. Both men and women participate
in the watering of livestock. The small tree nurseries, established with the aid of the NFM
project in each village near a well equipped with a mechanical pump, are tended and watered
by males—often heads-of-households.45





(not installed by state)
Mamouri 1 1
Garin Maigiya 1 1
Baban Rafi 2 1
Garin Labou 1
Goulgoussao 1 1
Yen Gobirawa 1 2
Garin Ali 1 1
a. The mechanical wells of western Baban Rafi were installed in the early 1980s by the
Nigerien government with the support of an internationally sponsored development
project. The model adopted in this region consists of a pedal-operated pump mounted on
an enclosed well.
b. The two "modern" wells of western Baban Rafi were installed by the state about 1960.
The wells consist of concrete tubes buried to a depth of 35 meters or more. The wells are
open at the top and water is drawn by lowering buckets or other containers.
c. Traditional wells generally fall into disrepair after a small number of years relative to
concrete, modern wells. Unlike mechanical wells, which are also susceptible to
breakdowns, traditional wells are more likely to be abandoned than repaired.
3.1.2 WILDLIFE
As noted in the preceding chapter, exploitation of the wildlife of Baban Rafi predates
contemporary agricultural settlements of the area. Hausa farmers visited the forest from
neighboring areas of Niger and Nigeria to engage in seasonal hunting. Little is known of the
extent of the hunting that took place at Baban Rafi prior to the establishment of villages, but
in terms of the region's later settled populations it is clear that until as recently as the 1960s
game was considered plentiful and hunting was an important occupation for many local
residents.
The significance of hunting in today's Baban Rafi forest appears to be negligible, though
a small number of local hunters are known to travel periodically to some of the thicker forest
regions of northern Nigeria, where there is more game than at Baban Rafi and where the
hunting of most species is legal (though subject to acquisition of a paid permit from a game
warden). Those hunters who continue to practice their occupation in the Baban Rafi forest are
said primarily to target birds, since there is little else. The hunters themselves are hesitant
to talk about the extent of their activities because they are in violation of Nigerien law
(hunting of any kind has been illegal in Niger since 1972). There may exist a small, local
underground market for various birds and possibly additional small game, but the dimensions
of this market are very small. The small number of Hausa farmers who admit to occasional
hunting are all age forty and above, are male, and represent a variety of ethnic backgrounds.
The extent of hunting activities among the Fulani and the Buzu of western Baban Rafi was
not explored by the research undertaken for the present study.46
3.1.3 TREES AND VEGETATION
Residents of Baban Rafi village were asked during a village meeting in early 1991 to list
the tree species with which they were familiar in the Baban Rafi forest. The list compiled
during this meeting contains 68 Hausa names of tree species. Fifty-nine of the 68 names were
later determined to be tree species of the natural forest." Of the 59 natural forest species,
55 were later identified by their scientific names, while four remain unidentified except by
their Hausa names. Forty-six of the natural forest species were included in a separate
questionnaire designed to obtain information concerning tree use.
59
The most noteworthy of the findings of the tree-use survey
60 is the degree to which the
majority of the 46 species researched serve a variety of purposes. For example, 72 percent
of species are exploited for their wood, 61 percent for fruit, 87 percent for leaves, 63 percent
for bark, 54 percent for roots, 37 percent for branches, and 7 percent for sap. Moreover,
each of the tree parts exploited may serve a variety of purposes. It was found that of those
species exploited for their wood, 91 percent provide fuelwood, 36 percent are used in the
construction of dwellings or other shelters, and 55 percent are used in some type of sculpture
(e.g., the manufacture of tools, utensils, mortars). The following observations reinforce the
multiple-use nature of the trees of the Baban Rafi forest:
61 3 species of trees are of particular
cultural significance, often functioning as "sacred" trees;
62 35 species (76%) are exploited
for fodder, including (depending on the species) leaves, fruits, and twigs; 36 species (78%)
provide local medicines, including leaves, fruit, sap, bark, and roots; 14 species (30%) have
been actively encouraged by some farmers to regenerate naturally in their agricultural fields;
and 25 species (54%) are said to be of commercial importance, including trade in wood, fruit,
leaves, bark, roots, branches, and sap.
63 Although the questionnaire failed to distinguish
between human and animal consumption of edible tree parts, it is clear that many trees are
58. Since some grasses and some woody species—such as mango—recently introduced into the village or farm
setting but not found in the natural forest were also included among the names on the list originally provided
by the Hausa farmers, the final list was reduced to 59.
59. The misplacement of part of the list by the team of enumerators prevented the inclusion of all 59 species
in this exercise.
60. The following information on tree use is provided by Hausa farmers and includes no input from the
Fulani or Buzu populations of the forest.
61. One will recall that this presentation focuses on trees of the natural forest and therefore ignores important
uses of trees in villages and on farms where trees achieve such benefits as shade, soil enrichment, and
windbreaks.
62. Trees designated as sacred are used in special ceremonies as the site for sacrificing small livestock or
poultry in the hope of improving harvests or reaching other goals.
63. Regarding commercially significant species, it is striking that of these species a greater number
contributes to trade in medicines (21 species, or 84% of commercially exploited species) than to trade in
fuelwood (18 species, or 72% of commercially exploited species).47
exploited by the inhabitants of Baban Rafi as a food source, with leaves, fruit, and sap
contributing to local diets—the most prized ingredient probably being the leaves of the
baobab.
In sum, the overriding observation concerning the use of natural forest trees at Baban Rafi
is the wide variety of uses as indicated by the intensive use made of almost all tree parts.
Although most forestry planners and developers active in the Sahel have traditionally focused
on the production of fuelwood, the tree use findings presented above are consistent with the
isolated though increasing appearances in Sahelian social science and natural forest literature
since the early 1980s of books and articles drawing attention to the nonwoody products of
African and Sahelian forests."
It would be difficult systematically to categorize the users attached to the uses described
above, and such a task is not attempted here. One may, however, speak in general terms of
users as classified by "occupational" group." Thus, for example, blacksmiths exploit certain
hardwood species for fuel to operate their forges, while traditional healers seek out a variety
of species, each known for a special ingredient to be used in the production of a local
medicine. One may state with near certainty that the collection of wood to be used in
construction or sculpture is the responsibility of men, while the gathering of dried wood for
fuel or leaves for sauces is generally done by women. Trees providing fodder are much more
heavily exploited by Fulani herders than by Hausa farmers, while the Hausa farmers are more
advanced than their Fulani counterparts in integrating trees into farming systems (in part
because they have been more receptive to the NFM project). Children are generally allowed
to collect freely the wild fruits of trees such as Lannea acida, which sometimes are the
objects of petty trade. Each "occupational" group enjoys a particular niche within the variety
of uses made of trees in the natural forest of Baban Rafi. A list (certainly incomplete) of such
occupational groups includes herders, farmers, women, men, children, traditional healers,
blacksmiths, sculptors, cooks, and traditional religious leaders. (One notes that one has yet
to mention harvesters and consumers of commercial fuelwood—a topic discussed below.)
In addition to the woody species (trees and bushes) discussed above, there are several
species of grasses occurring naturally in the Baban Rafi forest which are heavily relied upon
by local populations to fulfill needs for fodder and construction materials. Andropogon
gayanus is perhaps the most notable of the grassy species in terms of use value to local
inhabitants. Not only is Andropogon enormously prized as fodder, it is widely used as a
material that can be woven into either mats to cover the ground or sheets for use in the
64. See, for example, Poulsen (1982); Sène (1985); Von Maydell (1990).
65. The qualifier is used very loosely. For example, "men" may be considered as an occupation insofar as
membership in this category confers responsibilities such as the construction of dwellings and fences.
66. Unlike some of the longer-established farming regions of Niger—regions in which trees such as Acacia
albida have long played a role in traditional agroforestry systems—by almost all accounts trees have traditionally
been little integrated into the farming systems characteristic of the more recent farms of Baban Rafi.48
construction of walls for hangars and housing units, or it may be used in the fabrication of
baskets and other objects. Both men and women use Andropogon as a weaving material. In
common with many useful tree species, Andropogon is becoming increasingly rare in the
Baban Rafi forest.
3.1.4 SOIL: USE AND DEMAND
The use made of soil is, of course, crop production. Virtually every family residing year-
round in western Baban Rafi provides for its subsistence by producing grains (millet and
sorghum) and legumes (cowpeas and groundnuts). In addition to satisfying domestic needs,
a portion of legume production is generally destined for local markets, as are grains in cases
of bumper crops or particular cash needs. Groundnuts were established as the cash crop of
the region during the colonial period, and they maintained this role until the decline of the
international market in the 1960s and 1970s. In recent years cowpeas—produced primarily
for local
67 rather than international markets—have started to overtake groundnuts as the
region's primary commercial crop. Additional cash crops include cassava, sesame, sorrel, and
corn, though the number of farmers producing these crops and the quantities produced are
very small. Table 3.2 records the production choices effected in western Baban Rafi during
the 1991 growing season.
TABLE 3.2 Production decisions by field and by crop: growing season, 1991
(n = fields included in census")
MANAGEMENT CATEGORY





(n=239) (n=72) (n=78) (n =18)
Millet 192 (80%) 66 (92%) 76 (97%) 17 (94%)
Sorghum 190 (79%) 67 (93%) 76 (97%) 13 (72%)
Cowpeas 160 (67%) 54 (75%) 59 (76%) 14 (78%)
Groundnuts 93 (39%) 22 (31%) 12 (15%) 1 (6%)
Fallow 7 (3%) 1 (1-2%) 0 0
Other (cassava, corn,
sesame, sorrel, or cotton) 10 (5%) 1 (1-2%) 2 (2-3%) 0
a. Figures are based on information provided by random sample respondents regarding total
fields under their management authority. The sum of percentages recorded in a given
column exceeds 100 since many fields are managed to produce more than one crop at the
same time.
67. In this case, neighboring villages in Nigeria are considered part of the "local" market since commercial
channels established to supply this market remain informal. Marketing channels in place to circulate groundnut
production were established and continue to be managed by the Nigerien state.49
The first objective of Baban Rafi farmers is to satisfy domestic needs for grains. One will
recall that agricultural production remains a risky undertaking in this resource-poor region.
As a result of wide variations in annual amounts of rainfall, any given year is nearly as likely
to witness a grain deficit as it is to experience a surplus. Nevertheless, needs for cash are
increasing. According to local testimony, cash needs occasionally lead to crop sales in
situations in which satisfaction of domestic needs is not entirely secure.
In addition to the seasonal risk of uncertain rainfall, the region is experiencing a long-
term trend toward decreased production per unit of cultivated area. The region's soils, poor
to begin with, are easily exhausted after a number of seasons of continuous agricultural
production. In the past during an era of lower population densities, fields were routinely
abandoned following a number of years of production, at which time the farmer cleared an
alternative site for crop production. A few abandoned fields still exist in western Baban Rafi,
though such sites today tend quickly to be reclaimed by neighboring farmers.
Most of today's farmers hold their fields as private property and bequeath them to their
children upon death or old age. Consequently, fields are often continuously cultivated.
Although 38 percent of Hausa heads-of-household state that they occasionally leave their
fields fallow for an average of 3.8 years, only 3 percent of all fields managed by the Hausa
heads-of-household were fallow in 1991. Twenty-two percent of farmer's wives say they
leave their fields fallow for an average of 1.8 years, but only one of the 72 fields managed
by the women questioned was fallow in 1991. Corresponding figures for Fulani heads-of-
household are 20 percent who say they leave their fields fallow for an average of 2.9
years—but none of which were fallow in 1991. Similarly, Fulani wives included in the survey
manage a total of 18 fields, none of which was in fallow in 1991. Finally, none of the fields
cultivated by Buzu farmers—male or female—was fallow in 1991.
Fertilizers have never been widely available on an affordable basis to the isolated
populations of Baban Rafi, and their use throughout Maradi Department has been in decline
since 1981, presaging the suspension of many of the rural loan activities of the Caisse
Nationale du Crédit Agricole (CNCA) in 1983 (Niger 1986a, pp. 21, 32).
68 Although the
majority of area farmers state that they apply manure to at least some of their fields, many
Hausa-owned animals are left to the care of Fulani herders, the latter benefiting dispropor-
tionately from the integration of livestock raising and farming. It is widely said that Fulani
farmers consistently achieve higher yields per surface unit than Hausa farmers as a result of
increased manuring. No accurate figures exist to support this claim, but it should be noted
that increased levels of productivity achieved by Fulani farmers (if they exist) might also
result from the generally younger age of the fields of the Fulani. Finally, agroforestry has
not been an established practice at Baban Rafi. In fact, the argument that trees attract grain-
eating birds is often cited as the primary motivation for removing nearly all trees from
agricultural fields. The NFm project is working hard to convince local populations of the
utility of field trees and so far prospects for success appear promising.
68. The CNCA is the financial arm of the state-sponsored cooperative movement discussed in ch. 4
(pp. 72-74).50
The general observation relating to soil use and depletion at Baban Rafi is that local
production figures appear to reflect regional trends toward decreased production per unit area.
The Nigerien government, for example, estimates that millet and sorghum yields in Maradi
Department decreased 30 percent between 1978 and 1983, and that only a part of the decrease
can be explained by rainfall levels, adding that "the essential cause is poorer soils" (Niger
1986a, p. 19).
69 Research undertaken for the present study reveals an almost universal
feeling at Baban Rafi that living standards have declined in recent decades, with diminishing
average-per-hectare agricultural production mentioned along with the disappearance of
valuable trees and game as the reasons for the decline.
In the face of declining yields and annual population growth in the range of 3 percent,
there is tremendous pressure to expand the area put to agricultural production. Most farmers
(93% of Hausa heads-of-household and 86% of Fulani and Buzu heads-of-household) believe
there is wooded land available in the immediate vicinity to allow for expansion of existing
fields. The NFM preliminary management plan estimates that an additional 4-7 hectares are
put to agricultural production each year in the vicinity of each sedentary village, and that over
10 hectares additionally may be put to production around the semi-sedentary hamlets (Projet
SALAMA 1991, p. 37). In the course of the present study, 45 percent of Hausa farmers and
54 percent of Fulani farmers admit to having cleared new fields during the five years prior
to 1991. Further to illustrate the magnitude of agricultural expansion at Baban Rafi in recent
years, one adds that 33 percent of Hausa fields and 73 percent of Fulani fields were cleared
by the present occupants of these fields. The desire further to expand cultivated area is
expressed by 39 of 40 Hausa farmers; 35 of 37 wives of Hausa farmers; 23 of 25 Fulani
herders; 15 of 22 wives of Fulani farmers; and 2 of 3 Buzu farmers (the wives of Buzu
farmers generally do not work in their husband's fields or manage fields of their own).
Another indicator of the importance accorded by local populations to increasing food
production consists of responses to a request to prioritize local development needs. Forty-one
percent of Hausa and 46 percent of Fulani stated that the first goal should be increased
agricultural production.
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The ability of the individual farmers of western Baban Rafi to cultivate ever larger surface
areas has been enhanced since the mid-1970s through increased accessibility to animal
traction. The most important agent for the diffusion of animal traction throughout many areas
of Maradi Department was the Maradi Department Development Project active from 1977 to
1987. Seventy-nine percent of randomly selected heads-of-household questioned in 1991 state
that they generally make use of animal traction when they prepare their fields.
69. See also Dumont (1986, p. 28); and Djibo and Price (1990, p. 47).
70. Respectively, 24% and 41 % believed the first goal should be forest protection; 20% and 5 %, earn money
for local populations; and 15% and 8%, improve infrastructure.51
With the exception of the transhumant herding populations" (who are only seasonal
inhabitants of western Baban Rafi), all local populations depend directly on the area's soils
for their subsistence. With a few partial exceptions, all ethnic, gender, and age categories are
directly involved in agricultural production. The exceptions include a fairly significant number
of Fulani women who do not participate in crop production (23% of the Fulani women
included in the random sample do not farm), and a number of young Fulani men who are
full-time herders. In addition, by reputation at least, Buzu women do not farm (though one
of the three Buzu women interviewed said she does farm). In each case, however, each of
the ethnic, gender, and age categories contributes to a household that relies on farming either
as its primary occupation or as one of its two central occupations (herding being the other).
The division between farm management and labor within households, as well as the allocation
of fields between households, will be discussed below under the topic of resource tenure.
In terms of environmental impact, one might summarize this first half of the present
chapter by observing that currently there are but three significant categories of uses made of
the forest resources of western Baban Rafi. These categories are use of forest resources for
fuel, fodder, and the production of agricultural crops.
3.2 RESOURCE TENURE AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Resource use and resource users were discussed in the previous section. The present
section of this chapter introduces the concept of tenure in an attempt to discern the extent to
which tenure rules exist in western Baban Rafi and to determine how existing rules and
management guidelines and objectives affect use and regeneration of (or, in terms of
economic policy, investment in) resources. After briefly addressing tenure and management
regarding the resources of water and game in western Baban Rafi, the bulk of this section will
focus on tenure and management in the context of trees and soils.
"By `tenure' is meant the set of rights which a person or some private or public entity
holds in land or trees" (Bruce 1990, p. 1). One may also, of course, speak of "sets of rights"
in relation to resources such as water and wildlife. A resource management or tenure system
consists of the rules and the authority and/or decision-making structures in place to define and
regulate rights of access. One needs, therefore, to relate indigenous structures of general
authority to resource use as well as to identify tenure rules (e.g., the "land-clearing rule"
discussed below) which have no apparent relationship (or perhaps a weakening relationship)
to existing and identifiable authority structures or mechanisms of enforcement. These sets of
considerations are respectively and loosely referred to below as "centralized" and
"noncentralized" authority structures—though the distinction is not rigid or rigorously pursued
in this discussion. An example of a centralized authority structure with a role to play in the
tenure system is the village chiefdom, while an example of a decentralized authority structure
is the land-clearing rule discussed at length below.
71. These populations are not included in the random sample survey cited throughout this study.52
3.2.1 WATER
It was stated earlier that the major sources of water used in domestic consumption as well
as livestock production are the government-installed wells in each village. When questioned
as to the identity of the agent in charge of well management, most villagers and herders
ascribe responsibility to the village chiefs. It is clear, however, that state-installed wells are
exploited as an open-access resource. Moreover, when wells that are equipped with
mechanical pumps break down they are likely to remain inoperational for indefinite periods
of time—or at least this was the case until the arrival of the NFM project. Nor is any action
taken when water from the open wells tastes of cattle manure. Neither the state nor the local
chiefdom has been quick to assume responsibility for maintaining the wells.
A number of traditional, that is, privately constructed, wells still exist in western Baban
Rafi. From an early date, some or all traditional wells were shared by Hausa and Fulani
populations—in spite of the fact that the wells had been constructed by Hausa settlers.
Permission to use these wells is granted by the elder village chief or well builder, and kola
nuts or livestock are offered in recognition of authority over the well.
Given the critical and chronic shortage of water in the Baban Rafi forest, it is perhaps
surprising that most use of available water is not more strictly controlled. There are two
possible and partial explanations for the free and unrestricted access to most existing water
resources accorded to virtually anyone. The first is the evolution of an attitude and tradition
in this parched area that to deny water—"the source of life"—to anyone would be unthinkable.
The second reason is that the majority of the wells currently functioning in western Baban
Rafi were constructed by the state (though the villagers in most cases supplied most of the
labor), and therefore authority over use and maintenance of the wells has not been established
to be within the domain of local chiefs. The logic behind a lack of local authority over water
drawn from state-constructed wells might be found in the following definition of "property"
as articulated by a villager from Garin Maigiya: "Property is something someone has suffered
to gain, and in the process, has established claims to its use."
3.2.2 WILDLIFE
Hunting has existed as a clandestine activity since a hunting ban was put into effect by
the government of Niger in 1972. It is, therefore, difficult to gather information on local
authority structures that might regulate the hunting that currently takes place at Baban Rafi.
However, it is clear that hunting is no longer an important activity in the area, and its decline
probably is the result more of a lack of available game than of the state's interdiction.
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72. In support of this speculation one notes that the banning by the state of many uses of trees did not cease
the banned activities as long as the trees have been available.53
3.2.3 LAND
Trees and soils are treated here as a single block (land) to reflect customary practices and
authority structures, which are not usually organized according to distinctions between
individual resources,
73 and to reflect the reality of the ecological interrelationships between
the two categories of resources. Again, the present topic is customary or local tenure and
management arrangements. The use of trees is regulated in detail by the Nigerien Forest
Code, which is discussed in the following chapter. Access to soils is regulated in the same
legislation through restrictions to the removal of vegetative cover. Further, the use of trees
destined to supply the fuelwood market of Maradi is discussed below, which also includes a
discussion of the authority structures involved in the regulation of the wood trade. The
following discussion considers the interaction between local authority structures and the use
of trees and soils in western Baban Rafi.
The role of central authority at the village level: traditional land-use planning. One
begins by asking whether there exist centralized customary authority structures that currently
exert some influence over access to resources. By implication, centralized authority structures
would be capable of some degree of "planning"—that is, the ability consciously to modify
resource access rules and arrangements. The follow-up to the question of centralized authority
will be to determine whether noncentralized, unplanned authority structures (e.g., customs
or rules unattached to tangible structures capable of planning modifications to the rules) are
operating as determinants of access to resources. The central task is to examine the working
rules and enforcement mechanisms of either type of structure found to exist in western Baban
Rafi. The investigation addresses two administrative levels of potential customary authority:
the village and the household.
In spite of the case presented in the preceding chapter arguing that local chiefdoms are
generally weak, limited land use planning—one might even call it "zoning"—has been a
feature of the villages of western Baban Rafi since their inception. These land use rules
continue to regulate the use of trees and soils in certain areas. Where land use rules exist,
chiefs and elders or the village "ancestors" are cited as the authors. For example, each of the
villages has one or more designated cattle trails designed to allow cattle to circulate between
the village well or wells and the forest. The land designated as a cattle trail generally has no
or few trees but cannot be put to crop production. Therefore, trees and crops are forfeited
principally to allow for the passage of livestock herds without destruction to established
agricultural fields. Each cattle trail generally dates from early in the history of the village it
serves and is said to have been established by the early village chiefs and elders (though in
the case of one of the two cattle trails serving Baban Rafi village, the sous prefet of
Madarounfa is said to have participated in setting the boundaries the cattle trail).
73. See, for example, Shepherd (1988?, p. 1). The treatment of parcels as ecological systems rather than as
a collection of discrete resources in traditional African tenure systems is also attested to by Alain Rochegude
(personal communication), a specialist of both customary and modern legal systems in the Sahel [Rochegude is
affiliated with the Association Universitaire Partiellement et Entièrement en Langue Française (AUPELF) based
at the University of Montreal].54
Most cattle trails are not marked in any formal way, but their location and borders are
said to be generally known. Still, there is a degree of farmer encroachment said to take place
on the fringes of land recognized as a cattle trail. Disputes periodically result when cattle
enter fields and cause damage to crops. These disputes are, according to villagers, often
resolved at the level of the parties involved without appeal to local or external authorities. But
periodically such a case is referred to the village chief for adjudication. In such cases, the
chief is said generally to rule in favor of the farmer, thereby instructing the offending herder
to compensate the farmer for damages.
In addition to cattle trails, some wooded areas have been established as pastureland.
Inhabitants of a number of the villages—Garin Maigiya, Garin Labou, Yen Gobirawa, and
Mamouri—have claimed that sections of the nearby forest are officially recognized as pasture.
The areas designated as pasture have been placed off-limits to crop production—though
exploitations of trees, such as for fuelwood, are allowed. With the exception of Yen
Gobirawa, it is further claimed that the areas in question have been designated as pasture
since the time of the "ancestors." The designated pasture of Yen Gobirawa—a village in
existence only slightly more than two decades and therefore exerting little claim to rulings
inherited from "the ancestors"—is on the Nigerian side of the Niger-Nigerian border. The
expansion of the farms of Yen Gobirawa into Nigeria would present a political and
administrative complication, thus providing an alternative explanation for a land use
designation of "pasture." In at least one of the remaining cases of designated pastures—that
to the east of Mamouri—it currently appears that pressure is building for colonization by
farmers, and that the area's designation as pasture will likely fade with the passage of time.
In any case, the lines between pasture and forest (i.e., land eligible to be cleared for
agricultural production) are somewhat blurred. Villagers participating in village meetings at
Baban Rafi village and Garin Ali state that pasture and forest are the same thing.
A less significant example of resource use planning in terms of environmental implications
consists of the trees reserved for religious ceremonies. Four of the seven villages declare the
existence of such trees, and in each case the trees are protected from any use that might result
in their damage. But in only one case does the religious or mystical designation extend
beyond one or a small number of specific trees (often located in a farmer's field) to a unit
referred to as an area rather than a tree.
Limits to village-level central authority: land-clearing rule. The feeling that currently
forested land available for conversion to agricultural land is in short supply has come to
Baban Rafi only recently. Even in 1991, with the exception of Garin Maigiya, assembled
villagers in each village were largely in agreement that there remains plenty of forest into
which to expand. Yet there is already a sense that the limits to agricultural expansion are not
far away. Mamouri, for example, has been in dispute with the neighboring Buzu hamlet since
the latter relocated its housing site in 1991 to cut off the expansion of village fields moving
to the northeast. A similar dispute is pending between Garin Maigiya and the Fulani hamlet
to the east of the village. One observes, then, that whatever mechanism is in place to regulate
the clearing of new fields in western Baban Rafi, it is not always effective when confronted
with expansion by each of two ethnically unrelated groups.55
How is forested land allocated for agricultural production? Who has authority over land
as yet unused in this way? Most major uses of the forest, such as the exploitation of fuelwood
or fodder, are intended neither to permanently change the ecology of individual parcels
(regardless of whether environmental degradation is the de facto result of exploitation) nor
to claim individual ownership of the parcels. The clearing of the forest to create farms is
unique in that it is the only use made of the forest intended to change the physical and
"legal,"" or tenure, status of the land. Moreover, according to indications presented in the
general discussion of forest resource use contained in the first half of this chapter, the
expansion of agricultural production appears to be the primary development goal of local
populations. The result is a strong pressure to clear new lands for production.
It does not appear that land clearings are regulated by some central authority of the
village. In most cases, the only feasible representative of central authority at the village level
is the village chief. Yet only 28 percent (5 of 18) of random sample Hausa farmers who
admit to having cleared land in the five years prior to questioning state that they asked
somebody's permission before doing so. Of the five Hausa farmers who asked permission
before clearing land, four asked permission of the village chief and one asked permission of
a forester. The corresponding figure for Fulani farmers is only 13 percent (2 of 15) who
asked permission prior to clearing. One of the two Fulani farmers who asked permission
before clearing land asked a village chief, the other asked a hardo—a traditional Fulani chief.
The majority of both Hausa and Fulani farmers who cleared land in the five years prior to
1991 informed nobody in advance of the action.
These farmers did not inform others of their intentions to clear new fields because
according to local customary tenure rules they were not required to do so. In most cases, new
clearings consisted of extensions of fields already put to agricultural production. The
customary tenure regime dictates that by virtue of having established cultivation rights to a
given parcel, one has also established future clearing rights to the adjacent wooded parcel
lying on the forest's edge. From another perspective one could articulate the rule as follows:
anyone other than the owner of a field bordering the forest would be required to ask the
permission not of the village chief, but of the owner of the adjacent field before clearing a
parcel currently forming the edge of the forest and bordering on an established field. The fact
that the majority of clearings are extensions of existing fields, therefore, precludes the
necessity to ask permission before clearing a new parcel. It should be noted, however, that
such a rule stands in contradiction to national forest legislation which clearly states that all
forested land belongs to the state, and that the removal of trees from the land requires the
permission of the state.
In addition to the land-clearing rule, a factor which helps to explain the lack of necessity
to ask permission or to inform anyone before the clearing of land by Fulani farmers was
mentioned at the outset of this section on tree and soil tenure: that resources in the deep
74. The word "legal" appears in quotation marks since it is used in a broad sense to indicate a change in
ownership status—even though the change probably includes no title, but rather is recognized on the local level
according to customary practices.56
forest are exploited as open-access goods. Again one notes that such access is open according
to de facto rather than de jure criteria since the Nigerien state formally claims ownership of
all forests.
The land-clearing rule is recognized across as well as within residential (i.e., a village or
a hamlet) or ethnic groups. Within a group it tends to regulate land allocation over time in
an orderly way. Families are allowed to expand their fields toward the forest as they grow.
When a family does not need a parcel it has the rights to clear, it may accord clearing rights
to an individual parcel to someone else—such as a newcomer to the village. This is just what
happened in Garin Maigiya in 1991 when a newcomer that had cleared a parcel granted by
a fellow villager was challenged by a family of a Fulani hamlet expanding its fields from the
opposite direction. The incident illustrates the fact that while the land-clearing rule is
reasonably efficient in intragroup land allocation, it is insufficient as an instrument for
allocation between groups. Additional intergroup disputes over land probably are looming in
the near future of western Baban Rafi as land available for clearing comes increasingly to be
in short supply.
Another interesting characteristic of the land-clearing rule is that it confers the rights not
to clear land just as it confers clearing rights on those who are able to take advantage of it.
This characteristic was illustrated by the Buzu who in 1991 relocated their residential camp
from directly east of Mamouri to directly northeast in an attempt to cut off the expansion of
village farms moving toward the northeast. The result of the relocation was the establishment
by the Buzu of rights over the section of forest now separated from Mamouri by the Buzu
camp. Whereas the land would eventually have been converted by the villagers of Mamouri
to farmland, the intention of the Buzu is to preserve the land as forest to be exploited for
fodder by their herds of camels and other livestock. As mentioned earlier, the use of the
tactic of relocation of their camp on the part of the Buzu has infuriated the villagers of
Mamouri and the situation, at least in the view of the farmers, has yet to be satisfactorily
resolved.
In summary, one may say of the land-clearing rule that it is more than a mechanism for
the allocation of land, but rather, it signifies an instrument for the establishment of something
resembling private ownership of land. The key to "private" ownership is the conversion of
forest to farm. Through the act of conversion one establishes rights not only to the farm
created but to the potential farm adjacent to the one created. As noted earlier, uses of forest
resources such as for fuelwood or fodder do not exhibit a similar rights-creating capacity.
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This is why the Buzu will not expand their rights (in a geographical sense) beyond those
already established if they preserve the forest they intend to use for pasture. The land-clearing
rule, in other words, has a built-in incentive for the clearing of new land (the incentive being
75. This is not to say that no rights are created in the course of habitual exploitation of forested parcels for
fuelwood or fodder, since both herders and wood merchants appear to have built up such rights. However, the
rights claimed by herders and wood merchants over forested parcels do not equal the extent of the rights claimed
by farmers over recently converted parcels, since the latter category of rights approaches the status of private
property.57
the acquisition of property) and, therefore, creates a bias toward a particular land
use—farming. Many farmers and herders of western Baban Rafi will readily attest to this
observation.
Separate accounts: economies of women and men. Much of the following discussion
revolves around gender roles within the family compound as an illustration of variable
resource access by household member. Table 3.3 presents a demographic portrait of the
"average" compound of the Hausa farmers, on the one hand, and the Fulani and Buzu
farming-herders, on the other. One will recall that a household is defined as a married male,
his wife or wives, and his dependents, while a compound includes members of a family
grouping (of one or more households) who share a defined quantity of farmland (the bulk of
which is usually under the nominal control of a male head-of-compound), and usually live
together.
TABLE 3.3 Demographic characteristics of compounds
HAUSA FULANI AND BUZU
(n=40) (n=28)
Total population 7.4 7.3
Population age 15 or older 3.8 3.8
"Active" population or total work force 4.8 5.1
(age 8 or older)
Number of households 1.4 1.6
(corresponds to married males)
Number of wives of married males I.4
a 1.3'
Population/household 5.2 4.5
a. In the case of married males, the random sample pertaining to Hausa farmers includes
37 instead of 40 respondents. One of the 4
.0 respondents is a widower while 2 are single
adults, having become household heads upon the death of a parent. If "household heads"
rather than "married men" is used to determine average number of wives, the figure
becomes 1.3.
b. All of the 28 Fulani and Buzu heads-of-household included in the random sample are
married.
Underlying the present discussion is the central observation that the economic activities
and influence of women in the family compound are increasingly linked to women's
participation in a market economy. To a striking degree, the production of women is managed
separately from the general production of the compound or household. One must distinguish,
however, between management and possession of a productive resource such as land, and
management and possession of the production of the land. In most cases, the most permanent
of tenure and management rights to the productive resources of a given compound remain
in the possession of the male head-of-compound.58
All farm production may be classified either as collective (multi-person) or individual
(single-person)—all that is produced collectively being under the authority of the compound
head. One observes first the extent of total—that is, nongender-specific—individual production
by noting that of all agricultural parcels, 49 percent of Hausa fields and 39 percent of Fulani
and Buzu fields are farmed individually—the remainder being worked collectively, again,
under the managerial authority of the compound head.
76 The compound work force is
composed of all individuals above the age of 7, or 64 percent of Hausa populations and 70
percent of Fulani populations according to random sample data. Random sample data further
yield the following information regarding this active population:
► Of the Hausa work force: 91 percent of males and 67 percent of females work in the
collective fields of the household while 43 percent of males and 93 percent of females
manage one or more individual fields (whose produce remains, in general, under the
authority of the individual and not the household).
► Of the Fulani and Buzu work force: 78 percent of males and 17 percent of females
work in the collective fields of the household while 13 percent of males and 45
percent of females manage one or more individual fields.
One might also consider the gender composition of the respective work forces (as opposed
to categorizing practices within genders). Among the Hausa, 37 percent of the work force
participating in collective work is composed of women while 63 percent of individuals
working individual fields are women. The comparable figures for the Fulani and Buzu are
15 percent of the collective work force is composed of women while 74 percent of individuals
working individual fields are women.
One might use the information above to illustrate typical patterns of farm management and
land allocation in "average" Hausa, Fulani, and Buzu compounds—keeping in mind that
within each of the three groups there exist significant variations to these patterns. The average
Hausa compound of western Baban Rafi controls 5.3 fields with an average size between 1
and 2 hectares.
77 Some of these fields may be further subdivided into individually managed
parcels, but generally well over half of total hectares remain under the management of the
compound head. Based on the figures cited above, one might assume that the average Hausa
compound includes two men and two women of age 15 or older. Both men and one of the
two women (probably a young, unmarried woman) work in the collective fields while one
76. The percentages refer to total fields and do not take account of the generally larger size of collectively
worked fields as compared to individual fields. One notes as well that a field's classification as "individually
managed" does not necessarily exclude the participation of one or more additional household members in
performing agricultural tasks on the parcel, but does indicate that major management decisions, and especially
control over production, fall largely to an individual of the household who is not the compound head.
77. This is according to random sample data. The size is a rough estimate since I made no attempt to
measure the parcels. Djibo and Price (1990, pp. 44-45) note that field sizes at Baban Rafi vary from 0.5 to 5
ha, but agree that most are between 1 and 2 ha; they add that most Hausa households control fewer than 6 fields.
Individually worked fields tend to be smaller than collectively worked fields.59
man (probably a young, non-head-of-household) and both women probably manage individual
fields, usually of no more than 1 hectare.
78
The average Fulani compound controls 2.9 agricultural fields. While one or both working-
age men in a Fulani household work in the collective fields, it is highly likely that neither of
the working-age women work there. Generally in a given Fulani compound there is no more
than one parcel managed individually, and this field is likely to be managed by one of the two
working-age women of the compound (probably the one married to the household head,
perhaps with the participation of the other adult woman).
The Buzu, the most recent group to take up farming as a primary economic activity,
depart from the patterns of the Hausa and Fulani in that Buzu women rarely participate in
crop production. One may say of the Buzu that there generally is a single large field under
the control of each compound, and that this field is worked collectively by male compound
members under the direction of the compound head.
Among the Hausa and the Fulani, then, the women more than the men are engaged in
crop production that falls outside of the authority of the compound as a single entity. A large
number of men, however, also manage fields whose production is handled under a separate
account from that of the compound as a whole. The individually operated fields of men
generally tend to include local cash crops such as cowpeas, groundnuts, cassava, and corn
to a much greater extent than do the individually managed fields of women, who concentrate
on grains but also cultivate cowpeas. Men also take advantage of opportunities to participate
in the monetary economy generally not available to women, such as employment as farm
laborers or seasonal migration to cities. One speculates, then, that the greater participation
of women than men in individually managed crop production is the result of women's attempt
to satisfy individual cash needs through recourse to the most readily available means—farming
(men often have access to monetary remuneration through the practice of specialized trades
or as laborers). Such speculation is supported by anecdotal evidence from western Baban
Rafi. Farming, however, is not the sole means available for women's participation in a
monetary economy.
The intracompound fragmentation of economies is also evident in the livestock holdings
of women as compared to men. The contrasting holdings are illustrated in table 3.4. It is
clear that men's livestock holdings are generally more significant than those of women, just
as the volume of land under the direct control of men is much greater than that directly
managed by women. Nevertheless, women's investment and trade in livestock is recognized
throughout Baban Rafi as an established and significant component of the local economy.
78. Persons in the "active" age group—age 8 to 14—are ignored here since they are rarely assigned an
individual field; rather, they work in collective fields or individual fields under the authority of another
household member or, especially in the case of women, spend much of the working day at tasks such as
collecting fuelwood or drawing and transporting water.60














Cattle 0.1 0.6 1.6 7.1 1.0 1.0
Goats 2.4 1.4 3.2 8.2 3.7 2.7
Sheep 1.6 1.7 2.0 16.0 2.0 5.0
Donkeys 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.6 1.0 0.3
Poultry 1.6 1.4 1.0 7.9 0.3 1.7
Camels 0.0 0.0 < 0.1 <0.1 0.3 1.7
a. All figures indicate average holdings.
Not only are women and some other compound members deeply involved in productive
activities clearly distinguishable from those initiated collectively by the compound under the
managerial authority of the compound head, they also appear to be largely-though not
completely-in control of goods produced and profits realized through individual activities.
It is generally expected that both Hausa and Fulani women provide for baptismal and wedding
ceremonies using production or revenues gained from cultivation of individual fields. Beyond
the preparation of celebrations, women use profits from individually managed production and
trade to satisfy a variety of needs, including (in descending order of frequency with which
they are mentioned) kitchen and household items, clothing for themselves and their children,
spending money, helping a husband out of trouble if needed, and health care when illness
strikes. Although women usually do not mention it, they are also known to use a portion of
profits as investment capital for such items as small livestock or cooking oil and ingredients
to prepare fried doughnuts to be marketed locally.
Acquisition of fields. Although women are recognized as the owners of their livestock,
in most cases the land worked individually by women is ultimately under the authority of the
head of the compound, who, theoretically at least, may reclaim and reassign the field at any
time. With few exceptions,
79 each of the compounds of western Baban Rafi is headed by a
male who is the titular manager of all of the land parcels recognized to be under the authority
of the compound. The majority of parcels have come under the compound's authority through
either the act of clearing or the operation of inheritance rules. It was suggested above that the
act of clearing transforms land from open-access forest to something resembling private
property. Land is always cleared by men. Rights to clear land are most often derived from
rights established to currently cultivated land either through previous clearing or inheritance.
To the extent that the clearing of new fields becomes less feasible as a result of the
decreasing availability of virgin land, other modes of land acquisition increase in importance.
79. Two compounds, both located in Garin Maigiya, are headed by divorced women.61
In particular, inheritance rules as they apply to land will be instrumental in determining future
land distributions and the composition of units of land-management authority.
80 Since Islamic
rules of inheritance have largely replaced the indigenous Hausa practice of passing on large
family farms as a single unit, land is increasingly divided between heirs—a process which
over time will inevitably result in progressive land fragmentation (unless currently unforeseen
levels of out-migration are to occur).
In addition, the monetization of the local economy may eventually result in increased land
sales—a phenomenon of little importance in western Baban Rafi to present. That land sales
have occurred at all, however, is testimony to the increasing permanency of private use rights
associated with specific geographical locations—a virtual nonoccurrence as recently as two
generations ago, when shifting cultivation was still an accurate description of land-use
practices. The rising primacy of material inheritance (as contrasted to inheritance in terms of
social or familial status) bears witness to the same trend as specific land parcels become
resources to be transferred intergenerationally.
The vast majority of land transactions take place between men. While women are
assuming a more visible role in commercial production and trade, there are few signs that
women share directly in the increasing permanency of rights to land. While the male head-of-
household is becoming more secure in his lifelong possessions of land and the right to name
successors, women generally exercise use rights at the pleasure of their husbands and fathers.
Nevertheless, women's important role in the monetary economy is widely accepted in view
of the demands placed on women to provide for household needs such as clothing, kitchen
utensils, and food to be consumed during celebrations.
The fact that many of the demands placed on women cannot be met without entry into the
cash economy cements the need to guarantee the access of women to productive resources.
This does not appear to be a standardized process, with some women successfully asserting
the equivalent of private rights to individual farm parcels within the compound, while others
view their rights as precarious and temporary. For the moment, the data needed to comment
further with any degree of confidence on the direction of future trends in this regard are
unavailable. It bears noting, however, that while women's market power is growing, the
status of women within household compounds remains strictly subordinate to their husbands
and fathers, and even to their married male children.
In spite of Islamic inheritance rules calling for the award of land shares to both male and
female heirs (albeit with the proviso that the former receive twice the share of the latter),
only 6 (8%) of the 72 fields currently worked as the individual fields of the Hausa women
interviewed were inherited by those women, compared with an overall inheritance rate of 47
percent among the Hausa (none of the 18 fields worked individually by Fulani women had
been inherited). One local village elder states flatly that Islamic inheritance rules do not apply
to land, but only to livestock and other household possessions. Moreover, even when a
women holds a parcel through inheritance, once she enters another household (e.g., marries),
80. This observation is in part based on thoughts raised by Bruce (1988, p. 25).62
her landholdings are generally considered to come under the management authority of the
male head of her adopted household. The great majority of women working individually on
a field state that the field was given to them by their husbands (or sometimes by their
fathers)—variously referring to the land grant as a "gift" or a "borrowing."
3.2.4 TREES
In western Baban Rafi, there are very few examples of customary (long-standing)
management controls being applied to tree use, whether trees occur on or off the farm. It was
noted earlier that a small number of trees customarily have been protected in western Baban
Rafi as a result of their status as sacred trees. To repeat an earlier observation, the trees of
the natural forest of Baban Rafi—even the most valuable ones—appear to have been
considered by both past and present local populations to be open-access resources. There
remains at least one partial exception. In some cases, access to trees put to specialized
uses—for example, the collection of ingredients needed for certain practices of traditional
healing or hardwoods needed for special sculptured items—was and is limited on the basis of
possession of specialized knowledge and skills.
The situation specifically regarding trees in farmers' fields is more complex, though for
the most part these trees, too, appear historically to have been exploited as open-access
resources (at least during the nonagricultural season). Fulani herders have long been
free—even encouraged—to exploit farm fields for postharvest stubble in exchange for soil-
enriching manure. By most accounts, field trees were (in the past) also open to the
exploitation of Fulani herders, however limited field-tree resources generally may have been.
Almost all farmers currently active in western Baban Rafi agree that in former times, few
trees were left in farm fields—and those that were left were widely spaced and exploited for
shade and little else. The domestic needs of the traditionally small populations of western
Baban Rafi for most tree products were satisfied in the surrounding natural forest.
The contemporary context, however, is one of transition. There is an ongoing change in
management practices, which appears to be encouraging a modification of tenure rules. One
of the influences toward modification is the NFM project, which to a considerable extent has
been successful in promoting tree planting among Hausa farmers. In addition to achieving a
significant rate of success in its campaign to increase levels of local tree planting, the NFM
project has been moderately successful among Hausa farmers in encouraging the natural
regeneration in agricultural fields of naturally occurring local species.
The increasing interest of the Hausa populations of western Baban Rafi in establishing
field trees has been accompanied by a process of tenure modification. Along with its
promotion of tree planting and natural regeneration, the NFM project is encouraging the
notion that field trees are to be placed under the control of the farmer on whose land the trees
occur. The logic behind this modification of indigenous tenure rules is that planted trees and
naturally regenerating trees occur only because of the choice of a farmer to plant or protect
them. Such measures, it is reasoned, are not likely to be taken in the absence of property
rights to the trees. Local populations universally express the idea that planted trees are the63
property of the tree planter. Less than unanimous, though still significant among local
populations, is the notion that naturally occurring field trees belong to the field owner. In
sum, it is clear that whether planted or naturally occurring, the field trees of Hausa farmers
are increasingly considered to be the private property of the owner of the field.
The differential progression of Hausa and Fulani farmers toward a sense of private
property regarding trees in their fields is hinted at by the contrast between the two groups'
reactions to the cutting or debranching of field trees by strangers without forewarning. Hausa
farmers are many times more likely to complain of such "violations" than are Fulani or Buzu
farmers—though the widespread use of field trees for fodder by transhumant herders has long
been an established practice in western Baban Rafi.
According to Fortmann (1988, p. 21), "although tree and land tenure are distinct, each
affects the other ...." The exclusive rights to land parcels that tend to develop in a production
system composed of settled agriculturalists provide a base from which (especially with a little
encouragement and support from influences such as the NFM project and an emerging
commercial value in trees) private rights might eventually extend to trees growing on the
land. This appears to be the process now in progress in western Baban Rafi.
The current discussion has thus far considered how rights in land influence rights to trees.
One must also examine the effect of rights held in trees on the bundle of rights attached to
the land on which the trees stand. In common with many socioeconomic institutions of Baban
Rafi, the role played by trees in determining the exclusivity of rights to land is currently in
the process of transformation. In the discussion above it was demonstrated that in Baban Rafi,
the clearing of a parcel of land of its tree cover is the definitive step toward the assertion of
exclusive rights to use the parcel for crop production.
Evidence from Baban Rafi supports the conclusion that "rights to the clearer" is generally
a superior tenure rule to that of "rights to the tiller. "
81 For example, a number of household
heads claim to hold property rights—most often rights held on the basis of inheritance or
clearing—to more parcels than the household can put to production in a given season. Surplus
parcels are regularly lent out to farmers in search of additional crop land with the
understanding that the arrangement is temporary. A few holders of surplus parcels have
adopted a strategy of varying the tenant on particular parcels on a yearly or multiple-year
basis as a safeguard against the build-up of rights on the part of the tenant. Such a strategy
attests to the threat perceived by rights-holders who also perceive that the relative positions
of the principles of "rights to the clearer" vis-à-vis "rights to the tiller" are not viewed as
immutably fixed.
81. One notes here that Nigerien official policy has not been consistent on this point. The French colonial
regime introduced a legal system that allowed for the privatization of parcels regardless of who was to labor on
them, with nonprivatized land reverting to state ownership. This policy continued into independence until 1974,
when a new military government having won power through a military coup declared the principle of rights to
the tiller, while at the same time adopting a forest code that upheld state ownership of forests.64
The insecurity felt on the part of holders of rights based on clearing or inheritance plays
a role in some cases in willingness to invest in tree planting. While rights to land are
generally derived from the act of tree removal, rights to trees are derived from the act of
planting the tree—and the long-term balance between the two sets of rights (rights to land
versus rights to trees) is at least somewhat open to question. Furthermore, the role of trees
in land tenure is likely to expand as reserves of forested land available for clearing decrease,
causing inheritance to displace clearing as the primary mechanism of land acquisition.
Whereas clearing is generally directly related to need (and, by extension, the capacity to put
newly cleared land to crop production), holdings acquired through inheritance are less likely
to correspond exactly to the work force of the inheriting household, possibly freeing up over
time increasing numbers of parcels that might be made available for temporary transfer
through such mechanisms as loans or pledges. It will be shown below that tree tenure rules
sometimes affect willingness to plant trees (or to allow trees to be planted), particularly
regarding parcels to which rights of crop production are temporarily transferred. A corollary
observation is that the role of trees in land tenure may emerge as an important factor in
determining the future extent of temporary land transfers.
Many farmers of western Baban Rafi who lend out parcels express uneasiness with the
idea that a tenant engage in tree planting on a borrowed parcel. This is because, contrary to
the traditional rights of the landholder established through the removal of trees, rights to land
based on its improvement through tree planting are now gradually being recognized. Both tree
removal and tree planting may be interpreted as an investment in the land, and investment in
land is the basis of rights to the land. It remains to be seen how some conflicting trends will
eventually play themselves out, since farmers are far from unanimous in terms of their
current impressions on the topic of trees in land tenure.
3.2.5 INDIGENOUS ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREST OWNERSHIP
It was shown earlier that field research conducted for this study failed to reveal signs of
traditional structures currently in place to regulate exploitation occurring in the forest beyond
what may be termed the "spheres of influence" more or less subject to the control of the
individual villages. The still predominant character of western Baban Rafi as a pioneer area
probably explains the haphazard and chaotic use made of the resources of the natural forest
beyond recognized village boundaries. The generally adequate availability of forest products
provides a supplementary reason for the lack of a defined management regime. Thus, fodder
and fuelwood are exploited in the forest as free-access goods. The same appears to be
generally true of the soils of the forest, in spite of an emerging feeling that farmland will one
day be in short supply in western Baban Rafi.
Table 3.5 summarizes the answers of local populations when asked who owns the Baban
Rafi forest. It is particularly striking that traditional populations (indicated in the table by
"we") and chiefs are infrequently considered to be the "owners" of the forest relative to
modern institutions such as the state, the NFm project, and the Baban Rafi Cooperative—the
latter which arguably remains a somewhat alien institution in the eyes of local populations.65
TABLE 3.5 Who owns the forest?'
HAUSA FULANI AND BUZU TOTAL
(n=54) (n=46) (n n=100
)b
Foresters/state own the forest 44 52 48
Baban Rafi Cooperative owns the forest 30 9 20
NFM project owns the forest 13 7 10
"We own the forest" 6 17 11
Traditional chiefs own the forest 4 9 6
Villagers own the forest (stated by herders) 0 4 2
God owns the forest 2 2 2
Woodcutters own the forest 2 0 1
a. Figures indicate percentages of respondents who answered in the affirmative.
b. The sample includes both men and women. The question was added to the questionnaire
while the survey was already in progress, thus including a smaller sample than is
generally referred to throughout this paper.
No matter who "owns" the forest, local populations have shown by their actions that they
consider the forest to be open for colonization and, therefore, transformation. Wherever soils
are found to be suitable, farming hamlets increasingly dot the forest of western Baban Rafi
forest. Each hamlet tends to expand outward from its center, thus creating a new sphere of
influence. The forces and rules of colonization and transformation, then, become the relevant
elements when considering tenure in a forest that otherwise is little subject to any active
management regime.
One next turns to a number of institutional issues that extend beyond that of indigenous
land and resource tenure systems. For example, the legally established responsibility of the
state to manage the use of forest resources throughout Niger and the quality of its
performance in this regard in western Baban Rafi have played an important role in forming
current attitudes. Other important institutional factors in forest resource use and management
consist of the conditions emerging around the commoditization of forest products, particularly
fuelwood. The state and the economy are among the central topics of the discussion contained
in the following two chapters.67
Chapter 4
FOREST RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN NIGER:
STATE LEGISLATION AND POLICIES
This is the first of two chapters concerned with institutional issues in natural resource
management at Baban Rafi and in Niger. These chapters are divided according to a distinction
between national-level policies and site-specific manifestations of the policies. A major theme
of this study is that issues responsible for this distinction do not always receive the attention
they deserve. Such issues fit into categories of institutional realities in the form of state
limitations and local economic and social conditions, the primary topics of chapter five. The
present chapter provides the background to the following chapter by describing historical
policies and current trends in forest resource management.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Official state policies and politics in Niger sometimes appear to be remote and irrelevant
in the context of the daily lives of rural inhabitants. The appearance of irrelevancy stems
from: (1) the presence at the village level of nonstate authority systems and institutions; and
(2) the general absence at the village level of resident administrative or advisory installations
of the state. Elaborate legislative texts, such as forest codes and policies setting forth
initiatives of the state (e.g., the movement to create a "development society") rarely arrive
to the level of the village in unadulterated form. State machinery capable of delivering state
policy to rural populations in implementable form is, in many cases, inadequate for the task
or unavailable. Yet state policy is included as a major component of the present study.
In spite of the state's frequent inability to govern in the rural context in exact accordance
with stated intentions in terms of legislation or policy statements, the state itself plays, and
has long played, a central role in the lives of rural populations. The claim by the state to be
the ultimate authority in the land appears not to have been seriously questioned in the context
of rural Niger, or at least not for some time. The Nigerien state's strategy of integrating
traditional authorities into state-directed networks responsible for tax collection and other
functions of the state has created a powerful channel between central power and scattered
populations. More direct, though fragmented, channels between the state and rural societies
exist through the activities of state agents (e.g., agricultural extension agents, cooperative
advisers, foresters) active in rural areas. To present, a common characteristic of nearly all
of these channels is that they provide primarily for one-way communication: from the state
to rural populations. This characteristic is now being challenged.68
There is at present an apparently committed movement in Niger to arrive at a redefinition
of state/civil society relations. The military government's peaceful acquiescence in allowing
a national conference on democracy to take place in October 1991 opened new possibilities
for increased popular participation in setting policy priorities. The policy profile of forest
resource management in Niger is significant, therefore, not only for the legacy it has created
among policymakers and (in distorted form) among rural populations, but it is particularly
significant in the current context of evolving state/civil society relations that may finally make
state policies directly and literally meaningful to rural populations. It remains to be seen, of
course, to what degree—or even in what d
i rection—state/civil society relations will evolve
from historical patterns and, therefore, to what degree the policy trends toward increased
popular participation chronicled below will come to typify state/civil society relations in the
rural context.
4.2 FOREST CODE
In the legislative context, the trend in forest management policy in Niger to present has
been quite clear. However, a new course has been promised for the near future. A ground-
breaking legislative decree issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock was enacted
into law on 16 May 1990. The entire current regime of natural resource legislation is
eventually to be replaced by a new and precedent-setting rural code. These exceptional
legislative developments appear to be reactions to wider policy debates set in motion
following the onset of drought in the late 1960s and gaining momentum throughout the 1980s.
Traditional—and, it should not be forgotten, still current—legislative policies are discussed
below. This discussion of the Nigerien Forest Code provides background for the subsequent
discussion of current policy debates and trends.
Since 4 July 1935—the date on which the original Forest Code for the region then known
as French West Africa was enacted by the French colonial regime—management of forest
resources in the region has remained the legal preserve of the state. The bulk of the Forest
Code currently in effect in Niger dates from 1974. In common with the code of 1935, the
current code establishes in its first article that untitled forests (virtually all forests in Niger
are untitled) belong to the state. Postindependence forest legislation in Niger departs little
from the precedent set during the colonial period in terms of approach to forest management.
With the exception of a circumscribed set of use rights granted to local populations, forest
exploitation continues to be regulated through state issued permits, and infractions are
punished with fines or jail terms. The difference between the 1974 legislation and the 1935
code is that the regulations have become more elaborate and comprehensive—though fairly
detailed elaboration of regulations was not absent from the text of the original code.
Some innovations of the Forest Code introduced by the French colonial administration in
1935 include:
► a legal declaration of state property rights over all untitled forested land of the
national territory;69
► the division of forested lands into "protected" and "classified" forests, including the
establishment of procedures to "classify" additional parcels and therefore to greatly
restrict use rights of local populations to forest resources found within such parcels;
► the formulation of a list of seven "protected species" of trees not to be exploited or
mutilated without first obtaining a special permit from the state;
► the establishment of a permit system to regulate all commercial exploitation of forest
resources in classified forests;
► a provision allowing for the option of increasing, on a temporary basis, local use
rights in specified locations in exchange for local participation in reforestation efforts;
► an outline of fines and prison terms to be imposed for particular violations of the
code; and
► the nomination of sworn forest agents as the enforcement officers in charge of code
implementation and the empowerment of forest agents with considerable police
powers.
Each of the innovations introduced in 1935 and listed above have continued as legislated
policy into the 1990s. Many of them were refined and reinforced in 1974 with the enactment
of the current Forest Code. The protected tree species list, for example, now numbers fifteen
species. Permits must now be obtained before engaging in the commercial exploitation of
forest resources in protected as well as classified forests. The list of penalties—fines and jail
terms—to be imposed for violations of the code has been expanded, as have the police powers
of forest agents. Moreover, an incentive to impose fines was added to the 1974 legislation
through the stipulation that one-tenth of the revenues of each imposed fine is to be reserved
for the agent responsible.
The current Forest Code is not only elaborate, it is also confusing and sometimes
contradictory. For example, ART. 9 of Law 74-7 declares that customary rights are to be
exercised freely in protected forests (over 90% of the "forest domain" of Niger is classified
as "protected forest"). Customary rights in virtually any region of Niger would include the
right to clear forested or fallow land for crop production, as long as farming rights to the plot
are recognized by customary authorities. However, ART. 15 of Law 74-7 declares that the
right to farm "after clearing and burning may be denied in protected forests." The grounds
for denial are not specified.
Elsewhere, in the context of specifying the conditions for the exercise of customary
rights, the code makes perfectly clear that the exercise of customary rights includes absolutely
no rights to commercial exploitation, which always must be subject to the acquisition of a
state permit (Décret 74-226, ART. 8). Continuing in the same context, the code affirms that
the "harvest" of any tree, live or dead, requires the permission of the forest service. Thus it
appears in the code—without being clearly articulated—that trees may normally be removed
from a parcel without notifying the forest service for purposes of preparing the land for crop
production, but a permit must be obtained in order to sell any trees removed. This
interpretation may or may not be the intended one. In practice, according to accounts of
villagers, fines are routinely imposed for tree removal whatever the intention of the exploiter
concerning use to be made of the trees. The confusion and ambiguity between the affirmation70
of unhindered customary rights, presumably including the right to clear fields for crop
production, and the requirement to obtain state permission to "harvest" any tree, remains
unresolved in the legislation. Such imprecision increases the distance between forest law and
its application, and therefore renders parts of the law somewhat irrelevant.
Other subtleties of the Forest Code—e.g., distinctions between protected and nonprotected
species of trees, varying regimes of use rights applied to protected as opposed to classified
forests, procedures for classifying or declassifying parcels—are often lost on local populations
as they appear to be lost on many of the enforcers of the legislation. Moreover, even those
sections of the code which appear at first glance to be relatively straightforward in the
legislative texts, such as the list of protected species of trees, become confused when the
government issues conflicting statements that have not gone through the legislative process
and do not—legally speaking—carry the force of law. For example, in 1984 the government
issued a statement in response to a national seminar organized around the theme of fighting
desertification. Among other pronouncements organized in the form of a directive, the
government declared that it is forbidden to cut down any tree in the course of clearing or
preparing a field for crop production or subdividing lots for other purposes, and that one did
so at the risk of severe penalties.
82 The possibility of cutting the tree with the permission
of the forest service is not raised. If this government statement is to be taken as an addition
to the Forest Code, the directives render meaningless pre-existing distinctions between
protected and nonprotected tree species.
83
The current legislative regime concerning forest management is to be completely
overhauled with the enactment of a new rural code currently under formulation. To date, a
single legislative decree has been enacted to reflect the future natural resource code.
However, the decree of 16 May 1990 remains somewhat out of context within the present
regime. The decree is the result of recent domestic and international policy developments
(discussed below), which have yet to reach their conclusion. Prior to discussing these
changes-in-progress taking place within the forest management regime, the parallel and
separate regime of state policies toward local-level organizing will be addressed. Given the
growing emphasis on popular participation among forest resource policymakers, an inspection
of the state view of what participation looks like should help to put the new policies into
context.
82. This restriction was included in a statement issued by the government in response to the Engagement de
Maradi, 21-28 May 1984. Note also the impact the statement has on the practice of customary rights which are,
as noted above, upheld by the Forest Code in the context of protected forests. Protected forests constitute over
92% of the forest domain of Niger.
83. The statement ends with the note that enforcement of the directives is the responsibility of the organs of
the Development Society (discussed below). No mention is made of the forest service or any other state agency
regarding the enforcement of the directives. Nevertheless, this official government statement tends to carry the
force of law in the eyes of field-level forest agents. It is significant, therefore, that it explicitly discourages
farmers from clearing new or existing fields, regardless of customary rights. Moreover, the statement reinforces
the lack of distinction between protected and nonprotected tree species assumed by rural populations and,
perhaps, by state forest agents applying the Forest Code.71
4.3 STATE-SPONSORED INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR LOCAL-LEVEL
ORGANIZING
4.3.1 DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY
On 29 October 1979, the military government of Niger issued Decree 79-165 to establish
a commission to implement a national network of organizational structures to be known as
the Development Society. This action (and its accompanying publicity) to install a democratic
and peaceful (though claiming to be revolutionary) organizational framework to support and
coordinate development and create the institutions needed for progress captured the
imagination of domestic and international developmentalists alike. Government statements
depict the new order as one that: (1) is tailored to the mentality of Nigeriens; (2) will provide
security against famine; (3) will safeguard authentic values and civilization; (4) will promote
harmonious and dignified development; and (5) accepts socioeconomic realities and rejects
all development models based on universal ideologies (Niger 1988, p. 13).
Most striking about the Development Society is that, as it is presented in official
documents, it provides for the participation of virtually all adult citizens of the nation in
determining and implementing development priorities. The organization of the structures
envisioned parallels the administrative division of Niger, that is, there is a hierarchy of
structures at each level from the village to the locus of state power.
The Development Society is to be superimposed onto two pre-existing national networks
of government-sponsored institutions, cooperatives and the Samarya. At the village level,
representatives of the Village Mutual Group (VMG)—the basic unit of the national cooperative
network—and local representatives of Samarya are to combine to form a Village Development
Council (VDC). In principle, the VMG and the local unit of the Samarya continue to function
as independent and autonomous organizations within their own defined sphere of activities and
interests, even as they combine to form the VDC. Development councils also exist at the level
of the canton, the subdistrict (arrondissement), the department, and the nation—again with
the bulk of participation to be provided by pre-existing organizations of cooperatives and
Samarya at each level. At the subdistrict, departmental, and national levels, government
agencies also participate in the development councils. In addition, a number of socio-
professional organizations are, in principle, also represented on the development councils.
Such organizations include the Women's Association of Niger (Association Féminine
Nigérienne, AFN), the Islamic Association, the Association of Traditional Chiefs, the Veterans
Association, the Parents Association, the Students Association, the Merchants and Truckers
Association and the Niger Workers Trade Unions. In sum, the Development Society is an
organization of organizations and, in the words of the regional representative of the Institute
for Research into Human Sciences (Institut de Recherche en Sciences Humaines, IRSH)
resident in Maradi, "the Development Society forgets nobody." At least on paper, this is quite
literally true.72
4.3.2 SAMARYA
Samarya, along with cooperatives, is one of the pre-existing base institutions of the
Development Society. The Samarya network is the expression of a national policy to promote
collective work at the village level. The name signifies traditional youth organizations active
in political struggles against the French colonizing state in the late 1940s and 1950s and
banned as a result of such activities. It was rehabilitated in 1975 by the military regime in
power in Niger since the coup d'etat of April 1974. In its reincarnation as a national
movement sponsored by the government of Niger, Samarya has little other than its name to
tie it to its origins in traditional society.
Both the goals and the organization of the Samarya are specified in government
documents. Identical to the hierarchical organization of the development councils outlined
above, Samarya councils are to be maintained at the village, canton, subdistrict, departmental,
and national levels. Declared goals of the Samarya movement include: (1) to promote
development through communal actions; (2) to create and maintain among youth a patriotic
and civic spirit and respect for social values; and (3) to inform, sensitize, and mobilize the
mass of the population, and youths in particular, concerning problems of national
development (Niger 1988, p. 13). The governmental institution responsible for the Samarya
is the Ministry of Youth and Sports. At the local level, five or more delegates are named to
a Samarya council in each village, at least two of whom must be women.
In the rural setting, the most noticeable of the activities of the Samarya is the production
of a crop or crops on communal fields. At many locations participation in this communal
enterprise is quite low. Where low participation is observed, the identity of local delegates
to the Samarya council is usually not obvious—even to fellow villagers—beyond one or two
prominent individuals. Visits to the village Samarya council by officials from the canton or
subdistrict level councils are often irregular and may display little continuity in terms of the
agendas from visit to visit. In the not-too-distant past, agents of the national gendarmerie (les
bérets rouges) would occasionally visit a village to organize a labor unit in the name of the
local Samarya council to accomplish a task such as the construction of a schoolyard wall.`
4.3.3 COOPERATIVES
In contrast to the rather nonspecific mission of the Samarya as information diffusers,
consciousness raisers, and labor mobilizers, the national network of cooperatives is
specifically intended to organize production in Niger. The Nigerien Union of Credit and
Cooperation (Union Nigérienne de Crédit et de Coopération, UNCC) was created in 1962,
reorganized to include village-level structures and representation in 1967, and again
reorganized in 1984, at which time its name was changed to National Union of Cooperatives
84. This somewhat bleak assessment of local Samarya councils is biased toward the experience of the Baban
Rafi forest and may not be representative of the ensemble of rural Niger (though some anecdotal evidence from
other regions supports the portrait drawn here). In urban areas, Samarya appears to be more organized and often
takes the form of a social club for youth. Samarya in Baban Rafi is further discussed in ch. 5.73
(Union Nationale de Coopératives, UNC). The Uric is under the authority of the Ministry of
Rural Development. Its administrative structure almost exactly parallels those of the
Development Society and the Samarya, with associated councils existing at the village,
subdistrict, departmental, and national levels. The difference between the administrative
structure of the UNC and the two other national organizations is that the unit constituting a
cooperative—composed of a number of villages—does not necessarily correspond to the
region defined by a canton. It was noted above that the village-level cooperative council is
known as the Village Mutual Group (VMG).
The core legislation regulating cooperative structures in Niger is contained in Ordonnance
78-19 of 12 October 1978 and its implementation regulations, Decree 79-05 of 18 January
1979. These documents define a VMG as the ensemble of producers (farmers, herders,
fishermen, and rural artisans) inhabiting the same village or quarter of a village, who unite
in the goal of developing their economic activities. The decision to form a VMG must be
voluntary and representatives must be democratically chosen.
Notable restrictions concerning territorial boundaries include:
► no more than one VMG may exist within a village or herding settlement of less than
100 heads-of-household;
► a VMG may not include more than 100 heads-of-household;
► a cooperative may not include VMGS from more than one canton;
► there may exist no more than a single Local Union of Cooperatives in a given
subdistrict (arrondissement);
► there may exist no more than a single departmental Union of Cooperatives in a given
department; and
► there may exist no more than a single National Union of Cooperatives on the territory
of Niger.
The following brief list summarizes additional highlights of cooperative legislation in
Niger:
► Detailed guidelines are provided concerning the administrative composition of the
component parts of each VMG and cooperative, providing for an executive body, a
general assembly—to meet at least twice a year and elect a president and secretary for
each meeting—and a supervisory body.
► Special management committees are to be created to supervise particular activities.
► Required qualifications and functions of individual cooperative officers (e.g.,
president, secretary) are spelled out in detail.
► Safeguards are provided against conflicts of interest.
► Each cooperative body must send the same number of representatives as peer bodies
(from 3 to 10) to the next higher cooperative body.74
The government-sponsored cooperative movement in Niger historically has existed
primarily as a network structured to collect the cash crops—particularly groundnuts—
produced by Nigerien farmers. The UNCC was severely criticized in a study carried out by
the Cooperative League of the USA (CLUSA) accusing it of functioning primarily as a
provider of services to semiautonomous government agencies formed to market groundnuts,
rice and cotton (Sène and Phillips n.d.). The report adds that the UNCC was made to act as
a debt collector for a state rural credit institution created in 1967 as a complement to the
cooperative network and was thus further diverted from what should have been its true
mission of organizing farmers toward profitable enterprises. The credit institution proved not
to be financially feasible and was discontinued in 1984.
An assessment of the impact of cooperatives on agricultural producers in Niger must
include the observation that certain regions in Niger, and particular farmers somewhat better-
off than the average subsistence producer, have benefited disproportionately from the
cooperative network and credit availability. At some sites, such as the Baban Rafi forest, the
national cooperative movement has had little impact on local populations."
4.4 CURRENT POLICY TRENDS IN FOREST MANAGEMENT IN NIGER
It is possible that the pronounced enforcement orientation of the current Forest Code,
enacted in 1974, was a reaction by the state to the environmental destruction observed
throughout Niger as a result of several years of drought and abusive exploitation of resources.
If this suggestion is valid, one could explain the reinforcement of state claims over natural
resources and efforts to increase the policing of resources as a reflex reaction to confronting
a problem by sharpening tools already in existence. However, by the early-1980s, traditional
state policies in forest resource management were being challenged and modified in Niger.
The challenge has been formulated in international as well as domestic forums.
4.4.1 INTERNATIONAL CALL FOR REFORM
The messengers. During and following the severe drought years of 1968-1973, the threat
of desertification in the Sahel became an international issue. On 12 September 1973, seven
Sahelian countries created an organization with the goal of constructing a regional strategy
to achieve long-term food security and development. The new organization was named CILss,
a French acronym roughly translated as Permanent Inter-State Committee to Fight against
Drought in the Sahel. In March 1976, the international community created the Club du Sahel
(Club of the Sahel) to provide support for the objectives and programs of Cuss. The Club
du Sahel is an organ of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
and serves as a major informational and policy-coordinating link between donors and the
countries of the Sahel.
85. The specific historical role of the national cooperative movement in the context of the Baban Rafi forest
is discussed in ch. 5.75
The Club du Sahel takes dialogue promotion and information circulation to be among its
primary functions. By virtue of its role as coordinator of the international effort to arrive at
a solution to the problem of desertification in the Sahel, the Club helps to inform policy-
making among donor agencies active in the Sahel. As a result, the published statements and
studies of the Club are probably the closest thing that exists to an international policy
statement pertaining to the threat of desertification in the region. The Club du Sahel describes
itself as follows: "The Club should be a meeting point where the synthesis of what is known
merges with that of what should be done. The Club should also be a forum within which new
ideas emerge, where initiatives originate, which would elsewhere hardly be able to emerge"
(CILss and Club du Sahel 1988a, p. 3).
The message. That Sahelian states have not been successful in efforts to police the use
of natural resources became increasingly obvious during the droughts of the early 1970s and
again in the early 1980s. A growing consensus appeared among Sahelians and international
observers that the time had come for radical change in natural resource policies. This
consensus was nurtured in forums organized by the Club du Sahel and CILss. Among the
elements of the consensus was that some formula must be found in which local resource users
take on more responsibility for maintaining the natural resource base. State and local
populations, it was reasoned, must work together to create the institutions for increased
popular participation in resource management. By the time of the "Regional Seminar on
Desertification Control," organized by CILss and the Club du Sahel in Nouakchott,
Mauritania, in 1984, the "total, voluntary commitment from the populations concerned" was
listed as one of the two necessary conditions in the struggle against desertification.
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The Club du Sahel and Cuss have helped in introducing to international forums on
development and natural resource management in the Sahel calls for radical change as
opposed to reinforcements of traditional policing methods. Often repeated themes and
strategies articulated for the benefit of international and Sahelian audiences include: forging
a new equilibrium between the state and civil society; increasing popular participation;
reinforcing local initiatives and institutions; and increasing the role of nongovernmental
organizations (Ncos).
87 The general approach to natural resource management suggested by
these strategies has come to be widely adopted as a part of the rhetoric, and increasingly the
implementation efforts, of international aid organizations and NGos active in the Sahel.
Moreover, the new approach is increasingly voiced in domestic policies of natural resource
management within the individual Sahelian states, notably Niger.
4.4.2 TREND IN DOMESTIC POLICY
The evolution of a new policy stance in natural resource management within Niger began
in the early 1980s. Since 1982, Niger has held three national seminars organized around
86. The remaining "necessary condition" to engage in a successful struggle against desertification in the Sahel
is "[the] integration of agricultural, livestock and forestry activities" (Criss and Club du Sahel 1988b, p. 5).
87. See, for example, CILss and Club du Sahel (1988c).76
themes that included increasing popular participation in rural development and natural
resource management. The seminars, held in 1982, 1984, and 1990, display a progression
in state willingness to allow local populations to assume responsibility and a share of the
benefits of forest use and management.
The 1982 seminar in Zinder was entitled "Strategies of Intervention in the Rural Milieu."
The document resulting from seminar proceedings—the resolutions of which were adopted
by the Nigerien ministerial council about four months after the close of the seminar—affirmed
the Nigerien government's commitment to reinforce and support "village structures."
The statement of the Zinder seminar reads, however, as an effort to better organize rural
populations strictly according to the state's vision of development and development
administration, rather than as an invitation to rural populations to articulate any alternative
vision. Village structures identified by seminar participants included Samarya (a "traditional"
youth organization), AFN (the national women's group), and cooperatives, that is, those
structures sponsored by the state and under the tutelage of ministries of the state. The
Development Society was generally held to be the framework within which village structures
were to take their place at the bottom of a hierarchy with the state at the top.
Nonstate-sponsored institutions such as traditional chiefs and councils were invited to
participate in the new order, but some reservation was expressed at the seminar concerning
their status and rights. Traditional structures at the village level were accused of being
antidemocratic by upholding their own minority rights. A state representative cited in his
address to the seminar a case in which traditional authorities at the village level were
discovered co-opting efforts of cooperatives to market grains by claiming the proceeds for
their own gain. The state has recently adjusted its policy, he continued, to protect populations
from such abuse by limiting grain market authorizations to [authorized] cooperatives alone
(Niger 1982, p. 41). It was concluded at the seminar that traditional chiefs and youth groups
are to limit their participation to increasing information flows in the course of market
operations.
In 1984, a national seminar was held in Maradi to initiate the debate toward a national
strategy to fight desertification. It was resolved, among other things: (1) to reformulate forest
policy to give more responsibility to rural populations; (2) to undertake a project to rewrite
the ensemble of legislation dealing with natural resource management, and particularly to
explain within the legislation the relative roles of the state, exploiters, and communities; (3)
to create a national plan to fight against desertification; and (4) to dissociate forest service
police functions from extension functions. Emphasis was placed on the Development Society
to mobilize and coordinate rural populations in the common fight against desertification. It
is interesting to note, however, that the appeal for participation was broadened to include all
socio-professional organizations in Niger such as business associations and workers' unions.
The Nigerien government's ministerial council issued a response to the seminar three days
after its close. In spite of the progressive tone of much of the text of the document produced
in the course of the seminar, the government's official response conforms completely to the77
traditional regulate-by-fiat approach characteristic of forest management in the Sahel since
1935. The government statement is in the form of a list of directives, mostly to initiate tree
planting by rural populations and to establish village wood plots. The sole statement
concerning the management of existing natural forest resources was a prohibition against the
cutting of any tree for purposes of crop field expansion or preparation. In contrast to the
Forest Code, the government statement makes no mention of the possibility of obtaining a
permit to remove trees or of any distinction between tree species. The statement adds that
violation of this directive is grounds for severe sanctions but does not specify the nature of
the sanctions. Finally, the government specifies that the directives are to be executed by the
organs of the Development Society and makes no mention of the forest service or any other
government agency.
The 1984 Engagement de Maradi served mainly as a broad-ranging call-to-arms in the
fight against desertification. It is viewed today in Niger as a major milestone toward current
forest management practices and priorities of the forest service. Seminar participants called
for the mobilization of all available resources at all levels—international as well as
domestic—in the interest of waging a common struggle. As articulated in 1991 by Maradi's
departmental Director of the Environment: "Before 1984 the forest service was simply a
forest police force; since 1984 we have entered the era of the project." The era of the project
is characterized by a high level of financial, material, and technical participation in forest
resource management in Niger on the part of international donors and NGos .
The Maradi seminar invited further experimentation in rural organizing to manage forest
resources within the context of development projects. Prior to 1984 there had been a single
example of a project in natural forestry management operating according to a strategy of
eliciting popular participation through cooperative formation: the Forest and Land Use
Planning Project at the site of Guesselbodi, 25 kilometers southeast of Niamey. By the end
of the decade the model of Guesselbodi guided five additional projects in Niger attempting
to implement participatory management of natural forest resources. Most of these
projects—notably the Gorou-Bassounga forest along the Nigerien border with Benin and the
Baban Rafi forest of south-central Niger—are attempting to install management systems at
sites of a vastly larger scale than that of Guesselbodi.
The common experience of the new generation of forest management projects led in
February 1990 to a national seminar at Torodi, Niger, entitled "The Nigerien Experience in
Management of Village Forests for the Production of Fuelwood." This seminar was much
more focused than those at Zinder and Maradi in that it specifically addressed itself to issues
of natural forestry management and openly sought original formulas for popular participation
without referral to the centralized and state-sponsored Development Society. The national
director of the Service of the Environment, for example, promoted the creation of controlled
production perimeters to be jointly managed by foresters and local populations through a
partnership, the terms of which are yet to be defined (Niger 1990a, p. 9). Local populations
are referred to throughout the document as "participants" in forest management systems. It
is recommended, among other things, that local populations managing sections of "protected
forests" be granted title to forests in which they have installed a rational management system,78
and that management organizations be the direct recipients of some of the tax revenues from
forest exploitation (currently all tax revenues enter directly into the national treasury).
Seminar participants in Torodi further recommended that current forest legislation be
supplemented by laws to be enacted in the interest of implementing the strategies articulated
in the course of the seminar. Such laws would serve to fill the gap between the current
legislative regime and the future rural code now being formulated. The first of such laws
appeared in May 1990, about three months following the Torodi seminar, in the form of a
ministerial decree issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. This decree is
described in detail in chapter one (see "research agenda"). The decree gives village
communities use and management rights to natural forests in the vicinities of their villages.
It further states that benefits from forest exploitation are reserved in priority for communities
of the forest.
4.5 CONCLUSION
The policy profile presented above documents a growing consensus among Nigerien
policymakers toward increasing popular participation in forest resource management by
devolving a degree of authority over resources from the state to local populations. The
significance of the policy trend is undeniable, yet must be considered in conjunction with the
recognition that historically state policies have regularly been distorted in the course of their
implementation in rural settings. Such distortions have been the result of institutional
shortcomings that have yet to be resolved. There is no guarantee that the new policies of the
rural code will be delivered to rural villages and settlements in unadulterated form anymore
than has been the case with the traditional Forest Code.
Furthermore, the weight of traditional state/civil society relations having evolved
according to the tone of the current Forest Code probably works against effective implementa-
tion of new policies otherwise encouraging of popular participation. Current cooperative
legislation and existing state-sponsored institutional arrangements may also stifle local
initiative with excessive regulation and strong prescriptions for rigid hierarchies. However,
an event as important as the recent national conference on democracy,88," one would hope,
provides plenty of scope for dramatic possibilities.
88. The national conference on democracy took place in September and October 1991. It was the initial step
of an envisioned transition in Niger from military to popularly elected government.79
Chapter 5
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN FOREST RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
AT THE SITE OF BABAN RAH
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter serves to illustrate site-specific social, political, and economic dynamics at
a site at which forest management reforms are just beginning to play themselves out. The
policy context of the management reforms contemplated for Baban Rafi is one rooted in the
emerging consensus at the national level for the increase in local control over natural
resources described in the previous chapter. One must bear in mind that data for this case
study were collected during the early stages of a development/environmental project, the
Natural Forestry Management (NFM) project, whose intention is to help local populations
create organizations to assume greater responsibilities in local forest management and to
increase local benefits from forest exploitation. The NFM project has stimulated a high degree
of interest among the concerned populations and has introduced to the Baban Rafi forest a
widespread feeling of impending reform in forest management. The current atmosphere at
Baban Rafi presents a particular research opportunity since local institutions, attitudes, and
practices define and clarify themselves to some degree through their reactions to change. The
opportunity is exploited here to illuminate locally based issues relevant to a devolution of
forest management authority.
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The broad categories of issues identified in the case of Baban Rafi in increasing local
control over natural resources are very often the same categories of issues that must be
addressed at sites throughout Niger and the Sahel. Details—and therefore, appropriate reform
strategies—vary, of course, from site to site. However, the purpose of this case study is not
only to identify the issues, but especially to provide a glimpse of their site-specific complexity
and interplay with attempts at institutional reform. A central lesson from Baban Rafi is that
innovation, flexibility, and attention to local institutions are much more valuable than
blueprints, formulas, and theories in effecting forest management reforms. This lesson is
deduced from both observations of a high degree of local complexity and the sometimes
unanticipated nature of the interactions between local institutions and introduced reforms.
89. It should be noted at this point that no part of this study is intended as an evaluation of current attempts
to reform forest resource management at the site of Baban Rafi, since such an evaluation would be decidedly
premature. This discussion draws on data collected during a period that roughly corresponds to the second year
of existence of the Baban Rafi Forestry Cooperative, a period best described as one of consensus building,
training, and consciousness raising. The Natural Forestry Management Project is a central feature of this study
since it is now part of the local landscape and, as noted above, the presence of the project and its activities help
to illuminate some of the pre-existing social and economic conditions affecting local populations.80
The chapter begins with a brief introduction to the NFM project and the Baban Rafi
Cooperative—these efforts being the central elements of the effort currently in progress to
reform local forest management. Next, issues relevant to the current institutional landscape
are organized and discussed according to three categories: (1) consensus building among
heterogeneous populations; (2) state/local relations; and (3) obstacles to securing financial
incentives for local participation.
5.2 NFM PROJECT AND THE COOPERATIVE
The physical and social setting of the case study site of Baban Rafi are described in detail
in chapters 2 and 3. It is sufficient at this point to recall that increasing rates of environmental
degradation at the site in recent years have prompted many area residents to predict the
disappearance of the forest by the end of the century. Although my twelve-month sojourn as
a researcher in the Baban Rafi forest was too short to observe and record firsthand any
changing physical bench marks of the forest degradation widely believed to be in progress,
some signs of the change pointed out to me were impressive. For example, in 1987, the
Forest and Land Use Planning Project (FLUP) then active in the region of Niamey visited the
Baban Rafi forest to explore its potential as a site for a project in natural forest management.
The FLUP team visiting Baban Rafi marked the then-existing eastern border of the forest with
a concrete limit marker. By the time I began my research program in October 1990, the
forest limit marker was located in the middle of a vast expanse of agricultural fields, the
forest having receded at least 2-3 kilometers to the west as a result of the expansion of the
farms of the villages bordering the forest to the east.
The FLIP team's visit to Baban Rafi contributed to planning of the effort now under way
at the site. The NFM project, jointly administered by CARE International and the Nigerien
government's Service of the Environment, established its office in the departmental capital
of Maradi in March 1989. The project's zone of intervention includes over 40,000 hectares
of natural forest at Baban Rafi as well as an extensive "buffer zone" of village and farmland
along the forest's periphery.
The NFM project is best described as an international effort to slow environmental
degradation in the Baban Rafi forest by (1) diffusing and supporting appropriate technologies
such as soil management and agroforestry techniques and (2) aiding in the installation of a
management system to control exploitation of the resources of the natural forest. The former
is intended to address environmental pressures caused by farming by reducing demand from
farmers to clear new fields in the forest as productivity and sustainability of existing fields
improves. Project activities directed to this end are mostly of a technological nature. A81
number of project assistants
90 live in several of the villages of the forest and work directly
with farmers attempting to employ the new techniques.
The latter category—the installation of a forest management system—is aimed primarily
at reducing environmental pressures caused by commercial exploitation of the forest for
fuelwood. Project activities undertaken to achieve a management system are both technical
(e.g., studies to determine tree growth rates, standing stocks, yields, and harvesting
techniques) and broadly social in orientation and objective. Part of the strategy for achieving
a management system is expressed as follows in the project document, "[the project will] .. .
create a village cooperative system to exploit and commercialize forest products" (Projet
SALAMA 1988, p. 23).
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Of the project's targeted zones and development activities, the focus of the present study
is on the domain of the natural forest and the effort to train and organize local populations
to manage the natural forest as a cooperative and according to principles of sustainability. In
addition to the technical, logistical, and, exceptionally, financial aid extended to the Baban
Rafi Cooperative by the NFM project, an agent of the Cooperative League of the USA
(CLUSA) has worked full-time with the cooperative as a technical advisor and trainer for most
of its first two years of existence.
It is not entirely clear why the concept of a cooperative was chosen by the NFM project
as the unit of organization for the future management system, beyond the expectation that it
is to include the entire population of local users of forest resources. It is clear that the
cooperative is intended to function as the vehicle whereby local populations will assume
management and property rights to forest resources as incentives to invest in the resources
in accordance with ecological objectives. Such a strategy, of course, conforms to the basic
precepts of devolution and the supporting concepts of popular participation and common
property, as these concepts are outlined in the first chapter of this paper. The linkage between
local rights and ecological goals is made explicit in the preliminary management plan for the
Baban Rafi forest produced by the NFM project in July 1991:
The reliability of such a system (the cooperative system) of organization would respond to
institutional and ecological objectives:
90. In April 1991, the total number of village-based cooperative assistants was increased from 6 to 10.
Shortly following the increase, 4 assistants were reassigned to villages in the northern portion of the forest where
a second cooperative is planned. At the end of 1991, the number of project assistants living in the villages of
the original Baban Rafi Cooperative was reduced since some were reassigned to the villages of the south of the
forest where additional cooperatives are eventually to be formed. As noted below, project assistants provide
support for the cooperative in addition to working directly with farmers.
91. SALAMA is an acronym signifying Semi-Arid Lands Management. It is a multiple-site project, one site
of which is the Natural Forestry Management project at the site of Baban Rafi. The project document and
agreement was signed by the Government of Niger, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDO, and
the United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office (UNSO) in October 1988. The major financial contributor is DANIDA,
with CARE International and the Government of Niger named as co-executors.82
► To improve relations between the Service de 1'Environnement [including the forest
service] and participating [local] populations so that they [relations] contribute to
comprehensive and long-lasting resource management.
► To assure [local] populations the control and management of the resources of their lands
according to a legal and functional framework.
► To benefit from the productive activities of the forest.
► To maintain biological diversity and the reproductive activities of the forest by
encouraging natural regeneration.
The institutionalization of these ecological objectives will not be truly effective until [local]
populations achieve a level of forest management at which they have a clear perception of
property and management [authority] recognized by official institutions. What encourages
regular investment on the part of [local] populations in forest conservation is therefore [that
local populations] supplant current exploiters [the reference here is to the wood merchants
residing in Maradi].
The objective to create [locally controlled] property should be rigorously pursued if one wants
local participating populations to consider themselves and to behave as true and responsible
beneficiaries rather than simply as [resource] users (Projet SALAMA 1991, p. 26; author's
translation).
The pilot (and, at least through 1991, only) cooperative of the Baban Rafi forest held its
first election of officers on 14 June 1989. The cooperative, whose membership is exclusively
local (i.e., residents of the Baban Rafi forest), is envisioned to develop into a self-reliant
organization operating independently of the NFM project as well as of the Government of
Niger. During the life of the NFm Project, the first line of support for the cooperative
consists of the village-based project assistants as well as the specially trained cooperative
extension agent referred to above. The original Baban Rafi Cooperative is composed of
the inhabitants of the seven villages and several herding/farming settlements (often referred
to as "hamlets" to distinguish them from the more permanent villages) of the western-most
portion of the forest—an area thoroughly described in chapters 2 and 3. One will recall that
a census of the villages and hamlets of the cooperative area carried out by the project in 1989
counted 466 heads-of-household and a total population of 2,114, about one-third of whom
inhabit the herding/farming hamlets either on a year-round or seasonal basis. My own
research carried out in the summer of 1991 suggests that herding/farming populations in the
forest are growing faster than village populations as increasing numbers of former
transhumant herders have taken to clearing land and settling in the forest to farm.
92. The agent who has worked full-time to establish, train, and advise the Baban Rafi Cooperative since
November 1988—over six months before the cooperative s first election of officers—is an employee of CLUSA.83
5.3 CONSENSUS BUILDING AMONG HETEROGENEOUS POPULATIONS
5.3.1 CASE FOR CUSTOM-DESIGNED INCENTIVES
The assumption implicit in the desire to increase popular participation in natural resource
management is that in the process incentives will be unleashed among local populations (1)
to exploit resources responsibly (i.e., sustainably) and (2) to secure the conformity of external
exploiting populations to local rules. The present analysis of consensus building among
heterogeneous populations is concerned with the former: the formulation of positive incentives
for local populations to follow the rules of a locally based management system.
93 The
experiment in progress at Baban Rafi illustrates that the creation of broadly based incentives
toward sustainable management is likely to be a more complicated task than a simple transfer
of management authority from the state to local populations.
The focus on positive incentives inherent in a participative approach to achieving a
sustainable natural resource management system is easily justified through an examination of
the history of negative incentives such as taxes, fines, and jail terms characteristic of failed
state management systems. Accelerating rates of environmental destruction are the driving
force behind current policy reforms to increase local control over natural resources at the
expense of the state and to ensure the integrity of local management through the provision of
adequate incentives. However, given the situation in the Baban Rafi forest, in which diverse
populations speak with many voices, one might well wonder what form incentives are likely
to take in order to satisfy the widely varying needs and wants.
Incentives will consist, of course, of prospects for economic gain. At issue is the fact that
prospects of economic gain may be perceived differently by individuals and households
according to traditional user-group affiliation and habitual exploitation practices. For some,
economic gain might be defined in terms of increased agricultural yields; for others, revenues
from the sale of fuelwood; and still others, the conservation of the forest for pasture. The
significance of the problem is that a sustainable management system will not be attained if
large numbers of users see no benefit to participating according to the rules.
The NFM project is firmly committed to achieving a sustainable management system based
on the multiple use of forest resources.
94 The obstacle is in achieving an organization across
groups that (though the groups have long and successfully interacted at the margins of their
particular resource management and exploitation systems) lack any kind of historical
precedent or model for a comprehensive, jointly managed system over a large, defined
territory. For purposes of illustration, project and cooperative activities conducted prior to
and during the research period are considered here as a type of incubation chamber for an
93. The complexities of dealing with external populations are treated in the section below entitled, "Securing
financial incentives for local populations: fuelwood market."
94. Such a commitment is clearly expressed in the provisional management plan proposed for the forest by
the NFM Project in July 1991 (Projet SALAMA 1991).84
increase in popular participation in the management of forest resources and, therefore as a,
albeit imperfect, gauge of the attractiveness of current incentives to participate across user
groups in an intergroup forest resource management system."
So far, participation in project and cooperative activities has been uneven across the
diverse ethnicities, occupational groups and village factions co-existing in the vicinity of the
Baban Rafi forest (not to mention the contrast in participation by gender—further addressed
below). Of course, it is not uniquely the substance or nature of particular incentives to which
user groups respond with varying participation rates. Various occupational, cultural, and
economic factors tend to complicate the process of securing (i.e., realizing) available
incentives to participate across groups." This theme is taken up in the conclusion to this
section on consensus building among heterogeneous populations.
5.3.2 USER GROUPS
Low-profile user groups. It was noted at the outset of this study that the leading activities
responsible for the environmental threat facing the forest are farming, herding, and
commercial exploitation of fuelwood. However, user groups are not always neatly categorized
within one or another of these three leading categories.
Women, for example, are often farmers, but in the Baban Rafi forest they are rarely field
managers. Most women also own livestock, but usually in small quantities, and very often
placed under the care of paid herders. On the other hand, women's exploitation of the forest
to secure fuelwood for home use is significant and will eventually have to be accounted for
in any management system that is to prove sustainable in the long term. Yet, in this
predominantly Islamic region, women are not encouraged to assume any type of an active role
outside of the household—least of all in activities involving the opposite sex. Therefore, at
least for the moment, the particular interests of women concerning the management of forest
resources are not being articulated as new forest management structures come into being.
There is not a single woman included among the cooperative officers, nor have I ever seen
95. The NF M project represents the sole attempt to implement a single and comprehensive resource
management system in the natural forest ofBaban Rafi and, therefore, provides the only indications of the varied
levels of interest in such a system expressed by different groups. Indigenous tenure and management systems
characteristic of the various user groups of the Baban Rafi forest have yet to show signs of evolving into a
comprehensive system capable of both regulating resource conflicts between groups and operating according to
principles of sustainable exploitation. Increased demographic pressures, the degradation of the resource base as
a result of recurring drought, a history of state competition to local initiatives in natural resource management,
and the increasing commercial importance of fuelwood harvested from the forest have helped to complicate the
evolution of diverse systems into a single system committed to achieving sustainable exploitation on a multiple-
use basis.
96. Again, attention is drawn to the unique status of the development project, in this case, the NFM project.
As one would expect, different social and cultural groups respond differently to such externally driven initiatives.
The different responses are presented here to suggest they may pose a long-term threat to the viability of
cooperative management in the Baban Rafi forest.85
a woman in attendance at a cooperative meeting. It is true that there exists an official
organization in Niger intended to provide structure and support to women's activities—the
AFN. In most of the villages of the cooperative, however, the AFN is not very active, and at
any rate, is not generally regarded by men as a vehicle that might support the participation
of women in such activities as forest management.
In addition to women, forest resource user groups tending to assume a low or nonexistent
profile in project or cooperative forums include traditional healers, sculptors, and hunters.
These occupational groups continue to be active in the Baban Rafi forest, though the
individual members of these groups also engage in crop production and usually some
livestock raising or other economic activities. To a significant degree, several of the major
resource exploiting practices of these groups classified here as "low profile resource
exploiters" have been driven underground and their practitioners are not likely to pursue their
interests openly in cooperative or project forums. Hunting has been banned in Niger since
1972, and the use of wood for commercially important forms of sculpture such as mortar
making has long been aggressively and repressively controlled by the forest service (see
state/local relations discussed below). Some activities of traditional healers, such as the
stripping of bark or the collection of tree roots, have also been viewed by foresters as
violations of forest legislation and prosecuted as such. On the other hand, blacksmiths as a
group are exceptional in that a project activity has been designed to provide special training
in blacksmithing. Following such training, one envisions the possibility of blacksmiths acting
as a bloc to articulate their interests as a group within the cooperative.
It is probably true that blacksmiths were in somewhat of a unique position relative to user
groups composed of hunters, sculptors, and women even before arrival of the NFM project.
This is because of the groups named, only blacksmiths appear to have retained a significant
degree of the unique social status enjoyed in precolonial society. The decline of hunters and
sculptors results in part from their treatment at the hands of colonial and postcolonial
foresters enforcing the rules of the state and, perhaps, from the greater availability in today's
market of commodities they had earlier provided in the face of little competition. While the
services of traditional healers continue to be sought after, the installation of a small state-
supported health facility in Gabi on the eastern edge of the Baban Rafi forest, as well as a
hospital and a number of pharmacies in Maradi, probably has cut into their trade and reduced
their visibility in the eyes of fellow villagers as well as outsiders like the staff of the NFm
project. Regarding women as a forest resource user group, it is possible that the potential for
women's participation in management activities has declined with the spread of Islam to the
region.
High-profile user groups. High-profile user groups are those whose activities are
recognized and addressed by the NFM project document and generally by external observers
as having major environmental impact on the resources of the forest. We return here to the
triumvirate of activities making up the bulk of the threat: farming, herding, and commercial
exploitation of fuelwood. If farmers, herders, woodcutters, and wood merchants become
convinced that adequate rewards will be forthcoming from changes in exploitation practices,
great potential exists for a substantial reduction in the existing threat to the environment.86
Relative appeal of commercial exploitation of fuelwood between farmers and herders.
The Baban Rafi Cooperative was conceived by the project as a locally based mechanism for
the rational exploitation and marketing of commercial forest resources. The single
commercialized and commercializable resource currently feasible on any significant scale is
fuelwood. During the first two years of its existence, the Baban Rafi Cooperative engaged
in one major activity of natural forest resource exploitation and management: the harvest and
marketing of deadwood from a 300-hectare parcel delimited by the project. Local woodcutters
were invited to harvest the deadwood (mostly Prosopis africana, a species suffering a high
mortality rate in the region over the past decade) on the defined parcel and sell it to the
cooperative. A loan was obtained from the project to pay the woodcutters for wood delivered
and stocked. Woodcutters were required to hold cooperative membership cards which,
according to cooperative policy, should be in the possession of each household head residing
in the cooperative area regardless of participation in the wood harvest. The cards were
obtained at a fee of CFA 50 (about $.20).
For a variety of logistical and administrative reasons, the timing of the harvest was not
conducive to maximum participation of local woodcutters. The period for the cut correspond-
ed to the Muslim month of Ramadan, during which adherents of the Islamic faith (the
majority of local populations) are not allowed to consume food or water from daybreak to
sunset. It was also during the hot season. In all, 44 local residents cut and collected 1,399
steres of wood and received CFA 844,350 (an average of about CFA 19,000, or $77, per
woodcutter).
Woodcutting has long been important among many forest residents as a source of steady
or intermittent income. However, it is well-known that it is more common for Hausa farmers
to work as woodcutters than it is for Fulani herders. Nevertheless, slightly over one-third
(10/28) of the herders included in the random sample state they have at one time or another
earned income from woodcutting. The equivalent for farmers included in the random sample
is 83 percent (33/40). No record was kept of the ethnic composition of the 44 forest residents
who participated as cooperative woodcutters. However, 15 of 68 randomly selected heads-of-
household stated they participated in the woodcut, 14 of whom are Hausa farmers, leaving
a single participant from among the Fulani herders.
In terms of intended future participation, while 35 of 40 farmers say they plan to
participate as woodcutters in the next cooperative wood harvest, only 3 of 28 herders have
the same intention, though 7 more say they may participate depending on time availability.
Clearly, this particular choice of activity—woodcutting for market—holds greater appeal at
this time for Hausa farmers than for Fulani herders. Perhaps most revealing, however, is that
the proportion of randomly interviewed Fulani herders who participated in the Baban Rafi
wood harvest, as well as the proportion of those who express a willingness to participate in
future cooperative-sponsored wood harvests, is significantly lower than the proportion of the
97. The cooperative, after several months of frustrating negotiation with the wood merchants of Maradi,
turned a profit of CFA 258,359 (about $1,000), which is currently kept in a bank account opened in the name
of the cooperative.87
same Fulani who say they have at some time in the past engaged in wood harvest for profit.
One might reasonably suspect, therefore, that it is not simply the choice of activity that is
relatively unattractive to the Fulani, but that the framework of the activity (i.e., that it is
sponsored by the Baban Rafi Cooperative and the NFM project) might also play a role in
eliciting a particular response.
Nevertheless, there remains at least one additional alternative explanation for the low level
of participation of Fulani in the single Baban Rafi wood harvest undertaken to date, that being
the seasonal timing of the wood harvest. A large number of young Fulani men are absent
from Baban Rafi during part of the dry season, when the wood harvest chronicled above took
place. The lack of interest expressed by many of the Fulani concerning future cooperative-
sponsored harvests might likewise be in part a result of the expectation that these, too, would
take place during an absence from the forest. It is unlikely, however, that seasonal timing
provides a complete explanation. While (as was presented in ch. 2) 45 percent of adult males
living in households of randomly sampled Fulani men have at some time traveled with the
family herd during its seasonal migrations, the percentage of Fulani men absent from the
forest during any given season is likely to be much smaller. Moreover, in addition to the lack
of Fulani participation in woodcutting activities, the data from Baban Rafi further suggest a
general lack of Fulani participation in all cooperative activities.
The NFM project and, in particular, the cooperative extension agent, who has worked full
time with the Baban Rafi Cooperative for most of its first two years, have worked hard to
achieve the participation of Fulani herders in cooperative activities. Notably, the post of
treasurer for the cooperative and for each of the village mutual groups (the village-level cell
of the cooperative) from villages with herding settlements in its vicinity is reserved for a
Fulani herder. A number of Fulani have also been elected among the representatives of the
village mutual groups in cooperative assemblies. However, attendance of Fulani representa-
tives at cooperative assemblies has been irregular compared to average overall attendance.
98
One notes also that resident Fulani herders appear to have been slower in expressing
support for the cooperative through the purchase of a membership card at a nominal fee.
While 34 of 40 random sample farmers state they have purchased a cooperative membership
card, only 12 of 28 herders say they have obtained the card. When asked if they are members
98. No systematic records exist that allow an exact comparison of fanner and herder patterns of attendance
at cooperative meetings. All sources questioned on the matter (farmers, herders, and project representatives)
agree, however, that farmers attend meetings at a significantly higher rate than do herders. The 5-member
delegation from Mamouri provides a capsule illustration of the contrast between farmer and herder patterns of
attendance. The Mamouri delegation is composed of 2 villagers and 1 representative from each of 3 herding
settlements. The near-perfect attendance of the 2 village-based representatives at cooperative meetings during
the period monitored, coupled with an overall attendance average of 2.5 representatives per meeting for the team
from Mamouri, represents a general pattern.88
of the cooperative, only 2 of the 68 heads-of-household included in the random sample
answered negatively. However, both negative answers come from Fulani herders."
Although the evidence is not complete, there is no category of data collected in Baban
Rafi concerning the topic of Fulani participation in cooperative activities that suggests that
the Fulani are not reluctant to identify with the cooperative. This should not come as a
surprise, given the distinct culture, history and traditions of the Fulani discussed in chapter
2. For the same reasons, neither should the contents of the following section (in which it will
be seen that Hausa behavior is far from standardized in terms of participation across
subgroups in activities thus far sponsored by the cooperative and supported by the NFM
project) come as a surprise to the reader familiar with chapter 2.
Consensus building among Hausa farmers. Beyond attendance sheets of official
cooperative meetings, there are no systematic records indicating rates of participation in
cooperative and project activities that allow for distinctions between villages and factions
within villages. The following discussion focuses on attendance records and some anecdotal
information to formulate hypotheses concerning differential participation in project and
cooperative activities among Hausa farmers. The purpose of the discussion is not to quantify
or define current rates of participation. It is, rather, to illustrate that the existing social
landscape is fertile ground for the differential participation of factions of Hausa farmers in
externally introduced or centralized (even at the local level) development initiatives. Yet,
differential participation (at least if it persists into the long term) will surely work against
project goals toward sustainable, local management of forest resources.
Attendance was monitored in the course of eight cooperative meetings during the period
December 1990 to August 1991. The meetings were open to all interested residents of the
forest, but they were officially called as meetings of the cooperative general assembly. The
general assembly consists of the five elected representatives of each of the eight village
mutual groups (VMGS) that make up the cooperative. The VMGS include villagers as well as
herding populations established in village vicinities. Three of the eight VMGS had no herding
groups in their vicinities at the time of the election of officers in June 1989 (one of these
three—Garin Ali—has been the site of significant herder settlement since the first election of
officers) and include no herder representatives among those elected to represent the
organization. Two of the eight VMGS are based in the village of Baban Rafi, whose population
of 137 heads-of-household (including 69 Hausa farmers and 68 Fulani herders) required the
village to form 2 VMGS in order to conform to national legislation which sets the maximum
VMG size at 100 households.
Meetings were held in several but not all of the home sites of the VMGS. To remove the
bias favoring higher average attendance figures for villages that hosted more meetings than
99. Among women, 1 of 37 farmers' wives said she is not a member of the Baban Rafi Cooperative, while
3 of 26 herders' wives answered in the negative. In both cases, women often hesitated to answer the question
until their husbands prompted them, usually providing an answer of "yes."89
others, average attendance was calculated without consideration of host village attendance
figures. Average attendance per meeting of each VMG delegation is displayed in table 5.1.
"Percentage villager" indicates the percentage of each representative delegation that was
chosen from among the population of the village proper as contrasted to representatives from
surrounding herder hamlets.








Garin Ali 3.6 100
Yen Gobirawa 3.1 100
Garin Maigiya 3.0 50




Garin Labou 1.3 100
Baban Rafi II 1.2 60
a. The scale for attendance is 0 to 5, since each Village Mutual Group names 5 representa-
tives who would normally be expected to attend each cooperative meeting.
b. The composition of the group of 5 village representatives plays a role in attendance at
cooperative meetings since "villagers" or "farmers" tend to attend meetings more
regularly than do "herders" who reside in hamlets outside of villages.
c. In the case of Garin Maigiya, a "herder" was replaced by a "villager" midway through
the monitored period. The reason for the replacement was given as the poor attendance
record of the herder.
d. Mamouri is unique among the villages of the cooperative in having 3 distinct herding
settlements dependent on its water resources: 2 Fulani settlements and 1 Buzu settlement.
Herding settlements are generally considered to be dependent on or attached to villages
at which water needs are satisfied.
Average attendance of the 5 representatives of each of the 8 VMGS ranged from a high
of 3.6 representatives per meeting to a low of 1.2. Not surprisingly, 2 of the 3 VMGS whose
representatives consist exclusively of Hausa farmers occupy the top 2 slots in terms of
average attendance. As noted above, Hausa farmers tend to participate at a higher rate than
do Fulani or Buzu herders. More surprising is the second-to-last place finish of the third
exclusively Hausa contingent, that of Garin Labou. Average attendance for the five
representatives of the VMG of Garin Labou at the 7 meetings it did not host is only 1.3. Part
of the explanation may be found in the fact that Garin Labou retains allegiance to a traditional
structure of authority at odds with the traditional hierarchy dominant throughout most of the
geographical region defined by the cooperative. While 6 of the 7 villages consider themselves
to be under the authority of the canton chief of Safo, whose administrative seat is located
about 15 kilometers south of Maradi, the village of Garin Labou is under the authority of the
canton chief of Tibiri, who administers the canton from about 7 kilometers north of Maradi.90
Garin Labou has been described as a village of Tibiri located on the soil of Safo. Unique
history and traditions have probably contributed to the relative social isolation of the VMG of
Garin Labou from the rest of the cooperative, though geographical logic clearly argues for
its inclusion as a member of the cooperative.' The reputation of Garin Labou among NFM
project staff as a "village with problems" has probably been a factor in maintaining or even
increasing the village's relative isolation. It is the sole village of those included in the Baban
Rafi Forestry Cooperative that has never been home to an NFM project assistant.
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The VMG of Garin Ali receives highest marks—an average of 3.6—for participation at
cooperative meetings. In addition to the fact that its representative council includes no
herders, Garin Ali is perhaps the most homogeneous of the cooperative villages in terms of
the ethnic and family composition of its residents. It also has a reputation for being the most
devout in terms of the Muslim religion. In contrast, the villages of Baban Rafi (whose 2
VMGS compiled attendance averages of 2.8 and 1.2) and Goulgoussao (2.4) exhibit much
more ethnic heterogeneity (i.e., the co-existence of a variety of Hausa subgroups and
lineages) among their village populations.
Admittedly, attendance lists of cooperative meetings are rather a tenuous and somewhat
arbitrary indicator of Hausa farmer participation in project and cooperative activities.
However, there is substantial anecdotal evidence to indicate that village factions among Hausa
farmers are often well-defined and hard-line and that participation rates tend to vary by
village faction. For example, Baban Rafi Village is well-known to consist of two quarters,
characterized, respectively, as animist and Muslim. The Muslim quarter is found on the side
of the village facing Garin Ali, about 3 kilometers to the north. It is inhabited mostly by
former residents of Garin Ali, including the current village chief of Baban Rafi, who settled
at the site of Baban Rafi when a modern well was installed there about 1960. The animist,
or southern, quarter is inhabited by former residents of Tielawa, the site of a former village
about 5 kilometers south of Baban Rafi abandoned following a series of attacks on millet
fields by birds, as well as by former residents of more distant sites, mostly in Nigeria. Stories
abound, particularly among residents of the animist quarter, of sore points in a history of
unequal relations between the two quarters. Not surprisingly, project personnel note that
residents of the northern quarter have been much quicker to take part in project sponsored
agroforestry activities than have been residents of the southern quarter.
100. It is interesting to note that a strict reading of Nigerien legislation setting cooperative guidelines—which
prohibit cooperatives from straddling administrative boundaries—would forbid the Baban Rafi Cooperative to
exist in its present form. In this case the boundary straddled is that between the districts of Madarounfa and
Guidan Roumdji, since the canton of Safo is under the jurisdiction of the former and the canton of Tibiri is a
part of the latter.
101. Project assistants assigned to nearby Mamouri were given the responsibility (during the research period
of 1991-1992) of working with the villagers of Garin Labou. Based on nonsystematized observations, I would
further guess that of all the villages which the mobile project assistants visit as teams (much of their work is
done as teams moving from village to village), Garin Labou is among the least visited—if not the least
visited—of the villages of the original Baban Rafi Cooperative.91
5.3.3 CONCLUSION
The danger is the following: in the absence of an effective forum for the articulation of
diverse interests, or in the event of a failure to represent these interests in processes of policy
formulation, adequate incentives may not be created and sustained to induce the participation
of diverse groups in a new management system. In fact, changes introduced to such settings
as the villages and hamlets of the Baban Rafi Cooperative by agencies such as the NFm
project run the risk of unintentionally exacerbating pre-existing social cleavages (by favoring
Hausa over Fulani or by ignoring a "problem village" such as Garin Labou or a "problem
quartier" such as the southern section of Baban Rafi village). Nevertheless, the widespread
appeal to local populations of an introduced forest management system is of crucial
importance since the presence in the forest of large numbers of resource users with little or
no motivation to follow rules will undermine the sustainability of the system. The above
account suggests that the institutionalization of effective mechanisms to represent the varied
interests and rights currently operating in the Baban Rafi forest is a very complex matter.
For example, as measured in terms of cooperative-sponsored commercial wood
harvesting, attendance at cooperative meetings, and purchase of cooperative membership
cards, one observes at Baban Rafi a differential rate of participation between herders and
farmers in cooperative activities during its first two years of existence. I would suggest that
the different participation levels may be profitably discussed in terms of incentives to
participate. There are two obvious hypotheses: (1) the substance of the incentive is more
appealing to Hausa farmers than to Fulani herders; and (2) the prospects for realization of
the incentive are perceived differently by the two groups.
One may make an optimistic assessment of the concern raised by the first hypothesis.
Incentive structures sometimes, with little prodding, evolve to broaden the appeal for
participation across groups. For example, the forestry cooperative of Guesselbodi, near
Niamey, developed an enterprise over a period of years for the commercial harvest and
marketing of forage resources (straw) as an activity rivaling that of the commercial
exploitation of fuelwood. Such a development at Baban Rafi would, perhaps, increase the
appeal to herders to participate in cooperative activities, since the management of forage
resources on a commercial basis should help to ensure supplies and provide for their
distribution. Alternatively, the existing incentive of financial reward from the harvest and
marketing of fuelwood may broaden its appeal across groups as increasing numbers of herders
expand their activities in the monetized economy and find it acceptable to sell their labor.
The concern raised by the second hypothesis is, perhaps, more problematic. One should
note that the harvest and marketing of any of the forest's products as a community enterprise
(so far the central focus of the cooperative) is likely to be perceived differently by groups as
different as Fulani herders and Hausa farmers. While the financial incentives of commercial-
ization may be as attractive to herders as to farmers, perceptions of the attainability of the
incentive may, sometimes for perfectly practical reasons, differ from group to group. Several
household heads among herders state flatly that they do not have time to engage in wood
harvesting activities sponsored by the cooperative. Such activities are often timed to take92
place during the dry season, a time of reduced activity for the farmer but a demanding time
for herders attempting to secure the forage and water needed by their livestock. Problems of
communication between the village-centered VMGs and the scattered herder settlements are
another complication in the way of herder realization of the financial incentives (resulting
from cooperative-sponsored commercial enterprises) on an equal footing with villagers.
More disturbing, one observes that the second hypothesis is not limited to practical
realities but extends to individual and group perceptions that arise from a variety of factors.
Barriers to organizing and coordinating among groups may be rooted in a diversity of world
views and group histories that tend to encourage suspicions and isolationist sentiments among
some groups more than others. Not only is this a common occurrence between such groups
as herders and farmers, it may also play a role in participation rates between factions within
the same forest resource user group, as was shown to be the case above for farmers. One
suspects that differential patterns of participation between villages or between factions within
villages are likely to resurface in the course of current and future activities of the cooperative
unless the special needs of nonparticipating groups are recognized and addressed.
One returns momentarily to the questions surrounding the activity of the wood harvest
sponsored by the NFM project and organized (under the tutelage of the project and the CLUSA
agent) by the cooperative to observe that, to present, participation has been self-selective, that
is, no significant bars to participation had been imposed either by the cooperative or the NFM
project. Leaving aside for the moment the lack of participation on the part of the Fulani
herders, one finds no apparent correlation between the Hausa participants and any particular
social or geographical category (though a few Hausa farmers residing in the villages the most
distant from the wood harvest offered their location as the reason for nonparticipation). For
example, a number of young men with no obvious standing either within their villages or in
the cooperative participated in the harvest and reaped the financial reward, while many men
of medium or high stature (many of whom one might think the lure of quick financial gain
would prove difficult to resist) assumed a wait-and-see stance regarding the harvest (many
of these same men later stated they intend to participate in the next harvest). According to
intentions expressed following the initial harvest, however, the demand to participate in future
harvests may be substantially higher and will perhaps necessitate the imposition of selection
criteria or individual wood harvest quotas.
This raises a further concern (as it also serves to illustrate an earlier point). Success in
attracting future participants to activities such as wood harvests might bring its own set of
problems. The imposition of selection criteria carries the risk of further differentiating an
already diverse population according to existing divisions. There is a ready example of just
such a risk that arises from a policy modification that went into effect soon before my sojourn
as a researcher at Baban Rafi came to an end.
On the advice of the NFM project, the cooperative raised the cooperative's membership
fee from CFA 50 to CFA 500 in anticipation of a second wood harvest. The rationale behind
the fee rise was to limit the number of wood cutters participating in the harvest, since a large
number of wood cutters with a license to harvest was feared to be unmanageable. I suggest93
that the change holds two primary implications. First, participants in the cooperative-
sponsored harvest might tend to be those who can most easily afford to pay the fee, that is,
the revenue-earning opportunity represented by the wood harvest is most available to those
who already have greater-than-average means.
Second, and perhaps more disturbing, the membership fee originally intended as a
nominal gesture on the part of every male head-of-household of support for the cooperative
will more likely serve in the future as a divisive device between those willing to pay the fee
(and benefit from the wood harvest) and those who (regardless of intention to participate in
the wood harvest) would have paid a nominal membership fee to the cooperative but balk at
paying a more significant sum (unless, of course, they expect significant returns from the
wood harvest). Therefore, those already experienced as wood cutters, or those most open to
the idea of engaging in such labor for pecuniary remuneration, will tend to constitute the bulk
of cooperative participants. The multiple-use-of-forest-resources principle originally included
as the base of the NFM project platform might eventually fade in the face of an organization
that operates on a single-use principle, and that represents something of an elite of local
populations. Such is the ever-present danger of any development project attempting to
increase benefit flows to target populations. The potential ecological consequences are also
unfavorable. The fewer the individuals who see a direct benefit from cooperative activities
and rules, the lower the general willingness among local populations to respect the rules of
the new management system.
Such unfavorable eventualities could be headed off, of course, by imposing a management
regime based on ecological limitations and enforcing the new regime by means of a police
force. The reader will recognize, however, that such an enforcement-oriented regime is
exactly the type of nonparticipatory system that has failed in the past and in response to which
such projects as the NFM project were born as part of a negative reaction.
Therefore, the NFM project should be applauded for its general approach, but cautioned
to stand guard against a deterioration of its platform to a single use (as contrasted to a
multiple use) emphasis within the natural forest for reasons of expediency. Such vigilance will
require almost endless patience as well as re-evaluation of constantly modifying social
conditions.
It might be useful, for example, to frame the basic approach to resource management in
terms of the individual gain achieved by participants, since promises of an overall ecological
gain appear as overly vague to members of the different user groups. Individual benefits
sometimes take the form of enhanced revenues (e.g., woodcutting jobs), but they also come
in the form of distributions of pasture and farmland. The material presented in chapter 2
illustrated the willingness of Hausa men to engage in wage labor relative to Fulani men.
However, while the effective incentive to participation from the perspective of Hausa men
may be employment, the effective incentive from the vantage point of Fulani men will
probably be related to the activity most central to their currently less-diversified lifestyles,
that is, herding. The incentive capable of securing the participation of Fulani men in a new
management regime designed to achieve ecological objectives might be the preservation of94
adequate and—perhaps most importantly, precisely defined—parcels of the forest to be set
aside, perhaps on a rotational basis, for use as pasture and browse. This is, of course,
included in the proposed management plan of the NFM project, but it had yet to be
demonstrated to the region's herders by the time I left Niger in October 1991.
But even if perfectly executed, no approach to or strategy for modifying resource
exploitation patterns according to environmental goals comes without risk. The risk in
institutionalizing a strategy that distinguishes between use patterns current between different
groups is the threat that groups such as Hausa and Fulani could come to be inevitably
identified with their respective niches and, therefore, denied any future evolution of lifestyles
and occupations. This risk confirms the need to incorporate flexibility into whatever
management system arises in the future (i.e., demand for jobs versus demand for pasture
must constantly be reassessed), a requirement much easier to recognize than to satisfy.
The predominance of heterogeneity as a characteristic of forest populations, then, requires
that special attention be given to both incentive formulation and incentive realization.
Incentives must be designed that appeal to a broad range of interests across groups, and, at
the same time, barriers to the realization of incentives (particularly in terms of constraints to
intergroup and intragroup organizing) must be recognized and addressed. An additional
consideration in attempts to coordinate and organize across diverse populations is the varying
histories of interaction of different groups with agents of the Nigerien state and the legacy left
over from each separate history of interaction.
5.4 STATE/LOCAL RELATIONS
The Nigerien state is not only, along with CARE International, a co-executor of the NFM
project, it is the de jure past, present, and future authority over the region of the Baban Rafi
forest and over all its inhabitants. As for the present, precedents set according to traditional
patterns of state/local interaction continue to loom large in the minds of natural resource
users. As for the future, it is inconceivable that the state would not assume a major role in
any future natural-resource property and management regime in Niger, just as is the case in
all advanced capitalist countries. Between the present and the future of state/local relations
is a lot of undefined territory that needs to be attended to if local organization is to proceed.
The traditional role of the Nigerien state in natural resource management is discussed
below, with a particular focus on application of forest legislation by state foresters in the
Baban Rafi forest.
102 Following the discussion of traditional state/civil society relations is
a presentation of the evidence that these relations at the site of Baban Rafi have been
undergoing a change since the installation of the NFM project in 1989. However, a troubling
aspect remains: although evidence for change is convincing, the change has yet to be
harnessed into a clear direction, definition and purpose.
102. The contents of the Nigerien Forest Code are discussed in ch. 4 of this study.95
5.4.1 TRADITIONAL STATE/LOCAL RELATIONS
Shortage of human and material resources. Niger is a very poor country with a very
large territory. Niger's forest service—the governmental agency responsible for the
enforcement of the forest code—is understaffed and underfunded. According to the annual
reports of the Environmental Service of the Department of Maradi, total personnel available
to implement and administer state programs in fisheries, wildlife, and forestry in this
department covering 38,500 square kilometers numbered fifty-one in 1985—a typical year
from the pre-NFM project era. Included in this total, along with high-level administrators and
forest agents, are secretaries, chauffeurs, laborers, and an American Peace Corps volunteer.
The vehicle fleet of the departmental service consisted of seven Land Rovers (three of which
are listed in the report as in poor condition), four Toyotas, one Peugeot, one Renault, and
one tractor. The fleet was divided among the six districts and their subposts, with the choice
vehicles based in the departmental capital.
Because of shortages in human and material resources, it has been common in Niger to
entrust management of forested areas with several tens of thousands of hectares in surface
area to a single forest agent without regular means of transportation. The Baban Rafi forest
is such an example. Prior to the installation of the NFM project in 1989, residents of Baban
Rafi received infrequent visits from the forest agent residing about 25 kilometers to the east
in Gabi Mayaki. Forest inhabitants were even less frequently visited by the state forest agents
who ran the service's office in the administrative seat of the district of Madarounfa.
Forest Code enforcement patterns in the Baban Rafi forest. In spite of the infrequence
of visits to the villages of Baban Rafi by state agents, the state role in forest management
looms large in the minds of local populations. There is always the prospect of being visited,
and, periodically, the reality. About one-third of the heads-of-household randomly selected
for interviews in the villages and herding camps of the Baban Rafi Cooperative have been
charged by forest agents with violations of the forest code. We consider briefly the cases of
those charged with infractions since these are the instances that demonstrate enforcement of
the forest code in Niger and illustrate traditional state/local relations in the domain of forest
management.
Of the 68 heads-of-household selected randomly for interview in the region of the Baban
Rafi Cooperative, 40 are residents of the predominantly Hausa villages, and 28 live in
herding/farming settlements outside the villages (25 are Fulani; 3 are Buzu). The sample
represents slightly over 20 percent of household heads recorded during a population census
conducted by the NFM project of the cooperative region in 1989. Interviews were conducted
from May to August 1991. We treat, first, the farmers of the villages.
Farmer fine patterns. Eleven out of forty (28%) village farmers have been charged with
violations of forest law. Four of the eleven have been charged with forest violations on two
or more separate occasions; one was charged on three occasions; another says simply,
"several times." All but one of the incidents took place prior to the installation of the NFM
project in 1989.96
About one-half of the violations involved the commercial exploitation of wood. Some
(5/11 ) were pressed on farmers discovered cutting and collecting fuelwood to be sold to
wood merchants who would transport it to the Maradi market. An additional commercially
minded farmer was apprehended "on several occasions" while cutting wood with which to
sculpt mortars to sell at local markets. The sculptor reports the only case of a violation that
has been prosecuted among random-sample farmers since 1986. In a somewhat atypical
incident that took place in 1990, the sculptor was discovered at a local market with mortars
believed to have been carved from illegally exploited wood. His mortars were confiscated.
These six commercially minded farmers—five woodcutters and a sculptor—were all
experienced in the procedures sanctioned by the forest code concerning commercial
exploitation of wood. They had all obtained exploitation permits on numerous occasions prior
to their arrests. However, they were all willing to gamble, at least occasionally, that they
could exploit wood commercially without obtaining a permit and without being caught. The
permit represents for these farmers a considerable expense in terms of time and money. None
of the farmers expressed any notion that there was any forest management objective attached
to the permit system other than to collect revenues for the state.
The punishment imposed on all six of the commercial exploiters was the confiscation of
fuelwood or, in the case of the sculptor, the confiscation of mortars. Estimates of the value
of confiscated fuelwood in each case are CFA 40,000 or more ($160—this would be the
amount received by the farmers from transporters who would then take it to market—the
market value in Maradi would be at least five times greater than the price paid to woodcutters
in the forest). In addition to the confiscation, two of the commercial exploiters were made
to pay fines of CFA 40,000. One of the two received a receipt acknowledging fine payment.
In addition to the commercial exploiters, five farmers were charged with the misuse of
forest resources for domestic purposes. These five represent a variety of resource uses. One
cut wood to construct a small shelter; one thinned to clear a field; one removed a tree from
his fields to use the wood for fuel and tools; one cut a tree to harvest the sap; and one was
hunting. The hunter was discovered setting traps for field rats he said were destroying his
groundnut crops. His punishment was the confiscation of his traps. Of the remaining four,
three were fined. Fines were CFA 1,000, CFA 5,000, and CFA 6,000. None of these payments
was acknowledged by receipt. The intervention of the village chief saved the remaining
farmer from being fined.
Herder fine patterns. Twelve of the twenty-eight herding heads-of-family (43%)
interviewed have been charged by forest agents with violations of the forest code. Five of the
twelve have been charged on two or more occasions, and one herder received "warnings" for
misuse of forest resources on four separate occasions. Nine of the twelve herders report
incidents that took place prior to 1987. Four herders report incidents since 1989 (one herder
is found in both groups since he reports incidents before 1987 as well as since 1989). As is
the case with the farmers, one notes an almost total absence of incidents during the 1987-8997
period, the reasons for which are unclear.
103 The reappearance of incidents since 1989 is
more pronounced among the herders than among the farmers.
The vast majority of violations committed by herders involved the cutting of branches
from trees to be used as feed for livestock. Four of the herders, however, report nonlive-
stock-related incidents. Two of the four were discovered cutting down trees to clear
agricultural fields. One of these incidents took place in 1984. The herder was not fined but
was given a verbal warning. The other field-clearing incident took place in 1990, and the
herder was—at least, initially—fined CFA 10,000.
104 Another two herders report they were
discovered cutting trees for wood to be used in the construction of habitations. One of these
incidents took place about 1981 and involved a tree in the herder's millet field. The fine was
demanded and collected in Nigerian currency—the dominant currency in many of the villages
of the Baban Rafi forest closest to the border with Nigeria. The fine was set at 70 naira
(equivalent to about CFA 28,000 in 1981). The other incident involving a tree exploited for
construction wood took place about 1990. The tree was cut in the forest, and the fine
collected was CFA 5,000. Neither of these fine payments was acknowledged by written receipt
from the forest service.
Nine of the herders reporting encounters with forest agents were charged with lopping
branches for animal feed. Six of the violations occurred on off-farm bush or forested lands,
two in farm fields not owned by the herder, and one in the herder's own field. One of the
nine, though he was surprised by forest agents on four separate occasions, was never made
to pay a fine. Another among the nine herders reports that he did not pay a fine himself, but
that his relative who was charged in the same incident paid the fine. An additional herder
among the nine also has never paid a fine, but he was made to spend 1
1/2 days in jail for his
offense. Of the remaining six herders, fines ranged from CFA 2,500 to CFA 30,000, with an
average fine of CFA 13,250 imposed for the offense of lopping branches for forage. In two
of the six cases, receipts were issued upon receipt of payment.
103. There is little else to indicate any general lapse in enforcement of the Forest Code during the 1987-89
period. It is true that state tax revenues from the fuelwood trade have been falling steadily (see discussion below
of the fuelwood market), suggesting that enforcement, at least of forest legislation dealing with harvest and trade
of fuelwood, has been less aggressively pursued in recent years—but this would not explain the partial
resurgence of fines since 1989. There are two possible explanations: (1) farmers and herders were imprecise
in recalling the period in which they were fined (they were asked to give the number of years since the fine),
and in reality some of them were fined during the 1987-89 period; or (2) the random sample of herders is
simply not representative of total herders, who more than likely continued to receive fines throughout the period.
The latter explanation fits in with the general argument (presented below) that fines applied to herders have been
maintained since the installation of the NFm project while those to farmers have been reduced to near zero.
Yet the departmental reports of the Maradi Service of the Environment suggest the possibility of a marked
increase in fines applied to herders in 1990 as compared to 1989 (see below) and, therefore, support the original
interpretation of the evidence from Baban Rafi that there has been an increase in fines to herders since 1989.
The mystery of near-zero fine activity for the 1987-89 period remains unsolved.
104. It is not clear that this fine was paid, since there are reports that the project intervened on behalf of the
herder.98
In summary, twenty-three of the sixty-eight (34%) total heads-of-household (farmers and
herders) interviewed have been charged by forest agents with violations of the forest code.
Thirteen heads-of-household have been made to pay fines averaging CFA 15,731 ($63). One
was made to spend 1
1 days in jail. Receipts were issued in three of the thirteen (23%) cases
of fine payment. It is likely that the cases in which receipts are provided are included among
the violations listed in reports of the forest service, and that incidents in which no receipt is
issued are not reported by the agent to the forest service. Nine of ten farmers and eight of
twelve herders reporting violations of the forest code state that all incidents took place before
1987.
Legacy of traditional state/local relations in the Baban Rafi forest. Historically
speaking, villagers and herders see little logic in the actions of forest agents beyond their
obvious function as collectors of revenue. Forest residents are conditioned to avoid contact
with state foresters whenever possible. The relationship between forester and villager is still
often described in the villages as that between a cat and mouse. Rural inhabitants know that
if they are surprised by a visitor they risk being punished for things they are used to doing
every day—lopping branches for livestock, cutting trees to clear farmland or to sell as
fuelwood or to build a hangar—and they tend to flee at the first sound of a vehicle's motor.
While the distinction between commercial and domestic use of forest resources is
generally understood, other subtleties of the forest code—for example, distinctions between
tree species or the difference between "classified" and "protected" forests—are often lost on
rural inhabitants. The second most common answer by villagers to the question of what is
written in the forest code (the first answer is "no forest fires") is "don't touch any trees."
This is considered by villagers to be unrealistic. And for commercial exploiters of fuelwood,
no connection is made between the forest code and preservation of the forest. It appears that
any quantity of fuelwood may be harvested from the forest as long as the required tax is
paid—or as long as it is successfully evaded.
Cooperatives, Samarya, and the Development Society in the western Baban Rafi
forest. Prior to the NFM project, each village of the current Baban Rafi Cooperative had at
least some association with a state-sponsored cooperative. With the exception of Garin Labou,
the villages officially held membership in a cooperative seated in the village of Garin Jido,
35 kilometers from Baban Rafi Village. Village Mutual Groups (VMGS—see ch. 5 of this
study) were formed in 1981 in Baban Rafi
105 and Mamouri to participate in the Garin Jido
Cooperative. However, the CLUSA agent assisting the current cooperative of Baban Rafi found
on his arrival in late-1988 that participation of the villages of Baban Rafi and Mamouri in the
cooperative of Garin Jido was minimal. Although representatives of the VMGS of Baban Rafi
and Mamouri occasionally attended cooperative meetings in Garin Jido (villagers in Mamouri
estimate that such meetings took place on average 7 times in a year), it was generally felt that
105. The VMG of Baban Rafi actually represented the villages of Garin Ali, Goulgoussao, Garin Maigiya,
and Yen Gobirawa as well, since these 4 villages are considered by the state as quartiers ofBaban Rafi village
and therefore under the jurisdiction of a single village chief.99
Garin Jido was too far away for cooperative activities or assistance to play a role in local
village life.
The remaining village of the current Baban Rafi Cooperative, Garin Labou, formed a
VMG in 1987 to participate in a cooperative whose administrative seat was the village of Dan
Kano, 10 kilometers to the north. Four representatives were elected from Garin Labou to
attend cooperative meetings (9 meetings were held in 1988). One of the representatives of
Garin Labou was named treasurer of the cooperative of Dan Kano. The cooperative was
understood by the villagers as an organization to secure credit and seeds for rural farmers,
but villagers added that no benefits had reached Garin Labou. Villagers said of the
cooperative treasurer from Garin Labou that "no [cooperative] task had yet come his way."
Other villagers informed the CLUSA agent that Garin Labou has not participated in any
cooperative activities and that villagers got nothing out of the cooperative.
The traditional state cooperatives of Niger have generally engaged in little interaction with
herding populations. The herding populations holding membership in the Baban Rafi Forestry
Cooperative are experiencing their first association with cooperatives.
Samarya associations (described in ch. 4) had a much higher profile among villagers than
had cooperatives or VMGS in the pre-NFM project era. State representatives from the
departmental or district office of the Ministry of Youth and Sports (in recent years often
accompanied by district-level representatives of government services participating in the Local
Development Council seated at Madarounfa) have periodically visited the villages of the
Baban Rafi forest to advise Samarya units and hear reports on their activities. Such advisory
teams have helped the villages to form representative committees and elect officers of local
Samarya councils.
However, the purpose, structures, and activities of Samarya as understood and articulated
by villagers remain vague. Most villagers questioned on the matter refer to the village or
Samarya agricultural field. However, it is commonly acknowledged that in most villages,
participation in Samarya fieldwork is low and production is insignificant. Furthermore,
villager responses to questions on the subject of local Samarya reveal no particular agenda
or regular schedule of meetings or activities. Teachers at the elementary school in Baban Rafi
Village, originally from other Hausaphone regions of Niger, suggest that the primary
testament to the existence of Samarya consists of the now crumbling schoolyard walls
marking the location of countless village schools around the country. The walls were built
with village labor mobilized in the name of Samarya and under the direction of state officials.
Villagers also recall that in the early 1980s, they were mobilized in the name of Samarya to
work in some private fields newly established in the area by the district administrator (sous
préfet) at Madarounfa.
The national network of Samarya has been largely unsuccessful in extending to the
herders of the Baban Rafi forest. Herders say that a number of years ago a meeting was
arranged between representatives of some of the herding groups to establish a Samarya
council. The meeting was attended by the nonresident traditional leaders of the two major100
groups of Fulani herders in the Baban Rafi forest. Failure at the meeting to establish a
Samarya council among forest-residing Fulani herders was explained by the herders as the
result of a general incomprehension of the point of Samarya and an inability to organize
elections to choose representatives.
Nowhere among the villages of the Baban Rafi Cooperative does one find a functioning
village development council (VDC), the base unit of the Development Society. However, state
representatives of the local development council of Madarounfa have visited the villages of
Baban Rafi in recent years to lay the foundation for the VDCS. A villager of Baban Rafi
Village was named as a local representative of the Development Society, and has since been
somewhat facetiously referred to by fellow villagers as MNSD (the French acronym for the
National Movement of the Development Society, which also serves as a kind of state political
party of the military government). In the context of the newly open political atmosphere of
Niger leading up to the national conference in October 1991, the villager known as MNSD
stated he regretted his nomination as representative of the state-sponsored Development
Society.
106 The villager's attitude may be indicative of the future of the Development
Society in the Baban Rafi forest and even throughout Niger.
5.4.2 EVIDENCE OF CHANGES IN STATE/LOCAL RELATIONS SINCE THE DEBUT OF THE
NFM PROJECT
The NFNI project had, by the end of its second year, greatly influenced the nature of
relations between state forest agents and many of the rural inhabitants in the region of the
seven villages of the Baban Rafi Cooperative. Foresters now often visit the forest as
representatives of the project rather than enforcers of national laws. In addition, sponsorship
by the project of the Baban Rafi Cooperative has been accompanied by a level of technical
and material support far exceeding previous efforts to organize local populations into
cooperatives in the Baban Rafi forest. The motor behind the changes has been the project,
which has been warmly welcomed by most villagers who recognize it as a means to enhance
material and technical resources available to forest populations.
Nevertheless, problems remain. Especially disturbing are indications that traditional
neglect of Fulani populations by the state hierarchy might in some circumstances evolve into
outright discrimination given the vulnerability of more marginal populations to the demands
of any unscrupulous foresters who might seek out settings beyond the watchful eye of projects
(such as the NFM project) to practice "traditional" policing (and fining) activities. Equally at
question is the genuine long-term commitment of the state and its agencies such as the forest
department to uphold the new practices and attitudes.
Local attitudes toward state foresters. Thirty-eight of forty farmers say there has been
a positive change in villagers relations with foresters since the arrival of the NFM project in
106. MNSD said he wished he could change his allegiance to another political party (opposition parties had
only recently been legalized), but was unsure of whether this was possible since state party officials had already
written down his name.101
1989. A single farmer states there has been no change, and an additional farmer has no
opinion on the issue. Of the twenty-three farmers who provide descriptions of the improved
relations with foresters, twelve state simply that now they are friends with state foresters
(most of them citing as evidence that now they greet each other), and eleven cite relief felt
as a result of a decreased risk of being charged and fined by foresters for violations of the
forest code.
Twenty-four of twenty-eight herders believe relations with foresters have improved, while
four herders reply that there has been no change. One of those expressing the opinion of no
change gave as his reason that there continue to be fines imposed. Another expressed the
opinion that there may appear to have been changes, but they are merely cosmetic. Thirteen
of the twenty-four herders who answered that there have indeed been positive changes
provided accounts of the changes: nine expressed relief that foresters are less aggressive about
prosecuting violations of the forest code; two said simply that now they greet each other; and
two broke ranks by expressing the hope that the new regime will result in an increase in
forest surveillance by forest agents.
Modified exploitation practices in reaction to the NFM project. Respondents were next
asked if they had modified personal practices or patterns of forest resource use or
management since the arrival of the project. These answers are discussed below. It should
first be noted that these responses are not presented here as a veritable measure of the
influence of the project on actions and attitudes of rural inhabitants. Answers to a question
of this type are often formulated in a manner to please the questioner, especially since
connections between the questioner and the project are generally assumed by the respondents.
However, a comparison between farmers' and herders' answers may provide some insights
into the different attitudes each group tends to assume toward externally initiated development
efforts in general and toward the NFM project in particular.
Not surprisingly (the lack of surprise is explained above), all but two of the forty farmers
replied that they have modified their actions in forest resource use and/or management since
the arrival of the project. The most commonly cited change of behavior, attested to by
nineteen farmers, was the incorporation of one or more of the technological practices
promoted by the project. These practices include: leaving trees in fields that traditionally had
been removed; planting seedlings provided by the project or produced with its help; and
pruning field and house trees according to techniques taught by the project.
Twelve farmers specified that the management system represented by the cooperative was
already influencing their behavior. Some stated that now they would ask the cooperative
before clearing new fields, or that they would no longer sell wood they had cut directly to
wood merchants from the city. (One farmer in an unsolicited comment admitted he continues
to cut wood and sell it directly to the merchants.) A few farmers expressed their approval
that now there existed regulations to guide forest use and organize exploitation, and that the
forest was losing some of the anarchy that has long characterized its exploitation.102
Seven farmers indicated they have adopted some type of conservation practice since the
arrival of the NFM project. Such practices include: refraining from the cutting of live trees;
using manufactured string instead of bark for certain applications; and maintaining smaller
stocks of fuelwood stored in smaller piles since that way, they explain, they tend to use it less
wastefully.
A few answers did not fit into any of the above categories. For example, one farmer said
he has changed his actions because now he has no fear of foresters and so he exploits more
resources than before. Another farmer provides a similar response, "Now I get more profit
from the forest."
In sum, one notes that farmers tend to answer in the affirmative the question of whether
they have modified exploitation or use patterns in the forest since the arrival of the
NFM project. Descriptions of modifications fall into three main categories: the adoption of certain
agroforestry or soil management techniques (19 responses, 48%); respect for the rules of the
management system represented by the cooperative (12 responses, 30%); and increased
efforts toward conservation of resources (7 responses, 18%).
Of the twenty-eight herders to whom the question was posed, twenty-six said they have
modified their actions in the forest since the arrival of the project. Of the two who answered
"no," one stated simply, "I still make hay, just like before." Of the twenty-six who answered
"yes," all provided explanations of their answer. Most of the explanations fall into one of the
three categories established above by farmers' answers: the adoption of agroforestry
techniques (8 responses, 29%); respect for the rules of the management system represented
by the cooperative (10 responses, 36%); and increased efforts toward conservation of
resources (7 responses, 25%).
The leading explanation of modified behavior, cited by ten herders, is that now there is
a system in place to control the forest. Most of the herders (7 of 10) who referred to the new
management system explained modifications in exploitation patterns as a reduction of an
activity, usually the lopping of branches for forage. In contrast to the farmers, the majority
of herders (7 of 10) who fit into this category explicitly and without solicitation mention the
word, "fear"—usually specifically naming foresters as the object of fear. It will be recalled
that several farmers cited the new management system with approval, and never was fear
explicitly acknowledged as the motivation for modifying exploitation practices. While farmers
tend to acknowledge the new regulatory regime in the forest through phrases such as "now
I would ask permission before clearing a field" or "now I would sell wood to the cooperative
instead of to outside wood merchants," herders tend to say, "now I cut fewer branches for
my cattle because I'm afraid of forest agents" or "I avoid allowing my herd to graze the
postharvest stubble of village fields because a forester might catch me." One herder added,
"now fields are property [not ours] and they are no longer available for use by outsiders."
Five herders state simply that they cut fewer branches since the arrival of the project.
They were not included in the category above since they do not mention whether they cut
fewer branches because of new regulations (or fear) or because of increased awareness of the103
need to practice conservation. Two additional herders state explicitly that they now practice
conservation (i.e., cut fewer branches), and attribute that fact to the project: "our
consciousness has been raised by the [NFM] Project."
Eight herders explain changes of behavior in terms of adoption of new technologies,
usually natural regeneration of field trees. A few have also planted seedlings provided by the
project.
Finally, the answers of two herders do not fit into any of the categories above. These
herders answer, as did two farmers, that now they do whatever they want in the forest since
foresters no longer come around.
The differing perceptions of the inhabitants of the Baban Rafi forest regarding the
questions cited above are striking, not only between groups but also within groups. At one
extreme, 28 percent of farmers and 32 percent of herders identify the reason for improved
relations with forest agents to be the reduced risk of being fined for illegal acts of forest
resource exploitation. A minority both of farmers and of herders openly state that they now
exploit resources at higher rates than before the risk was reduced. At the other extreme, a
few farmers and herders suggest there is a need for increased surveillance of the forest by
state agents, and some speak with unsolicited approval of the prospect of installing an
effective management system in the form of the cooperative to regulate resource exploitation
in the forest. In the middle are the 30 percent of farmers and 36 percent of herders who claim
to have already modified their resource exploitation behavior in the forest as a result of the
cooperative either out of respect or out of fear.
5.4.3 MORE SIGNS OF CHANGE: STATE/LOCAL RELATIONS AT THE DEPARTMENT AND
SUBDISTRICT LEVELS
Changes in the manner in which the forest code is enforced in the department of Maradi
are suggested through an examination of recent forest service reports including records of
prosecuted violations of forest legislation. At first glance the changes are not obvious. Forest
service reports for the years 1985-1986, 1989, and 1990 (the only years for which reports
were made available to me) show little significant change at the departmental level in terms
of the number of reported fines and total revenues collected from fines. The department
reports 122 fines totaling CFA 4,043,000 collected in 1985-1986; 120 fines totaling
CFA 4,744,325, in 1989; and 124 fines totaling CFA 3,881,500, in 1990. One notes,
however, significant variations in fine patterns between 1989 and 1990 in some of the districts
of Maradi Department. Madarounfa (the administrative district that includes the Baban Rafi
forest), for example, collected 32 fines in 1989—only 2 more than in 1985-1986—but 54 fines
in 1990. Furthermore, 53 of the 54 fines in 1990 were imposed for the single offense of
mutilating protected species of trees. Categories of forest code violations such as fraudulent
collection of wood (harvest of fuelwood without a permit) and bush fires, which had been
important in 1986 and 1989, had practically disappeared from the list of prosecuted violations
in Madarounfa in 1990.104
The 1990 fine profile for Madarounfa suggests a shift of code enforcement emphasis away
from commercial wood exploiters and farmers extending or clearing fields through tree
removal to increase crop production and toward herders exploiting trees for forage by lopping
branches. This interpretation is based on the distinction between tree removal and tree
mutilation, the latter being the offense for which almost all fines were imposed in Madarounfa
in 1990. The interpretation is supported by evidence (see above) from the Baban Rafi forest,
where four of twenty-eight herders have been fined for illegal use of forest resources since
1989 compared with one of forty farmers. A 44 percent reduction in forest service revenues
from commercial fuelwood exploitation between 1989 and 1990 also indicates a de-emphasis
on control of wood—as opposed to forage—exploitation.
Evidence to support the interpretation of the shift of forest code enforcement emphasis
discussed above (an interpretation which draws a clear distinction between use of trees by
farmers or wood merchants on the one hand, and by herders on the other) is substantial but,
perhaps, not conclusive. However, it is clear from anecdotal accounts that the recent arrival
of internationally supported forestry projects and activities (such as the NFM project) is
influencing patterns of code enforcement. In general, the influence of the new project's
emphasis on popular participation has reduced the level of policing (i.e., fining) by forest
agents in favor of an increase in extension. It is possible that changes set in motion through
project activities have already reached the more (culturally as well as geographically)
accessible Hausa populations living in villages, but will require more time to reach relatively
isolated herding populations scattered among semipermanent hamlets. It is equally possible
that the isolated Fulani populations represent for foresters working in areas such as Baban
Rafi (that are dominated by a development project) the only remaining niche available for a
particular brand of exploitation.
5.4.4 YET-TO-BE-DEFINED ROLE OF THE NEW COOPERATIVE IN STATE/LOCAL
RELATIONS
It is probably not surprising that by the end of its second year the Baban Rafi Forestry
Cooperative had yet to assume a clear identity. Farmers and herders tend not to distinguish
between the NFm project and the Baban Rafi Cooperative. In fact, the NFM project is an
internationally sponsored effort to slow or reverse resource degradation whose administrative
structures are based in Maradi, Madarounfa, and Niamey, while the cooperative—intended
to function as a self-reliant organization independent of the project as well as of the Nigerien
government—is composed exclusively of forest residents and is based at Baban Rafi. The
common assumption of local inhabitants is that the VMGS of the cooperative and the
cooperative general assembly are at the base of a hierarchy whose next level up includes state
foresters who also participate in the NFM project. In this view, VMGS are a modern form of
the traditional state cooperatives and Samarya councils discussed in chapter 4, and in this
sense they reflect historical continuity.
Nevertheless, since the arrival of the project, village mutual groups have established
themselves as a part of the village-level institutional landscape. Virtually all respondents,
whether farmers or herders, are aware of the VMGS and know that they are intended to105
represent all villagers as well as all herders residing in this western region of the forest. The
vaguely revolutionary potential of the VMGS, as nongovernmental bodies sanctioned by the
state yet semi-independent of it, is hinted at by some of the VMG leaders who speak of
eventual local ownership of the forest. What does not yet appear to be clear among forest
residents is where the VMGS intersect with overall state administration.
Villagers have been conditioned to regard state-sponsored organizations such as
cooperatives and Samarya councils as bodies serving mainly to transmit state directives to
local populations. Participation of the Nigerien state in the NFM project, therefore, signals
to many local residents that VMGS are to take their marching orders from the state, or at best,
from the project. This attitude is changing slowly but noticeably among those most involved
in the cooperative. One currently observes, for example, demands from cooperative leaders
that the western portion of the Baban Rafi forest be legally declared the property of the
cooperative. However, there has as yet been little discussion as to the configuration of a
property enforcement system in terms of state and local participation. A declaration of
property in the current context would be meaningless until nonresident exploiters of forest
resources are made to respect the property rights—an enforcement task well beyond the means
of the cooperative.
For its part, the state does not speak with a single voice concerning its role in a new
forest resource management system featuring a village cooperative. Different foresters display
different degrees of enlightenment in terms of favoring new or traditional policies of forest
resource management and rule enforcement. Moreover, individual foresters may act one way
as representatives of the NFm project and quite another as upholders of traditional forest
legislation. The danger is that the NFm project could be viewed as an aberration in the middle
of a longer-term history of state authority and control.
Neither has a consistently local-initiative-supporting consensus emerged among higher
level state administrators. Well into its second year the legal status of the Baban Rafi
Cooperative was—at least indirectly—questioned by a state official no less important than the
departmental Director of the Environment (DDE). The specific complaint voiced by the DDE
was that the CLUSA agent working with the cooperative was not under the jurisdiction of a
state agency. The DDE's objection led to a brief suspension of the CLUSA agent's activities
in the Baban Rafi forest. From the vantage point of local populations, the event re-introduced
the issue of whether state-recognized legitimacy may be forthcoming in the case of
nongovernmental organizations operating in the Baban Rafi forest. Furthermore, the incident
probably diluted the notion in the minds of villagers—if such a notion had in fact taken
root—that the cooperative is intended as a mechanism for local participation in decision-
making, anymore than are traditional state-sponsored cooperatives and Samarya councils.
5.4.5 CONCLUSION
The Nigerien state has accepted in principle the need to modify its role in natural resource
management so that it becomes compatible with an increase in local control over resource
use. Two matters that show themselves to be in need of attention in the modification process106
as it is unfolding at Baban Rafi are: (1) new attitudes and practices on the part of forest
agents may not be expressed uniformly among the various resource user groups, particularly
between farmers and herders; and (2) the long-term role to be assumed by the state in the
new management system remains an open question. The significance of the former concern
is that any additional (e.g., state) encouragement for local populations to stratify—particularly
insofar as the stratification is accompanied by a widening gulf between the different groups'
perceptions of interests—endangers the capacity of local populations to coalesce into an
effective natural resource management system.
The significance of the latter concern—that state/local relations have been little addressed
and less clarified within a state/local forum—is that the uncertainty surrounding questions of
long-term institutional support to be provided by the state for local organizations creates an
opening for short-sighted exploitation practices. In other words, the old resource management
system could be dismantled before a new system is in place.
Both state agents and forest residents appear to be reserving judgment regarding their
long-term future relationship in the domain of forest management. There are a number of
possibilities, of which the following are only a few examples: (1) both state representatives
and local populations might be biding their time (yet benefiting from the presence of the NFM
project where possible in the meantime) until the end of a project that like others they have
known in the past will one day end, perhaps leaving no lasting effects in terms of stated
goals; (2) the same players might be biding their time until the enormous political changes
currently under way in Niger play themselves out; (3) new alliances may be forming (e.g.,
between state foresters and settled Hausa populations) to the exclusion of certain groups (e.g.,
Fulani) in spite of NFm project efforts to include all user groups in the new management
system; and, finally, (4) the cooperative will eventually be recognized by the state as a
legitimate body that represents the interests of local populations and has the authority to
negotiate according to its interests with the state and others (e.g., the wood merchants of
Maradi). The latter is, of course, the preferred outcome, and the one envisioned by the NFM
project. This outcome is not dismissed by this study as out-of-hand, but rather, as one that
faces many obstacles.
While almost all respondents agree that relations with forest agents have improved as old
enforcement strategies have been relaxed, few expect the sudden appearance of a new
management system capable of preserving the forest. As this study noted at its outset, 76
percent of those questioned believe the forest will eventually disappear, most of them
indicating a time frame of less than ten years. Some respondents expressed surprise at the
suggestion that the new cooperative might halt—or even that it was intended to halt—the
process of forest extinction. The cooperative, after all, is made up only of villagers and
herders—while the demands placed on the resources of the forest greatly exceed forest
boundaries.
Furthermore, most villagers and herders within the project zone are aware that foresters
have been known to act one way within the project zone (within which their rewards do not
depend on the unofficial collection of revenues gained by surprising individuals in the act of107
forbidden resource exploitation activities) and another outside of the zone (a context in which
old habits are relatively unchallenged). This observation shows that change is possible while
at the same time suggesting that the special conditions of a given change are specific to a
particular time and place. The relevant factor surrounding change is whether or not it is
institutionalized, and the relevant factors determining the degree of institutionalization are the
voluntary participation and faith in the system on the part of all the players. Among the most
important of the ingredients required for eventual success will surely be: time, perseverance,
patience, commitment, and probably more time.
5.5 OBSTACLES TO SECURING FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR LOCAL POPULATIONS:
FUELWOOD MARKET
5.5.1 UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE FUELWOOD MARKET AMONG FOREST RESOURCE
EXPLOITATION ACTIVITIES
Pressure exerted on natural forests in Niger as a result of external demand for forest
products adds a layer of complexity to management approaches emphasizing local control.
Whereas the market activities of farmers and herders are not necessarily trivial (and are
becoming ever less so), the commercialization of grains or livestock remains primarily an
extension of a way of life characteristic of the inhabitants of the forest and vicinity rather than
a business. It is true that ten or twenty years ago large fields were cleared in the region of
Baban Rafi for the production of groundnuts for the export market, and that in more recent
years there has been a degree of large scale grain production for market. These exploitations
have been, generally, localized and scattered in their impacts on local populations and on the
ecology of the zone today known as the Baban Rafi forest. The majority of farming and
herding activities in the region are small scale and are motivated more by subsistence needs
than by commercial aspirations—and they are managed by people who live either year-round
or seasonally in the forest or along its periphery. Fuelwood exploitation is unique among
current uses of forest resources at Baban Rafi in its scale, organization and in its characteris-
tic of being externally driven.
Fuelwood is big business in Niger, and its importance is growing. In a 1990 address to
a national conference on village forest management of fuelwood resources, the Minister of
Waterworks and Environment estimated annual consumption of fuelwood in the country at
about 1.8 million tons. This figure represents over 86 percent of energy consumed in Niger
and translates into a per-capita annual fuelwood consumption of about .25 ton. The majority
of fuelwood consumed, adds the minister, is harvested in natural forests. The current forest
code of Niger grants state ownership over natural forests and places the forest service in
charge of administering forests (the Nigerien forest code is described in ch. 5).
The percentage of total fuelwood consumption that is commercialized in urban markets
grows with the size of urban populations. The urban population was estimated at 1.1 million
in 1988, or 15.3 percent of the total population of the country (7.25 million). Estimates of
the current urban growth rate in Niger are around 7 percent.108
The harvest of wood to be sold in markets as fuel provides the government with a
potentially significant source of revenues. State regulation of the commercial fuel- wood
sector consists of collecting a fixed tax applied to units of volume (steres) of wood harvested.
Wood merchants are expected to obtain a permit prior to exploitation. The price of the permit
is fixed by law according to estimates of the normal volume capacity of the particular animal,
cart or motorized vehicle to be used in transporting the wood to market.
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In 1987, the tax per stere of wood harvested was raised tenfold from CFA 35 to CFA 350.
This measure could be interpreted either as a conservation effort or a means to increase state
revenues. If the objective were to reduce wood consumption, the rise in exploitation taxes
should have been matched by a rise in prices to consumers. However, the selling price to
customers in Maradi—subject to the regulatory authority of local officials—remained
unchanged. According to a number of Maradi's wood merchants, repeated requests to the
mayor's office for permission to raise the retail price of fuelwood in Maradi were denied. It
is important to add, however, that neither were there any shortages of market supply noted
in reaction to the tax hike. Evidently, wood merchants have continued to engage profitably
in their trade in spite of the freeze on price hikes at the retail level.
One of the ways in which the fuelwood trade has remained profitable is the ability of
fuelwood traders to dodge the tax. In spite of the apparent maintenance of fuelwood supply
at pretax-hike levels, government revenues from the fuelwood tax did not increase in
proportion to the tax. Although revenues in 1988 (CFA 61,353,157) were more than double
those of 1986 (CFA 27,208,265) and continued to increase to a peak of CFA 75,364,310 in
1989, they came nowhere near increasing by a factor of ten. And in 1990 state revenues from
the fuelwood tax were off 8 percent from the 1989 figure. The figures indicate that the rise
in the fuelwood tax has been serving as an incentive to reduce compliance with state
regulations on the part of wood merchants rather than to reduce fuelwood consumption and
has fallen well short of expectations in increasing government revenues. One study relying
on estimates of total urban consumption of market-supplied fuelwood calculates the
compliance rate (percentage of marketed wood permitted by state collection of taxes) fell from
23 percent in 1986 to 5 percent in 1988 (Ichaou 1991). After rising slightly to 6 percent in
1989, the compliance rate fell back to 5 percent in 1990. The same study believes even these
estimated rates may be higher than actual compliance rates since some studies based on
estimates of wood transported into urban areas (rather than on calculating estimated per-capita
consumption multiplied by total urban population, the latter figure which tends to be
underrepresented in census figures) indicate higher total fuelwood consumption.
5.5.2 DIMENSIONS OF THE MARADI FUELWOOD MARKET
In late 1989, the NFM project undertook an ambitious exercise to collect data concerning
the fuelwood market in Maradi, a market estimated to receive at least 75 percent of its
fuelwood supplies from the Baban Rafi forest. An attempt was made to monitor all wood
107. Relevant legislation includes: Décret 87-037 of 12 March 1987; Arrêré 05 (Ministry of Water and the
Environment) of 16 July 1987; and Arrêré 03 (Ministry of Waterworks and the Environment) of 2 May 1990.109
coming into the city during about a two-week period. Teams of data collectors were placed
at all major entries into the city. Vehicles, ox carts, and animals (mostly camels and donkeys)
were classified according to estimated volume capacities for fuelwood. Information requested
of drivers included location where wood was collected, quantity of wood loaded, and price
paid for the wood and other expenses. The reluctance of some drivers to answer questions,
the suspicion that others were providing misleading information, and the discovery of
miscalculations of wood volumes prompted a decision by the project coordinator to leave the
data collected from this exercise unanalyzed.
However, a component of the data collected treated consumption of fuelwood by
households and businesses. In Maradi, 296 households (about 2% of households) along with
all fuelwood-consuming public enterprises and private businesses identified by the project
(totaling 181) were visited twice a day for a week for weighing of stocked wood to calculate
consumption per meal and per day. A list of households to be surveyed was provided by the
mayor's office and said to be randomly chosen from tax lists. In addition to the weighing,
households and businesses were requested to provide information concerning fuelwood
expenditures and volume consumption. The NFM project coordinator agrees that the collection
of consumption-side data is free of the flaws he noted in the collection of production-side
data. Much of the following information is based on the fuelwood consumption data collected
by the NFM project in November and December 1989.
Project data yield an average fuelwood consumption figure of 49.13 kilograms per
household per week for households containing on average 8.8 persons.
108 Based on these
figures, individual daily consumption is about 0.8 kilograms, and annual individual
consumption, about 0.29 tons—a bit more than the 0.25 tons cited by the Minister of
Waterworks and Environment in an address to the national seminar at Torodi (cited above).
Fuelwood expenditures per household per week are about CFA 824, amounting to annual
expenditures per household of CFA 43,000 ($171)/household.
108. The average of 8.8 persons/household in the survey sample is significantly higher than the figure of 6
persons/household often assumed in calculations of fuelwood consumption in Niger. The most recent full-scale
census conducted in Niger in 1977 indicates an average household size in the town of Maradi of 6.38 persons.
A national census conducted in 1988 based on a 10% population sample indicates an average household size
throughout the department of Maradi of 6.9 persons (6.56 persons in urban areas and 6.97 persons in rural
areas—Maradi town contains 64% of total urban population in Maradi Department). Obviously, the figure of
8.8 obtained from a sample of 2% may not be representative of the general population of Maradi town.
However, it should be noted that there exists a motive for underreporting household members to census takers,
since an annual tax is imposed per household member 14 years of age or older. This motive may have been less
of a factor in the course of multiple visits by project data collectors who appeared to have other interests than
the collection of information for tax purposes. It is also possible that city households tend to increase in size
during the nonagricultural season (the season would have recently ended during the period of data collection in
late-November-early-December). At any rate, there are those who believe that estimated figures of households
multiplied by 6 tend to greatly underestimate urban populations and therefore market fuelwood consumption.
In particular, a study of state permitting of commercial fuelwood carried out by a student working under the
direction of the $nergie II project cites evidence to illustrate that the assumption that the average household
contains 6 members leads to consistent underestimations of total fuelwood consumption in urban areas (Ichaou
1991).110
The size of the population of Maradi town remains as a wild-card figure which reduces
all estimates of fuelwood market size to guesswork.
109 A conservative estimate results from
the extrapolation of a recent figure—say, 1990—from the 1977 estimate of 44,458 reported
in the national census. Based on an urban growth rate of 6.8 percent reported in census data,
one arrives at a population in 1990 of about 104,500. Alternatively, one might take 64
percent (the stated proportion of the department's urban population that resides in Maradi
town) of the total urban population reported in census figures for Maradi Department in 1988,
which yields a figure of 114,000 as the population of Maradi town. In the latter case, the
number of households in Maradi town—17,378—is obtained by dividing total population by
the figure of 6.56, which the census reports as the average urban household size in the
department. It is likely that problems of underreporting leave each of the above estimates as
somewhat lower than the actual population of Maradi town.
The NFM project data provide for calculations of the size of the Maradi fuelwood market
in terms of annual total retail sales based on either individual consumption figures or
household consumption figures, the variation between the two being the result of the large
number of persons per household found in the NFM data (8.8 as opposed to 6.56 based on
official census data). Total annual fuelwood consumption, for example, ranges from 33,000
tons of total annual consumption calculated on the basis of the NFM figure for average
individual consumption to 44,400 tons of total annual consumption based on the NFM figure
of average household consumption. Annual retail value of wood may be calculated as quantity
in kilograms times CFA 16.8 (a figure calculated from NFM data), which puts it in the range
of CFA 554 million ($2.2 million) to CFA 746 million ($3 million), or according to average
household expenditures from NFM data multiplied by total households, CFA 745 million ($3
million). Whichever of these methods of calculation one chooses to gauge the size of the
Maradi fuelwood market, one must then add to the total the annual retail value of fuelwood
purchased by public enterprises and businesses, about CFA 21.5 million ($86,000). The
bottom line is that there are few commercial categories in Maradi Department of greater
importance than the urban fuelwood market concentrated in Maradi town.
5.5.3 CURRENT INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKET SUPPLY: MARADI WOOD MERCHANTS
Considering the volume of wood sold in Maradi, the smoothness with which the market
operates is striking. Although occasionally wood stocks may be depleted at some of the
smaller locations where it is sold—at private homes, for example—there is no evidence that
anything approaching a citywide shortage has ever been experienced. The absence of supply
shortages is in spite of the complaint voiced by the leading wood merchants that while
operating costs rise steadily, local government officials have repeatedly denied requests that
the retail price of wood be increased. Other common complaints suggesting threats to the
109. The Maradi mayor's office declined access to me for research purposes to urban population records
maintained for tax purposes, preferring instead to refer me to the Maradi office of the National Ministry of
Planning, where records are kept of the national censuses of 1977 and 1988. At any rate, it is not at all clear
that access to records kept by the mayor's office would significantly increase confidence in population estimates
based on available information. See also Staatz and Eicher (1986).111
regularity of supply are the regular breakdown of vehicles used by the merchants to transport
wood from the forest and the impassibility of some of the forest roads during the rainy
season. Yet, there is always wood in the market. Sometimes the slack might be taken up by
fuelwood arriving on camelback or in ox carts, both modes of transportation being among
established means of supplying the Maradi market. However, by most accounts wood
merchants equipped with trucks and Land Rovers supply the bulk of the wood on the Maradi
market.
Success in the wood trade requires a significant investment in terms of both institution
building and capital. Most of the leading wood merchants typically maintain a personal
network of regular supply points, each point being managed by the associate of a particular
supplier and dependent on him. The associates are often family members. Suppliers often
express a high degree of obligation to maintain the supply of associated wholesalers and
expect a high degree of loyalty in return. Yet, supplying Maradi's markets with fuelwood is
rarely the sole occupation of a wood merchant and often not even the primary occupation.
Secondary activities include trucking, grain milling, and commercial farming. There is a
moderate degree of movement in and out of the leading positions in wood supply over periods
of several years.
The primary capital investment of the wood merchants is purchase of trucks. However,
the wood merchant must also be prepared to face substantial recurrent costs for truck
maintenance and repair as well as for wood purchase in the forest, labor, and payments of
taxes and bribes. Table 5.2 displays some calculations provided by a successful wood
merchant regarding his nontransportation-related costs per vehicle-load of fuelwood.
TABLE 5.2 Typical expenses of a wood merchant
EXPENSES CFA




Labor (to load) 1,500
Police (at road checkpoint) 1,500
Gendarmes (at road checkpoint) 2,000
Exit tax (collected by mayor's office) 2,000
Subtotal 14,000
Wood purchase price 12,500-16,000
Total
s 26,500-30,000
a. It is important to note that this total does not include transportation-related costs such as
fuel and vehicle maintenance.112
In addition to the costs noted in table 5.2, one must consider that regular fuel sells for
CFA 255 per liter (about $1), and diesel fuel, for CFA 190 per liter. A typical truck might
require as much as 30 liters of diesel to make the minimum round trip (about 100 kilometers)
between Maradi and the northern border of the forest, or about CFA 5,700. Travel within the
forest, repairs, tires, insurance, and so forth add to transportation expenses rather
dramatically.
The figures provided above by a wood merchant are not repeated here as an absolute
statement of expenses incurred for each truckload of fuelwood delivered to the Maradi
market. Like many businessmen everywhere, the wood merchant has a motivation to
exaggerate his expenses as a justification to increasing retail prices (and the businessman
providing the expense list above argues forcefully for an increase in retail prices of
fuelwood). For example, one of the quoted expenses that is very likely an exaggeration is the
wood tax. It was noted above that a study shows the national rate of compliance to the tax
(estimated from revenues collected versus urban fuelwood consumption) was no better than
5 percent in 1990. The same study estimates the compliance rate for Maradi in 1990 at 3
percent. However, in defense of the wood merchant, it is likely that reduced tax collection
translates into increased collection of bribes.
The revenue situation is, perhaps, even more obscure to the outsider than are the
expenses. The main problem is that actual volume of a truckload is difficult to determine
(though undoubtedly the wood merchants have a good idea of how much their trucks can
hold). The tax is set at CFA 350/stere, so the purchase of a permit for CFA 3,500—the
standard permit required for typical truck sizes—should normally set a load at 10 steres. The
wood merchant quoted above states that a typical load is 700-800 bundles. Market data
collected by the NFM project indicate that the average bundle weighs 5.3 kilograms, which
means that 800 bundles would equal 17 steres at 250 kilograms per stere.
"° This would
already exceed the load size permitted by the tax payment. But many observers believe an
average load size for the type of truck under discussion is well over 1,000 bundles, or at least
21 steres. The wood merchant quoted above says he sells the bundles to his wholesalers in
Maradi for CFA 50, a price that is eventually doubled before the final retail sale to the
consumer. If this is the case, the wood merchant collects CFA 35,000 to 40,000 (by his own
calculation of size of load) for a load of wood, the costs of which he calculates at up to
CFA 30,000 before accounting for vehicle-related expenses.
5.5.4 CONCLUSION
The point of the above illustration is not to expose the wood merchants as untruthful (i.e.,
given to overstating expenses and understating revenues) but to gain a glimpse into current
practices and institutions built into the fuelwood trade as it operates in Maradi. It has been
110. Research studies and reports commonly use 250 kg as the weight of a stere when converting between
volume and weight. However, there is no standardized conversion weight one can apply to a stere since different
woods, of course, have different weights. Some researchers work from an average stere weight of 300 or even
350 kg.113
felt by leading officers of the Baban Rafi Cooperative and the NFM project that the wood
merchants of Maradi have been uncooperative and unreasonable in their resistance to entering
into a new partnership with the villagers of the forest. Certainly they have been uncoopera-
tive. However, they apparently feel they have been quite reasonable in protecting their own
interests given current institutional structures and practices. The higher prices the wood
merchants would have to pay for wood collected by the cooperative is regarded simply as
another expense to avoid if at all possible. So far it has been very possible, with one brief
exception,'" to avoid the higher costs of the cooperative. This is, of course, a worrisome
signal in terms of the cooperative's aspirations to gain entry into the fuelwood market. The
cooperative is 100 percent dependent on the wood merchants or some other outsiders with the
means to transport wood from the forest to the market in Maradi. It will be a long time
before the cooperative could hope to have the means to do so on its own.
It appears that the NFM project did not at its outset sufficiently appreciate existing
complications in the way of devolving forest management rights and authority from the state
to local populations in view of the significant rights and authority claimed and exercised by
nonlocal and nonstate agents. This is not necessarily the fault of the NFM project. The pre-
existence of institutionalized fuelwood marketing structures and interests presents a situation
for which theories of popular participation and common property probably do not provide
adequate preparation. It is easy to underestimate the degree to which in the African context
de facto property rights often differ from de jure property rights and management systems.
The central observation is that existing power configurations (in this case, the economic
power of the wood merchants of Maradi) and associated interests simply cannot be ignored,
but must somehow be integrated into the development project's design.
In considering the current institutional landscape in its entirety, one suspects there are a
variety of modifications that might provide the incentive necessary for wood merchants to
cooperate with the forest cooperative, including modifications in tax policies, reduced or
eliminated bribe payments, increases in retail prices, increased patrolling of fuelwood
transportation and trade, and the like. Many of these changes will necessarily involve
collaboration within and across the groups broadly defined as local populations, wood
merchants, and the state. Perhaps the first step is to convince the wood merchants through
words or deeds that changes of the suggested nature are both possible and forthcoming. Their
reaction to suggestions of coming institutional changes remains, for the moment, one of
skepticism.
111. The exception occurred in Jan. 1991 when, following 8 months of stalled negotiations between the wood
merchants and the cooperative/project, political pressure finally built up to the point where the wood merchants
were forced by Maradi's departmental Direction of the Environment to buy the cooperative's wood, stocked at
a site in the forest since it was harvested in March/April 1990. During the short period required to deplete the
cooperative's wood stock, fuelwood loaded on trucks was not allowed to enter the city of Maradi until it was
verified that the wood came from the Baban Rafi Cooperative. The wood merchants, interviewed a number of
months after the incident, maintain they were doing the Direction of the Environment a favor, that they had lost
money in the process, and that they are not in a hurry to purchase wood from the cooperative in the future. The
incident clearly has reinforced the negative views held by Maradi's wood merchants regarding the cooperative
and the project.114
5.6 GENERAL CHAPTER CONCLUSION
The desire to increase local control over forest resources carries with it the assumption
that such a development will lead to more sustainable resource exploitation practices. This
case study of Baban Rafi suggests three categories of site-specific issues that deserve special
attention in light of the twin goals of local and sustainable management: (1) issues embedded
in heterogeneous societies; (2) issues arising in the course of a confusing evolution of
relations between local populations and the state; and (3) issues revolving around the
commercial exploitation of the forest to supply external markets, and reliant on nonlocal
economic resources.
The experience of the Baban Rafi Cooperative to present illustrates that organizations,
management systems and sets of rules do not operate in a vacuum. Local communities are
not simply black holes to which rights may be devolved or in which organizations may be
implanted to accomplish predetermined goals. Policy changes effected at a national level often
encounter unexpected obstacles in the course of their implementation and sometimes yield
unforeseen consequences in the course of interactions with local institutions, practices, and
profiles. The better informed implementation efforts are in terms of the local institutional
landscape, the better the chance that policies will achieve desired results.
However, the primary lesson from Baban Rafi is not uniquely concerned with policy
implementation strategies. The pre-existing institutional environment characteristic of the
Baban Rafi forest, and beyond to the urban center of Maradi, suggest the following: that
policies based on a devolution of forest management authority to local populations are not
assured of being any more effective in preserving forest resources than have been policies
based on state control—unless institutional issues spilling beyond the normal boundaries of
policy implementation come to be adequately addressed. A secure institutional environment
is one in which incentives to participate are attractive and realistic across groups, structures
of authority are understood, and responses to events are predictable. Policy statements may
start the process to increased local control over forest resources, but essential elements along
the way will be both recognition of existing institutions and construction of new ones—the
latter endeavor most likely to succeed when built on old foundations and with their consent
and collaboration. But let there be no mistake concerning the complexity of the task.115
Chapter 6
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It would be difficult to imagine a society undergoing a more rapid social and economic
transition than that currently in effect at Baban Rafi. In the space of a generation many of
today's residents of Baban Rafi have undergone a startling transformation of earlier belief
systems regarding such institutions as religion, household, and community. At the same time,
local populations are steadily increasing their participation in and dependence on market
activities as a complement to (or substitute for) domestic production destined to offset
subsistence needs. In a setting of social and economic dynamism, one might do well to frame
an analysis in terms of trends rather than in terms of current or past structures or
characteristics.
One trend that holds implications for resource management is that which applies to the
resource tenure system. The general observation on this topic is that in the absence of
external intervention, the area currently defined as the Baban Rafi forest is more likely to be
divided among individuals and families than it is to be redefined as community property.
Many residents of Baban Rafi prepare for the future by attempting to expand the base of
resources now under their private control. Such expansion takes place according to informal
(i.e., nonstate) tenure rules currently in effect. The first of these rules is that which upholds
land as the "property" of the clearer. Much of the forest judged to be suitable for farming has
already fallen to this rule. It is unclear how much of the remaining forest will be deemed
worth the effort to clear and claim as property (though in countless sites throughout the Sahel
and beyond extremely marginal lands have been cleared by land-hungry farmers, perhaps to
be abandoned once the soils prove unproductive).
The overall effect of land clearing as it takes place according to indigenous rules is the
"privatization" (along with the physical transformation) of the forest. The trend toward
increased individual and permanent proprietary claims of farmers for the land they cultivate
becomes more pronounced over time in conjunction with a parallel evolution of indigenous
tenure rules. The rules increasingly encourage individual private holdings as they subject
holders to ever fewer claims on the part of the larger community.
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112. For example, a number of the landholders of Baban Rafi lend out parcels because they currently do not
control the necessary labor (i.e., their households do not contain enough members) to keep all their holdings in
production. In some cases, the tenant holder of these parcels is replaced from year-to-year in order to avoid a
build-up of rights that might challenge those of the "permanent" holder, whose claims are based on first clearing
(whether by himself or a progenitor). This is in contrast to a "communal" system in which the village chief or
elders would exert some influence in the distribution of unused parcels of individual villagers—a situation in
which, presumably, the original holder would be less well placed to exert rights to reclaim the parcel at a given
date in the future.116
One observes as well at Baban Rafi the evolution of individual private rights to trees. As
a number of useful tree species become scarce, and as techniques to privately cultivate
particular prized species come to be increasingly accessible (one of the valuable contributions
of such interventions as the NFM project), trees are coming to be valued by farmers for two
significant reasons. First, trees are increasingly viewed as improvements to (i.e., investments
in) landholdings and, therefore, provide a reinforcement to individual rights to the parcel on
which they have been planted or nurtured. Second, trees are increasingly gaining an economic
importance of their own in terms of the marketable products they produce (e.g., fuelwood or
construction wood, leaves, fruits). Given the current stage of evolution,
113 the outright
commercialization of tree products is lagging behind the value added to land on which trees
have been planted as a factor in the privatization of trees. At Baban Rafi it is quite clear that
the presence or absence of planted trees on a particular parcel, and the identity of the tree
planter, play a role in determining claims to the parcel. Therefore, trees are enveloped into
the overall local tenure system regarding agricultural lands as the system evolves toward
privatization.
The still sizable regions of the forest not converted to agricultural use are subject to a
steady onslaught of herders and wood merchants, the latter seeking profits through the supply
of fuelwood to the Maradi market. The tenure system in the forest, therefore, contrasts
sharply with the "privatizing" system of farm tenure. On the basis of historical use patterns,
both herders and wood merchants rival the majority of the farmers of Baban Rafi in terms
of established rights to exploit forest resources.
114 Clearly, from a tenure point of view,
there are significant advantages to exerting property rights on the basis of clearing (i.e.,
transforming the forest to farmland) as opposed to attempting to exert long-term rights to
wood, pasture, or uncleared farmland in the natural forest—a context in which rights are
much less well defined according to existing customary standards. The task of the cooperative
113. I refer here not only to the evolution of the tenure system but also to the evolution of environmental
factors such as the balance between degradation and restoration, which can play a role in determining the
configuration of a particular tenure system. A given profile of resource availability influences the tenure system
by determining the relative scarcity of resources. For example, if baobab trees are abundant throughout the
natural forest, there exists little incentive to plant or claim private rights to individual trees. As the tree becomes
rare, however, a market may eventually develop for its leaves (which are highly prized as an ingredient in
soups), thus creating an incentive to assert private rights to individual trees. Alternatively, claims of private
rights might precede the emergence of the market for a particular product. The few remaining baobabs in the
vicinity of the villages of the Baban Rafi Cooperative are concentrated in private fields and are, in fact, the
objects of claims of private access. A significant market for baobab leaves has not yet developed, howev-
er—perhaps because the quantity of leaves produced is fairly insignificant and generally consumed by the
household claiming the tree.
114. This semantic division of the primary forest resource user groups into three distinct categories is
somewhat artificial. In fact, the nonexclusive nature of the groups (i.e., the same individual may farm, raise
livestock, and harvest fuelwood for market) further muddies attempts to sort out prevailing tenure systems
operating in the context of the trees and the lands of the forest. Nevertheless, the core membership of each group
probably is distinct (e.g., the wood merchants from Maradi direct the harvest of fuelwood and its transport to
market; Fulani herders retain a primary interest in the pasture resources of the forest), and the groups as they
are labeled above do represent competing interests in terms of the use of forest resources.117
is to define and secure long-term rights in the name of the entire forest community: a task
at odds with the ongoing trend toward privatization of rights.
A second trend takes the form of increasing rivalries between groups over access to
resources. Such rivalries are evident both among the populations of the forest (e.g., between
the Fulani and the Hausa of Garin Maigiya or between the Buzu and the Hausa of Mamouri)
and between local and nonlocal populations (e.g., between the cooperative and the wood
merchants of Maradi). Such rivalries present an obvious obstacle to the establishment of a
common property system.
A third trend, related to the second but less apparent, also stems from the heterogeneous
nature of local populations. In this case, the trend is not yet confirmed, though there are
warning signs. The danger results from the susceptibility of existing social cleavages (e.g.,
of a political or an economic nature) to further erosion in the face of change, such as the
change represented by the introduction of a new forest management regime. The risk of such
erosion might result either from unbalanced representation of the various user groups within
the framework of the cooperative or from the unique set of relations between each user group
and an external authority such as the Nigerien state. While the former potential cause of
erosion is self-evident, the latter bears a word of explanation.
The Nigerien state has historically attempted to protect the forest through enforcement of
rules intended to curb exploitation of resources on the part of each of the user groups,
whether farmer, herder, or wood merchant. However, each group exhibits a unique set of
relations vis-à-vis the state, and, therefore, the groups are probably not treated equally.115.'"
Unequal treatment appears to have played a role in the ineffectiveness of rules. There is some
evidence to suggest that in the past the imbalance has discouraged conformity to rules on the
part of marginalized groups who feel victimized (e.g., transhumant herders) and has likewise
promoted disrespect for rules among favored groups who have learned to manipulate the
system (e.g., wood merchants). The cumulative outcome is probably the increased
socioeconomic differentiation of groups that may already, and with increasing justification as
the resource base becomes more contested, be termed "rival" groups.
At the heart of the matter is the proved inability of the Nigerien state to enforce the rules
it has enacted regarding forest resource exploitation, and there is little reason to believe it will
be any more effective in enforcing rules adopted by the cooperative. The resultant arbitrary
and often ambiguous enforcement of the forest code has little helped (and possibly hurt)
efforts to preserve forest resources in general and increases the risk of further exaggerating
politico-economic differentiation between groups through the systematic favoring of one group
over another simply on the basis of relative accessibility vis-à vis the state.
The inability of the Nigerien state to enforce rules is, of course, a compelling reason for
the formation of a local forestry cooperative intended to assume at least some of the
115. This unequal treatment is not necessarily the result of systematic discrimination, but is the inevitable
result of unequal access across groups to information, political influence, or material or economic resources.118
responsibility for rule enforcement. However, each of the trends referred to above presents
an obstacle to the smooth running of a forestry cooperative in the setting of the Baban Rafi
forest. The strategy proposed for the cooperative in its attempt to counteract the trends is as
follows. As an incentive to respect rules, the cooperative is to participate in the formulation
of guidelines to regulate resource tenure and exploitation. The basic principle and ideal would
be that the cooperative serve as a mechanism to ensure that exploitation rights in the context
of the natural forest become secure enough and long-term (permanent) enough to compete
with the long-established and widely recognized rights that result from conversion of the
forest to farmland. The further requirement would be that expected economic benefits from
forest resource exploitation be competitive (in the estimation of local participants) with those
of increased farm production (to result from the supplementing of current farmland with
newly cleared parcels). Both of these requirements suppose not only that stable arrangements
will be arrived at whereby nonlocal exploiters of forest resources respect local claims, but
also that local exploiters respect the claims of each other. The process of arriving at such
arrangements (beyond the creation of a cooperative) has thus far been little specified.
Unanswered questions remain. Residents of Baban Rafi are faced with a variety of options
of which pledging allegiance to the Baban Rafi Cooperative is but one. Individuals or
households might choose, for example, to: (1) participate communally in cooperative activities
and pledge to respect rules; (2) participate individually to transform the forest into farmland;
or (3) participate individually to mine the forest for fuelwood to sell for individual gain (an
option that will exist as long as the cooperative has not gained control over the fuelwood
trade). To the extent that any option but the first is chosen by either residents or nonresidents,
the cooperative will be faced with the problem of enforcement. To the extent that entire user
groups (e.g., herders or wood merchants) decide against cooperation, the task of enforcement
threatens to become insurmountable. The same is probably true if a single user group decides
the cooperative is unlikely to gain the allegiance of another user group, in which case no user
group would be serving its best interests by conforming to rules.
Short of the unanswered question of whether or not local populations would judge it in
their best interests to participate in and respect the rules of a forest cooperative,
116 the
transfer of responsibilities to the populations of Baban Rafi is proving to be a very difficult
matter in organizational and logistical terms. Following is a summary list of the most
important of the research findings at Baban Rafi attesting to the difficulties of establishing a
common property or locally self-reliant regime through a primary emphasis on a policy of
devolution:
► A high rate of population growth promises a steadily increasing demand on the part
of individuals and individual households for local forest resources to be exploited both
116. Although this retains the classification of an unanswered question, the record of participation in
cooperative activities and respect for cooperative goals described in ch. 5 allows for, at best, a guarded optimism
when one considers the long-term prospects for cooperative support and law abidance on the part of local
populations.119
commercially and to provide for subsistence, which intensifies the pressures faced by
the resource management system.
► Whatever the situation in the past (forest management systems of the past in this
region are little understood), current populations are faced with a general absence of
local customs or traditions that might provide a base of support for centralized
regulation of forest resources at the local level.
► A steady increase in the participation of local populations in market relations provides
a variety of options available to individuals and households beyond participation in
a cooperative and submission to cooperative rules.
► The heterogeneity of ethnicities, lifestyles, and work patterns, and therefore of the
interests that guide use patterns of forest resources, present obstacles to consensus
formation.
► The now deep-seated tradition of the state as the recognized authority in all civic and
economic matters, including the use and regulation of natural resources, hinders the
ability of local populations to place a great deal of faith in an institution both lacking
of state representation and organized along the lines of an alien model."'
► The nonlocal concentration of the economic and material means to exploit marketable
forest resources (e.g., wood merchants from the city have trucks at their disposal
while the residents of the forest do not) limits the management options available to
local populations, increases dependence, and threatens the ideal of self-reliance.
The Natural Forestry Management Project at Baban Rafi is actively addressing the
problems outlined above that stand in the way of organizational effectiveness. Such an effort
requires a serious and long-term commitment in view of the complications. It is unclear at
the time of this writing what degree of success may be expected in the long-term.
Nevertheless, even if these problems are overcome, there remain important considerations of
an institutional nature.
I would suggest that issues of de jure ownership within the natural forest are largely
beside the point, at least, for the time being. In fact, the emphasis on designating the natural
forest as the "property" of local populations may serve as a catalyst for conflict, as appears
to be the case between the wood merchants of Maradi who regard with suspicion the
ownership claims by the inhabitants of Baban Rafi that are supported (though not unambigu-
ously) by the state and evolving national policies.
117. As Young et al. (1981, p. 11) remind us: the cooperative model as it was introduced to Africa is, after
all, "alien."120
Finally, and also in the context of institutional considerations, one might reformulate the
concerns touched on above in terms of the twin problems of incentive and authority11
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Regarding the "problem of incentive," the primary interests of local inhabitants regarding the
Baban Rafi forest may be loosely categorized as follows: (1) the forest as a source of
revenues; (2) the forest as a reserve of farmland; and (3) the forest as a source of fodder.
Regarding the "problem of authority," one notes that although popular participation in natural
resource management is the goal both of Nigerien policy and the NFm project, each of the
"interests" noted above must ultimately be subjected to the ecological limitations to be
determined by (presumably) dispassionate scientific research organizations. In other words,
unless projects and policies (e.g., the NFm project; the Nigerien Decree of 16 May 1990) that
otherwise support devolution are willing to allow local populations to set the environmental
criteria applied to resource exploitation (which they are currently clearly unwilling to do),
popular participation in resource management will be limited to: (1) possible input into
decisions concerning the overall production goals in terms of its division between the products
of fuelwood, farmland and fodder; and (2) the distribution among populations of the benefits
that result from forest production and exploitation. The consequent risk is that an uneven rate
of participation in designated structures of resource management (e.g., the cooperative) would
likely lead to nonrepresentative production goals and an uneven distribution of benefits,
resulting in an accentuation both of "problems of incentive" and "problems of authority."
The first "interest" noted above (i.e., interest in the forest as a source of revenues) is the
one currently in ascendance and is the motivation behind the formation of the cooperative.
In part, the centrality accorded this interest results from the existence of authority structures
beyond the borders of the Baban Rafi forest. The authority structures represented by the
Nigerien government, the international community of donors and the NFm project are reacting
to the following (probably correct) assumption: in the long run, the search for revenues from
forest products poses perhaps the greatest threat to the environmental health of the forest.
Demand for fuelwood from Baban Rafi is sensitive not only to urban population growth
(which is increasing at rates in excess of 7% annually), but also to the reduction of stocks of
fuelwood harvested from outside of the Baban Rafi forest. Moreover, the fuelwood market
attracts entrepreneurs from well outside of the forest boundaries (and the attraction is likely
to increase further as stocks go down and per-volume profits increase). In spite of the
pressure on forest resources resulting from exploitation for fuelwood, however, it is not clear
that local populations would have established the same priorities as those upheld by the NFm
project. According to information gathered in the course of this study's random sample
survey, increased agricultural production was considered by the majority of respondents as
of higher priority than either preserving the forest or earning revenues directly from it.
In addition to the question of whether the apparent primary purpose of the cooperative
conforms to local priorities, one must consider that the promise of the forest as a source of
revenues most directly appeals to the individual, or perhaps to the family, as contrasted to
the community. This is not an immutable rule, but, rather, stems from the difficulty inherent
in establishing a resource such as a forest as true common property in a setting that
118. These twin problems are identified and discussed in Lawry (1989).121
apparently lacks a tradition of commonly managed forests.
119 As was illustrated in chapter
2, the settlements of Baban Rafi retain many of the characteristics of pioneer settlements,
including perhaps a greater degree of individualism than might be true in more established
settings. The attempt to establish a commonly managed system in order to obtain what in the
end are individual benefits adds a layer of complexity that may or may not be subverted by
individually minded settlers. One is forewarned of the complications of common property
creation by observers such as Ostrom (1987, p. 263), who refers to common property
regimes in Switzerland and Japan in noting:
These [common property] systems were not created by a single sweeping administrative
reform that set up local councils in all communities. The power of local villages to regulate
their own common properties was wrested from feudal lords during an epoch of struggle.
Trial-and-error methods could be used as villagers became aware of the consequences of the
current rules.
One might well ask whether common property regimes established in the context of
commonly used resources are best described as the exception or the rule. And even if one has
confidence that such regimes will eventually evolve, can the fragile natural resource base of
the Sahel survive the necessary period of trial-and-error?
Such questions are not posed here as an argument against establishing a resource
management system at Baban Rafi based on cooperation. They are intended, however, to
underscore the inherent difficulties in doing so and the long-term commitment that will be
necessary on the part of international donors and the Nigerien state if success is one day to
be achieved. Project planners and implementers might do well to remain flexible regarding
the particular model of social organization best suited to assume responsibilities for forest
management. Although the democratic and egalitarian ideals of a cooperative are appealing,
these ideals do not necessarily correspond to the pre-existing social structures and
heterogenous societies of sites such as Baban Rafi. Nor are these ideals furthered by the
needlessly detailed, formalistic, and hierarchically inclined legislative texts regulating
cooperatives in Niger.
An extremely delicate balance is called for between participation (or, at least,
representation) and voluntariness. As a matter of policy, the entire adult population of western
Baban Rafi holds membership in the cooperative. Yet, if one considers membership to be
voluntary, and if membership bears any relation either to participation or to representation,
reality does not in this case conform to the policy. Perhaps populations should be invited to
define themselves in different ways (i.e., other than as a wood marketing cooperative) and
119. It was noted in ch. 1 that some writers on common property even include the inherent difficulties in
establishing a common property regime as a part of the definition of the term (see Bruce and Fortmann 1988,
p. 2; and Berkes and Farvar 1989, p. 7).122
to form any number of interest groups.
120 Participation, in other words, may be viewed by
potential participants as an investment, and needs to allow for a reasonable expectation of
some return. Special attention will need to be given to marginal groups (i.e., both the "low
profile" user groups described in ch. 5 along with the "high profile" groups that risk
undergoing a process of marginalization) that may be predisposed to low expectations from
participation in an organization dominated by more advantaged groups. The NFm project is
aware of this need and is taking steps to address it, but it remains a persistent problem.
The primary empirical conclusion of this study was stated at the conclusion of ch. 5:
policies based on a devolution of forest management authority to local populations are not
assured of being any more effective in preserving forest resources than have been policies
based on state control—unless institutional issues spilling beyond the normal boundaries of
policy implementation come to be adequately addressed. Whereas among the lessons imparted
by this study is one that states there are no formulas or blueprints available for addressing
such institutional issues as those outlined above, some suggestions of experimental approaches
that might be tried (some of which have been) within the context of the NFM or similar
projects are offered in the concluding section to this chapter.
Among the original intentions in conducting the present study was that its findings
constitute lessons of practical interest to planners and implementors of similar efforts of
natural forest management, especially efforts planned or under way in the Sahel. While
blueprints should be neither compiled nor sought, the preceding discussion helps to illuminate
certain snags encountered in a variety of settings involving natural forest management based
on popular participation. Yet in the condensation of specific principles below, the more
specific the suggestions enumerated, the more they should be understood to be offered in the
spirit of experimentation.
The central operating principle proposed here stems from the observation that policy
changes affected at a national level often encounter unexpected obstacles in the course of their
implementation, and sometimes yield unforeseen consequences in the course of interactions
with local, regional, and national institutions, practices, and profiles. Therefore, the better
informed and more flexible implementation efforts are in terms of the local, regional, and
national institutional landscapes, the better the chance that policies will achieve desired
results. This line of reasoning follows from Montgomery (1981, p. 1), who goes so far as to
call decentralization "more an art than a science."
In spite of the desired emphasis on research and flexibility advocated here, the broad
categories of issues identified in the case of Baban Rafi in increasing local control over
natural resources are very often the same categories of issues that must be addressed at sites
throughout Niger and the Sahel. Details (and, therefore, appropriate reform strategies) vary,
120. This suggestion assumes that some flexibility would be extended by the Nigerien government in terms
of current legal requirements regarding voluntary organizations. As Thomson (1985, p.. 244) reminds us: "All
Niger groups (public and private) must conform with relatively onerous administrative registration requirements
to achieve the status of legal organizations."123
of course, from site to site. Perhaps ironically, even the notion of variability might hold a
useful general application. The purpose of this case study is not only to identify the issues,
but especially to provide a glimpse of their site-specific complexity and interplay with
attempts at institutional reform. A central lesson from Baban Rafi is that innovation,
flexibility and attention to local institutions are much more valuable than blueprints, formulas,
and theories in effecting forest management reforms. This lesson is deduced both from
observations of a high degree of local complexity and the sometimes unanticipated nature of
the interactions between local institutions and introduced reforms.
Devolution is found to be an overly specified rather than a misguided policy. Currently,
Nigerien forests are widely (probably even generally) exploited as open access (i.e.,
nonproperty) resources. Consequently, the long-standing claim by the Nigerien state of
ownership of most forests is, to a large degree, a fiction. In considering devolution to be the
"granting" by the state of rights to local populations, the Nigerien state and the international
community assume a position that suggests the solution to resource degradation is to be found
in an adjustment of a pre-existing de jure system of property rights, thus ignoring prevailing
de facto practices rooted in part in the weaknesses or absence of appropriate extralegal as
well as legal institutions.
A more appropriate focus than devolution would be a focus on the establishment of
appropriate institutions at all levels: local, regional, national, and even international. Such a
framework will include a defined and regulated relationship between local populations,
commercial interests, the state, and the international community. This focus is in contrast to
the emphasis placed by devolution on a decrease in the authority and rights of the latter two
in favor of an increase in the authority and rights of the former.
It is evident that a decision to implement a policy of devolution at a site such as Baban
Rafi leaves many questions unanswered. The initial task of implementation is to identify
"local" populations, and the more daunting follow-up is to aid them in organizing. One
quickly finds that the lines between those possessing established interests and authority
regarding forest resources are not easily drawn on the basis of geography. Further, in the
current context of a long-established state and an increasingly monetized economy, one finds
that the parallels between the portraits of customary land tenure discussed in chapter 1 and
the societies of today's Baban Rafi forest are becoming increasingly tenuous.
Nevertheless, it is also important to recognize that local tenure rules are in force, and
indications (concerning residential land, farms, and the trees thereon) are that they are
evolving toward something resembling private property of their own accord. For example,
one notes that land transfers involving the exchange of cash, though still numerically small
in volume, are probably increasing. More to the point, indigenous tenure institutions such as
the land clearing rule (discussed in ch. 3) provide a locally based mechanism that may
increasingly be used to claim (for the good or the bad) portions of the natural forest as the
private property of individuals. Similarly, rights to trees appear to be moving along the same
road toward privatization.124
The ongoing process of privatization regarding land and trees probably should not be
interfered with. However, the unfolding of the process in the context of the natural forest will
require special attention if ecological goals are to be met. If indigenous rules (e.g., the land
clearing rule) are allowed to continue unchecked in the forest, it is almost certain the forest
will not exist much longer. Moreover, indigenous rules will lead increasingly to conflict and
chaos as resources become scarce. Clearly, devolution is not a complete solution to the
environmental problems of Baban Rafi, just as it is unlikely to present a complete solution
to environmental problems elsewhere.
There is no argument advanced here that should be taken as an attack on the advantages
to be gained from organizing at the local level. The cooperative presents an opportunity to
arrive at novel, democratic, and site-specific formulas of desired resource use by balancing
customary interests against growing commercial aspirations. Considering the diversity
characteristic of forest populations, this is already a tall and delicate order. But just as
important, the cooperative is a forum for interaction between local populations and external
participants in resource management. The cooperative, therefore, should not be considered
(and should not consider itself to be) in isolation of or opposition to external interests. If the
goal is to conserve the forest as a healthy natural system in the face of growing population
pressure and increasing market demand for forest products, the concept of popular
participation in the management of forest resources does not stop at the boundaries of the
forest, but extends as well to the state and to externally based commercial actors, that is, to
all who have established an interest in the forest. One notes optimistically that a promising
initiative sponsored by the World Bank and conceived along the lines urged by this study was
launched in Niger in 1990 under the name of nergie II.
Following is a list of specific steps that are supported by the conclusions of this study and
that might be implemented (as some already have been) on an experimental basis. Some of
these steps presuppose the high level of commitment and support on the part of the
international community noted above. The levels of support called for in order to implement
the following recommendations may be viewed by many as unrealistic, but in my view they
simply reflect the magnitude and complexities of the problem of resource management in the
fragile environment of the Sahel and the lack of simple solutions. On the other hand, it should
be noted that many of these steps are included in the project designs either of the Natural
Forest Management project operating at Baban Rafi or of nergie II operating at the national
level, and some of these steps are increasingly found in the platforms of many other
organizations operating at a growing number of sites.
1. Local organizing, whether according to the cooperative model or otherwise, is extremely
valuable in providing a voice to local populations where such a voice has been long neglected.
Local organizations, however, need to reflect a high level of representativeness in terms of
local populations if they are to be viewed as legitimate and achieve high rates of participation
(i.e., an emphasis on representation of the majority of local populations should act as a partial
safeguard against elite domination). Therefore, consideration should be given to encouraging
the separate development of local organizations in regions in which multiple lifestyles and
occupations prevail (e.g., between farmers and herders, between men and women) in125
recognition of the fact that local populations do not necessarily speak with one voice (see also
suggestion below that local woodcutters could consider forming a trade union). Of course,
such organizations would need to be independently supported and nurtured if they are not
simply to provide an alternative configuration of elite domination. In other words, some form
of advocacy and special support of otherwise neglected groups will be necessary. Special
research into local sociopolitical configurations will be a prerequisite to defining agendas of
this type.
2. The current forest code in Niger is needlessly complicated and largely unenforceable and
should be abrogated in favor of the mobilization of decentralized and flexible units of the
forest service, each supported by international aid agencies or nongovernmental organizations
capable of implementing research programs and establishing regional technical guidelines to
forest exploitation (management plans) in collaboration with local populations.
3. Cooperative legislation is needlessly detailed and restrictive and should be abrogated in
favor of the encouragement and support of organizing according to locally-generated needs
and desires. The corporatist structures of the Development Society and state-directed (as
opposed to state-sponsored) associations should be dismantled. The principle that cooperatives
are to include the entire adult population of particular geographical areas, though laudable for
its democratic leanings, perhaps violates the general cooperative principle of voluntary
membership, and introduces problems of an organizational nature leading to elite domination.
4. No restrictions to tree use that might interfere with the evolving system of private rights
to trees and farmland should be applied to holders of currently occupied residential and
farmland regarding the trees either naturally propagated or planted on these lands.
5. Pressures to expand the geographical limits of agriculture into territories currently
occupied by natural forests might be alleviated to a degree through the provision of extensive
technical aid and extension aimed at supporting appropriate soil management and agroforestry
techniques. If there is "popular" (in the broadest sense) support for it, consideration might
be given to the establishment of rigid limits beyond which agriculture would not be allowed
to expand. However, local populations should not be expected to assume full enforcement
responsibilities concerning such limits, at least not in the early stages of organizational
reform.
6. Adequate parcels should be made available to satisfy the needs of herders regarding
grazing and browse for livestock, perhaps on a rotating basis. A system should be put into
place to diffuse information concerning the location and boundaries of such parcels. It should
be recognized that this is among the most difficult—yet most necessary—of the steps to be
taken, and will require extraordinary efforts in order to secure the participation of herders in
the goal of clearly understanding and taking account of their particular needs and concerns.
7. Exploitation and trade of commercial fuelwood could be regulated as follows:126
a. The state would retain management rights in the domain of natural forests as the agent
responsible for establishing and enforcing the technical parameters of fuelwood harvesting
patterns (e.g., offtake rates and rotations). This is by no means an easy solution since the
state currently does not possess the resources either to determine or to enforce ecologically
sound harvesting patterns, and would require long-term assistance from international sources.
Nevertheless, it is important that the state assume this responsibility since it is unlikely that
any substate entity such as a local cooperative could achieve both the consensus and the
discipline to enforce rules made necessary by environmental limitations.
b. Local transporters of commercial fuelwood (most of whom are urban dwellers) should
be organized into a cohesive and identifiable group that could be easily monitored by the
government. Checkpoints along the routes used by transporters should be reinforced and steps
should be taken to eliminate bribes and other irregularities.
c. Local woodcutters (to be recruited from the local rural population) could be organized
into an organization resembling a trades union that might exist either as a component of or
separately from the cooperative. Fuelwood transporters would be required to recruit
woodcutters exclusively through the local organization of woodcutters. Bargaining would take
place directly between the woodcutters and the transporters but would be monitored and
perhaps mediated by the forest service (as above, supported in its early stages of development
by an international agency).
d. Fuelwood prices would gradually cease to be regulated (i.e., maintained at artificially
low levels) at the retail market and would reflect any taxes imposed on fuelwood exploitation.
e. Fuelwood taxes would be linked to management costs incurred by the state.
Two earlier-stated points bear repetition. First, the rather specifically worded suggestions
noted above are intended for consideration in light of specific conditions at individual sites
more than they are recommended for outright adoption,
121 and, if adopted, a spirit of
experimentation should be retained by the implementors. Second, many of the changes listed
above are already in various stages of implementation at sites such as Baban Rafi or are
represented in policy exercises and initiatives sponsored by such organizations as the World
Bank (e.g., Projet nergie II in Niger) and the Government of Niger. The continued
monitoring of the changes-in-progress promises eventually to advance understanding of
popular participation in natural forest management well beyond that embodied in this paper.
The policy initiatives cited in this study, the supporting literature, and activities
surrounding the implementation of the policies (represented in this study by the NFM project
at Baban Rafi) are genuinely admirable efforts to advance in the global fight against natural
resource degradation. It is far from my intention to criticize or detract from such efforts. The
121. This does not apply to suggestions 2 and 3, which would need to be addressed at the national level and
are beyond the scope of specific sites. Nevertheless, even national policy changes might do well to retain a
classification of "experimental."127
intention is, rather, to contribute toward the illumination of some of the conditions that are
relevant to the effort of natural forest management with popular participation as it unfolds at
the single site of Baban Rafi and, further, to speculate on the findings in terms of the
concepts on which the effort is based and in terms of the potential applicability at alternative
sites of the lessons drawn from Baban Rafi.129
Annex 1
GLOSSARY
Following is a list of terms that commonly appear in discussions related to the topic of this paper.
Such discussions may be conducted within or across diverse bodies of literature whose contributors
may be trained in one or more of a variety of disciplines. Some of these terms have yet to acquire
standardized meanings (e.g., "social forestry" and "community forestry"), others have acquired a
specific meaning within a discipline that may not be evident to readers from other disciplines (e.g.,
"community development,
" "community participation,
" "natural resource management"), while still
others are occasionally misunderstood and misused (e.g., "common property"—especially where the
term appears in literature dated before 1975).
The terms are briefly presented here as a guide to their use in this work. Where a definition has
been borrowed from a published source, the source is noted. I have exercised some discretion in
choosing particular definitions over others. I do not claim that the terms discussed below do or should
carry identical meanings in other contexts.
Agroforestry
Agroforestry is a collective name for land use systems and technologies in which woody perennials
(trees, shrubs, palms, bamboos, etc.) are deliberately combined on the same management unit with
herbaceous crops and/or animals in some form either of spatial arrangement or of temporal sequence.
In agroforestry systems, explains Raintree (1987, p. 50), there are both ecological and economic





One briefly notes here that there are some divergent—and some complementary—thoughts on this
topic. Bromley and Cernea (1989, p. 15) stress the exclusive nature of common property in referring
to it as "private property for the group" or "private property with consensus."' Bruce and
Fortmann (1988, p. 2), while not disagreeing with Bromley and Cernea, nevertheless insist that a basic
characteristic of common property regimes is the difficulty and/or cost of excluding others from
common-pool resources. Each of the aforementioned writers accepts the notion of common property
as exclusive, which is a notion that explains why common property has become the ideal of many
project planners and legislators.
One should not neglect to add, however, that some publications (mistakenly, in my view) continue
to use the term "common property" to signify a nonproperty regime that in this paper is referred to
as "open access." An economics text published in 1992, for example, states the following: "Common
property resources are those that are not exclusively controlled by a single agent or source. If access
122. See also the extended discussion in ch. 1.
123. See also National Research Council (1986, p. 598).130
to these resources in not restricted, the resources can be exploited on a first-come, first-served basis"
(Tietenberg 1992, p. 45).
Community development
The original model of community development assumed that villagers, meeting with community
development specialists, would express their needs and unite to design and implement self-help
programs aimed at promoting rural development; and further assumed that rural development could
be achieved through the direct transfer of Western agricultural technologies and social institutions,
such as local democracy, to the rural areas of the Third World.' Such a definition of community
development anticipates the "basic needs approach" in that it begins to consider development in terms
other than growth of per-capita GNP. The term is conceptually compatible with cooperative formation
and popular participation. Some recent writers refer to community development as a more locally self-
reliant concept (similar to community participation, described below) than is generally understood to
be a part of the original model. In a text published in 1992, Rubin and Rubin (1991, p. 3) observed
that: "Community development occurs when people form their own organizations to provide a long-
term capacity for problem solving."
Community forestry
Community forestry consists of community-based management systems that occur in or around
forests (Grassroots Development 1991, p. 4). Community forestry is distinct from "social forestry,"
which is the planting of trees outside of forest areas, such as on farms or village plots (see social
forestry, below, for reference).
Community participation
"Unlike community development, community participation involves an aggressive critique of
existing power structures and social conditions and requires a far more direct role for ordinary people
in deciding matters affecting their welfare" (Midgely 1986, p. 145).
Cooperative
In its broadest sense, a cooperative is a group of people working together to achieve a common
goal. The goal is understood to be one that is definable in economic (especially commercial or
financial) terms. One notes the following entry for the adjective "cooperative" contained in Webster's
New Universal Unabridged Dictionary: "designating or of an organization, as for the production or
marketing of goods, owned collectively by members who share in its benefits"; and for the noun
"cooperative": "a co-operative society or enterprise; also, a member of such a society or enterprise."
1n the rural setting, the term has been defined as follows: "A `cooperative' is a formal
organization embracing more than one agricultural production unit (household), membership in which
requires that individual production units limit their operational independence, either by making use
of the organization's services in certain aspects of their operation, or by accepting the organization's
intervention in managerial decisions concerning the conduct of their agricultural activities" (Young
et al. 1981, p. 13).
Cooperatives in developing countries are often subject to extensive regulation by governments.
Such regulation is often spelled out in elaborate legislation that defines the dimensions, scope, and
operations of all cooperatives operating within the national territory.'
124. See Staatz and Eicher (1986, p. 48).




Blaikie and Brookfield (1987, pp. 1, 4) point out that degradation signifies a reduction to a lower
rank. The term is conventionally used to indicate a loss in productivity of a resource, most often
considered in terms of agricultural or livestock production.
Desertification
Grainger (1990, p. 7) defines desertification as the degradation of lands in dry areas. The United
Nations Conference on Desertification adopted a definition of desertification as the diminution or
destruction of the biological potential of the land, and added that this can lead ultimately to desert-like
conditions (Grainger 1990, p. 8). The term is generally understood to include the notion that human
societies play a role in desertification (Nicholson 1986, p. 107).
Development
Development has long been understood to be epitomized by industrialization and growing
economies. By the late 1960s, however, such a view was no longer universally acceptable. Dudley
Seers, for example, begins a 1969 essay on the meaning of development with the question: "Why do
we confuse development with economic growth?"' Many definitions of development have,
therefore, expanded the concept to include economic growth as only one of a number of specific and
nonspecific indicators of human welfare: "development is economic growth along with a more
egalitarian access to income-generating opportunities; it is bound up in and necessitates the general
improvement of human capacity and a general reduction of mass poverty and unemployment, together
with enhanced security" (Thiesenhusen 1976, p. 7).
Some recent thoughts on the nature of development have dropped the concept of economic growth
altogether: "[Development is] an expansion of peoples' choices in terms of how resources (in the
broadest sense) are expended; a [growing] capacity defined by what people can do with whatever they
have to improve their quality of life and that of others" (Ackoff 1984, p. 195); or more simply:
"Development is a word that implies movement from a worse to a better situation: `developed' is to
be preferred to `underdeveloped" (Van Arkadie 1987, p. 109).
Development Society
On 29 October 1979, the military government of Niger issued Decree 79-165 to establish a
commission, to be known as the Development Society, to implement a national network of
organizational structures. This action (and its accompanying publicity) to install a democratic and
peaceful—though claiming to be revolutionary—organizational framework to support and coordinate
development and create the institutions needed for progress captured the imagination of domestic and
international developmentalists alike. Government statements depict the new order as one that (1) is
tailored to the mentality of Nigeriens, (2) will provide security against famine, (3) will safeguard
authentic values and civilization, (4) will promote harmonious and dignified development, and (5)
accepts socioeconomic realities and rejects all development models based on universal ideologies
(Niger 1988, p. 13).
126. See Seers (1979, pp. 9-30). As one might expect, Seers rejects the equation of development to economic
growth and instead insists on a normative definition: "Development' is inevitably a normative concept, almost
a synonym for improvement. To pretend otherwise is just to hide one's value judgments" (p. 10).132
Devolution
Devolution is classically explained in terms of its relationship to decentralization and deconcentra-
tion: "There are actually two forms of decentralization—administrative and political. Administrative
decentralization is commonly called deconcentration and means the delegation of some implementing
powers to local levels.... Political decentralization, or devolution, means that some decision-making
authority and control over resources is assigned to regional and local officials" (Bryant and White
1982, pp. 160-61). Thus while decentralization in its guise as deconcentration is generally understood
to indicate a geographical configuration of administrative functions, devolution takes the notion a step
further by including power (autonomous decision-making) as an element to be decentralized.
The association of devolution with the decentralization of power or authority is commonly
acknowledged in the literature. As noted in the report of a conference convened by USAID in 1968
on the topic of the implementation of Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act: "There is a distinction
of course between devolution of authority ... and decentralization of function from the center"
(Hapgood 1969, p. 113). The simple use of the term "decentralization" is noncommittal regarding the
prevailing power configuration.
In addition to an increase in real authority at the local level, it has been suggested that devolution
inevitably implies autonomy and independence (Sherwood 1967). Maddick places devolution and
deconcentration at opposite ends of a continuum measured in terms of tendencies toward hierarchy:
Decentralization—embracing both processes of deconcentration and devolution.
Deconcentration—the delegation of authority adequate for the discharge of specified functions to staff
of a central department who are situated outside the headquarters (hierarchical).
Devolution—the legal conferring of powers to discharge specified or residual functions upon formally
constituted local authorities (non-hierarchical).''
The clear implications are that while devolution confers power on local authorities, at the same time
it reduces the power of the central authority, which no longer may claim a superior position within
a hierarchy. Therefore, devolution constitutes a true transfer of power.
In spite of the efforts found in the literature to standardize the definitions of such terms as
devolution and decentralization, one is cautioned against locking into one or another of the definitions.
As John Montgomery (1981, p. 1) remarks: "Decentralization is more an art than a science.... The
reality of decentralization changes almost as readily as its rhetoric."
In the context of the present study, devolution takes on a slightly more specialized meaning than
indicated in the discussion above. Whereas a classical understanding of devolution tends to consider
the term within the framework of governmental institutions, devolution is used in the present paper
as a handy label for the process of increasing the rights and responsibilities of local nonstate officials
and leaders and, most especially and generally, of local populations. In summary, in this paper the
term most often refers to the decentralization of decision-making (management) authority or property
rights regarding natural resources and, further, to the transfer of authority and rights from the state
to civil populations.
Economic development
The traditional understanding of economic development has been expressed as follows: "Economic
development entails the diversion of a nation's scarce resources and productive powers to the
augmentation of its stock of productive wealth and to the progressive enlargement of its gross and net
national product of goods and services" (Spengler 1961, p. 9).
127. Henry Maddick, Democracy, Decentralization and Development (London: Asia Publishing House,
1963), p. 23, as cited in Sherwood (1967, p. 7)7.133
1t is a recent phenomenon that statements defining economic development often reflect
environmental concerns in addition to the traditional emphasis on growing economies. For example,
the World Development Report, 1991 defines the term as follows: "a sustainable increase in living
standards that encompass material consumption, education, health, and environmental protection"
(World Bank 1991, p. 31; emphasis added).
Farm forestry
The establishment of plantations on individual farms (Grainger 1990, p. 245).
Institutions
Institutions are rules and conventions of society that facilitate coordination among people regarding
their behavior (Bromley 1989, p. 22). Institutions determine the nature and scope of individual choice
sets from within which maximizing decisions will be selected (ibid., p. 5).
Natural resources
Resources are a property of things found in the material and nonmaterial human environment—a
property that is a result of human capability (De Gregori 1987, p. 1243). In other words, resources
do not exist independent of human society, the latter which applies technologies to things and in the
process creates resources. One retains especially the notion that one makes use ofresources—natural
resources signifying usable materials found in nature.
Natural resources management
"If one term can characterize [economic-environmental] thinking during the 1980s it probably is
`resources management.' This term implies beneficial use of natural resources, but use that is
tempered with concern for future generations" (Dixon 1990, p. 6).
Open access
Open access signifies resources existing in a nonproperty regime, that is, the condition of
resources to which access is denied to no one (Bromley 1989, p. 205).
Popular participation
In the context of this study, popular participation signifies especially the involvement of local
peoples in tree-growing, forest-management, or forest-conservation activities and the channeling of
some of the benefits resulting from these activities directly to the participants; this notion provides the
common thread running through the "participative" types of forestry: farm forestry, agroforestry,
social forestry, and community forestry (Grassroots Development 1991, p. 4). One notes that the
concept of popular participation does not necessarily address the question of possible organizational
forms for local participation, an element that is central to the present study based on a project to create
a forestry cooperative.
Property
Property is a social institution that implies a system of relations between individuals: "A property
relationship is at the minimum triadic: the person or other social unit, the object or locus of scarce
values, and the potential challenger to `rights.' Property relationships may also be very complex, with
various social units holding common or diversified rights in the same locus of value, varying rights
of disposal, transfer, use, and appropriation of increase" (Moore 1961, p. 64).
Property has also been described as a socially recognized claim on something of value, allowing
for a secure set of expectations related to a particular benefit flow. It is the expectation that134
matters—an expectation sanctioned by the collectivity and enforced by the collectivity (Bromley 1989,
p. 203). It is important to recognize that "property" designates a set of social relations in which the
key element is the right to exclude resource access to others. This function is accomplished in
industrialized countries primarily through a legal system designed to support and protect private
property holdings.
Rational/rationality
Use of this term within the present study is not rigorously based on a strict reading of neoclassical
economics, but rather is based on the spirit articulated by Adam Smith in the phrase: "private vices
yield public benefits" (Friedmann 1987, p. 19). Such a spirit permeates neoclassical economic
literature as well as much of the recent natural resource management literature.
In neoclassical economics the term most often is used as a label applied to the basic assumption
of economists regarding consumer behavior. A representative definition of the term is as follows:
"Given the consumer's tastes, we assume that he or she is rational, in the sense that he or she tries
to maximize utility" (Mansfield 1985, p. 53; emphasis in original). A second foundational assumption
of neoclassical economists—that producers generally act to maximize profits—is also included in the
notion of rationality as it is used in this study. The maximizing tendencies and strategies of consumers
and producers in terms of utility and profits are here lumped together under the phrase "best interests"
or "self-interests." The general principle is simply that resources at hand are expended according to
the judgments of consumers and producers seeking to obtain the highest level of benefits possible on
the basis of available information. Best interests are revealed through the behavior of individuals (or
groups) acting rationally.
Friedmann terms the unrestrained pursuit of self-interest by individuals and corporations as
market rationality (according to which doctrine "the individual is assumed to be logically prior to
society, and the satisfaction of material needs is said to be the principal reason people live in social
groups") and contrasts it to social rationality (which assumes that social formations are logically prior
to the individual) (Friedmann 1987, p. 20). Clearly, the doctrine of market rationality is that which
guides much of neoclassical economic and conventional development thought and thus constitutes the
brand of rationality referred to throughout this paper.
Sahel
The word "Sahel" is derived from the Arabic term for margin or shore (Delehanty 1988,
p. 45).
1' It has become a place-name commonly used to indicate a zone, approximately 200 to 400
kilometers wide, extending along the southern border of the Sahara desert from the Atlantic seaboard
to the Indian Ocean and described by some as: "an eco-climatically autonomous region, largely defined
by its highly variable precipitation and its characteristic therophyte ('summer prairie') vegetative
communities, and roughly bracketed by the 100 and 500 millimeter isohyets" (Gritzner 1988,
pp. 3-4).
As a political designation, the term is used to indicate the portion of the zone described above that
is in West Africa. The countries containing significant portions of territory considered to be within
the West African Sahel are known as the Sahelian, or CILss countries—the latter by virtue of their
formation into an organization called the Comité Permanent Inter-États de Lutte contre la Secheresse
dans le Sahel (Permanent Committee to Fight against Drought in the Sahel, CILSS), which includes
the following countries: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, and Senegal.
128. For a good summary of climatic and biotic features, topography, and soils of the Sahel, see Delehanty
(1988, pp. 45-58).135
Samarya
In the modern context, Samarya—along with cooperatives—is one of the pre-existing base
institutions of the Development Society. The Samarya network is the expression of a national policy
to promote collective work at the village level. The name signifies traditional youth organizations
active in political struggles against the French colonizing state in the late 1940s and 1950s and banned
as a result of such activities. It was rehabilitated in 1975 by the military regime in power in Niger
since the coup d état of April 1974. 1n its reincarnation as a national movement sponsored by the
government of Niger, Samarya has little other than its name to tie it to its origins in traditional
society.
Social forestry
Social forestry is the planting of trees by local communities outside regular forest areas (Grainger
1990, p. 217).
Sustainability
Sustainability is used here to signify a condition in which exploitation of a resource, of a group
of resources, or of an ecological zone does not exceed regeneration of the resources nor does it
prevent maintenance of the ecological zone in a nondegraded state.
Sustainable development
Sustainable development is defined by the World Commission on Environment and Development
(1987, p. 43) as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs.
Tenure
Tenure is the set of rights which a person or some private or public entity holds in land or trees
(Bruce 1990, p. 1). One commonly refers to these rights as a bundle that can be broken up, redivided,
passed on to others, and the like (Riddell 1987, p. 2).137
Annex 2
LEGISLATIVE TEXTS
The following legislative texts were consulted in the course of this study. Brief descriptions of the
laws that appear as part of the headings of the official documents are included below, following the
law identification code and date. Abbreviations are explained in the list of abbreviations (see p. x).
Arretd 05/MHE/DFF, 16juillet 1987
Portant application de 1'Ordonnance 87-011 du 12 mars 1987 relative a la délivrance du permis
de coupe de bois et du Décret 87-037/PcMs/MHE du 12 mars 1987 portant tarification des redevances
perçues a 1'occasion de la délivrance du permis de coupe de bois.
Arrêté 03/MHE/DE, 5 février 19%
Modifiant 1'Arreté 05/MHE/DFF du 16/07/87 portant application de l'Ordonnance 87-011 du 12
mars 1987 relative a la délivrance du permis de coupe de bois et du Décret 87-037/PcMs/MHE du 12
mars 1987 portant tarification des redevances perçues a l'occasion de la délivrance du permis de coupe
de bois.
Arrêté 048/MAG/EL/CNcR, 16 mai 1990
Détaillant les droits d'usufruit accordés aux communautés villageoises qui participent a la gestion
des ressources naturelles de leurs terroirs (see annex 3).
Décret, 20juillet 1900
Rélatif au régime forestier du Sénégal et dépendences.
Décret, 23 octobre 1904
Portant organisation du domaine en Afrique Occidentale Française.
Décret, 4 juillet 1935
Sur le régime forestier de 1'Afrique occidentale française.
Décret 72-88 MER/MI, 20juillet 1972
Portant interdiction de la chasse au Niger.
Décret 74-226 PCMS/MER/CAP, 12 aotlt 1974
Fixant les conditions d'application de la Loi 74-7 du 4 mars 1974 fixant le régime forestier.
Décret 79-05 PCMS/MDR, 18janvier 1979
Portant application de 1'Ordonnance 78-19 du 12 octobre 1978 portant statut des organismes
ruraux a caractère coopératif et mutueliste.138
Décret 87-037 PCMS/MtHE, 12 mars 1987
Portant tarification des redevances perçues a l'occasion de la délivrance du permis de coupe de
bois.
Loi 74-7, 4 mars 1974
Fixant le régime forestier
Ordonnance 74-16, 23 août 1974
Modifiant et complétant la Loi 74-7 du 4 mars 1974 fixant le régime forestier.
Ordonnance 78-19, 12 octobre 1978
Portant statut des organismes ruraux a caractère coopératif et mutueliste.
Ordonnance 87-011, 12 mars 1987
Relative A la délivrance du permis de coupe de bois.139
Annex 3
COMPLETE TEXT OF DECREE OF 16 MAY 1990
(recent legislation favoring devolution)
ARRÊT  NO. 048/MAG/EL/CNCR DU 16 MAI 1990
détaillant les droits d'usufruit accordés aux communautds villageoises
qui participent a la gestion des ressources naturelles de leurs terroirs
ARTICLE premier
Afin d'encourager la gestion participative des ressources naturelles, et dans le souci d'une
exploitation rationnelle, faite dans le respect des normes techniques établies ou a établir, les droits
d'usufruit ci-après sont accords aux communautés villageoises participantes a la gestion des
ressources forestidres de leurs terroirs: prélèvements de tous les assortiments de bois (bois d'oeuvre,
bois de service, bois-énergie) ainsi que prélèvements des écorces, des feuilles, des fruits, des produits
d'exsudation, des plantes médicinales, des plantes alimentaires, et de tout autre sous produit forestier.
ARTICLE 2
L'établissement des normes techniques d'exploitation des ressources forestidres (plan de gestion)
de chaque site géré dans le cadre d'une activité de développement, incombe, en collaboration avec les
communautés villageoises intéressées, a la structure chargée, au niveau dudit site, de 1'encadrement
et du suivi des populations bénéficiaires.
ARTICLE 3
Le bénéfice de l'exploitation des ressources forestidres visées a l'ARTICLE 1 est réservé en priorité
aux communautés villageoises des sites concernés. Cependant, s'il est déterminé que la participation
desdites communautés n'est pas suffisante pour permettre d'atteindre les objectifs sylvicoles pouvant
être attendus (cas de sous exploitation liée a une importance des ressources), le prélèvements sera
permis, selon des modalités a convenir, a des personnes autres que celles des sites.
ARTICLE 4
11 peut être provisoirement mis fin a 1'exploitation: s'il est déterminé que les objectifs sylvicoles
sont satisfaits pour l'année, c'est a dire que toutes les ressources exploitables pour l'année (possibilité
de la forêt) ont été prélevées; si la manière d'exploiter n'est pas conforme aux normes sylvicoles
prescrites dans le plan de gestion. Dans ce cas, la structure d'encadrement et de suivi tiendra des
réunions avec les communautés villageoises pour resoudre les non conformités.
ARTICLE 5
Au niveau de chaque site géré, le Conseil sous Régional de Développement concerné sera arbitre
dans le cas de désaccords non résolus ou des interpretations différentes de documents entre les
communautés villageoises et la structure d'encadrement et de suivi.
ARTICLE 6
Les droits d'usufruit fixés par le présent arrêté seront pris en consideration par le Code Rural.140
ARTICLE 7
Les préfets, les sous-préfets, et le Directeur de 1'Environnement sont chargés de faire appliquer
le présent arrêté qui prend effet pour compter de sa date de signature et qui sera publié au Journal
Officiel de la République du Niger.
English translation 
of
DECREE NO. 048/MAG/EL/CNCR OF 16 MAY 1990
ARTICLE 1
In order to encourage participatory management of natural resources, together with a concern for
their rational exploitation following established (or to be established) technical norms, the following
usufruct rights are granted to village communities that participate in forest resource management on
their traditional lands: harvesting of all types of wood (timber, building poles, firewood) as well as
bark, leaves, fruits, gums, medicinal plants, food plants, and all other secondary products.
ARTICLE 2
The establishment of technical norms for the exploitation of forest resources (e.g., a management
plan) for each site managed as part of a development program is the responsibility of the
institution1
30charged with the training and follow-up of the participating communities.
ARTICLE 3
The benefits incurred from the exploitation of forest resources mentioned in ARTICLE 1 are
reserved in priority for the involved village communities. However, if it is determined that the
community is incapable of attaining the harvest objectives set out in the management plan (i.e., in case
of underexploitation of significant available resources), harvests will be permitted, according to
suitable procedures to be established, by persons outside of the village communities.
ARTICLE 4
Harvesting operations can be temporarily suspended:
► If it is determined that silvicultural objectives have been met for the year (i.e., all of the
exploitable resources for the year have been removed).
► If harvest methods do not conform to silvicultural norms prescribed in the management plan.
In this case, the institution responsible for training and follow-up will hold meetings with the village
communities to resolve this problem.
ARTICLE 5
At each management site the Sub-regional Development Council will arbitrate all unresolved
conflicts or differences of interpretation of the management plan between the village communities and
the institution responsible for training and follow-up.
129. Following is the unofficial translation included in Rands (1990).
130. Institution in this context could be a government service, a nongovernmental organization, or any
combination of public and private development organizations.141
ARTICLE 6
Usufruct rights established by this decree will be recognized by the Rural Code.
ARTICLE 7
Préfets, sous Préfets, and the Director of the Environment are instructed to implement the present
decree, which takes effect on the date of signature and which will be published in the Official Journal
of the Republic of Niger.143
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